USAAF Attack & Light Bombers: Needs & Desires

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drgondog drgondog M MIflyer

This is something that was mentioned in another post about how the RAF's Desert Air Force campaigns showed that there was a preference for two types of aircraft: The first was a fast-attack fighter that was agile and capable of air-superiority, recon, and close air support; the second was a fast-attack bomber.

It appeared that the RAF adopted this around 1941-42: When did the USAAF start to adopt this idea and fully implement it? I'm curious if this was about the same time or significantly earlier (and by that, I mean at 1-3 months as a starting point) that the decision was made to abandon dedicated light-attack aircraft, and if there was a significant difference, if that had to do with bureaucratic inertia or varying points of view?
 
drgondog drgondog M MIflyer

This is something that was mentioned in another post about how the RAF's Desert Air Force campaigns showed that there was a preference for two types of aircraft: The first was a fast-attack fighter that was agile and capable of air-superiority, recon, and close air support; the second was a fast-attack bomber.

It appeared that the RAF adopted this around 1941-42: When did the USAAF start to adopt this idea and fully implement it? I'm curious if this was about the same time or significantly earlier (and by that, I mean at 1-3 months as a starting point) that the decision was made to abandon dedicated light-attack aircraft, and if there was a significant difference, if that had to do with bureaucratic inertia or varying points of view?
A complex question. The evolution of battlefield air for US morphed from Army doctrine of battlefield Observation/short recon in the mid 30s to fast attack/fast reconnaissance in 1940 with the advent of the A-20 and the implied promise of the P-39 and P-40. That said, the Army still insisted on light s/e observation, while recognizing that the NAA O-47 was a 'tweener' with greater range but increasingly vulnerable - and no bomb capability,

Political pressure on Arnold 1940-41 to adopt Wermacht/LW model of Ju 87 dive bombing and light/medium attack bombers for tactical support. That triggered adoption of the A-24 and A-25, but even without the experience of combat (for US) it was clear that air superiority was required for survival of classic dive bomber - which led to a requirement that the single engine attack aircraft should not only be capable of carrying bombs but be capable of defending itself.

Coningham's Desert Air Force tactics with heavily armed Hurricanes and various light bombers in the African campaigns was watched closely by the AAF Close Air Support Directorate in 1941 which led to driving Materiel Command to solicit concepts including the selected Brewster XA-32. His (Coningham's) report re: use of fighters in tactical use to Montgomery, landed in CAS Directorate in Dec 1941.

Prior to December, NAA's primary beltway bandit (I have to look up his name) was very well connected to War Department planners and began shaping the argument (with Kindelberger/Atwood) that a modified Mustang design to provide bomb capability, heavy armament and dive bombing capability could compete for Dive Bomber funding remaining for FY 41.

An important 'behind the scene' player was General Lawrence Kuter. He could be considered the most respected 'theoretician' in AAF, shaped the concept that "gaining air superiority is the first requirement for the success of any land based operation'. He was the author of FM 100-20 and shaped the doctrine that the air war superiority must be won by fighters - not bombers. Kuter also was CO of 1st BW, 8th AF and a strong supporter of LeMay's concepts regarding lead crews in Dec 1942, then took command of AAF MTO Allied Air Support Command in Jan 1943.

There were many moving parts in the transition from Observation to Fast Attack. The full implementation could be marked by the introduction of bomb carrying capability for P-39/P-40, replaced by A-36, then replaced by P-51A/P-47 but for a time, the P-51B was scheduled to be the Battlefield Fast Attack/Recon fighter. So the answer to your question of implementation for US? Mid 1943
 
The USAAF did not abandon attack aircraft until tests of XA-41, which resembled the AD Skyraider's fatter, uglier sister. They concluded that compared to the P-51, P-47, and P-38 the A-41 could not defend itself nor be used for air superiority. Bombed-up fighters could do just about as good as dedicated attack aircraft and after they dropped their bombs could do air combat. So the "A" designation went away and the USAF found itself in the unfortunate situation of having to scramble to find enough F-51's to do CAS that were already in the theater until a bunch of Mustangs could be referbed and shipped over from the USA.

The Mustang was not at all the best attack aircraft for the mission in Korea but it was all they had. Jets did not have the range or bombload. The USN was much better off with the F4U and AD. The F-47N would have been much better than the F-51 but they had been phased out. P-47's stored at Tinker AFB Ok were sold at prices so cheap that selling the fuel in the airplanes enabled the buyer to pay for them. The F-82 would have been good but all they had were night fighters.

The A-26 replaced the A-20, B-25 and B-26, but in Korea it was used in strike and interdiction roles rather than strafing and CAS, in other words, level bombing and some rockets.

Vietnam finally forced the USAF to realize they needed some "A" airplanes.
 
The USAAF did not abandon attack aircraft until tests of XA-41, which resembled the AD Skyraider's fatter, uglier sister. They concluded that compared to the P-51, P-47, and P-38 the A-41 could not defend itself nor be used for air superiority. Bombed-up fighters could do just about as good as dedicated attack aircraft and after they dropped their bombs could do air combat. So the "A" designation went away and the USAF found itself in the unfortunate situation of having to scramble to find enough F-51's to do CAS that were already in the theater until a bunch of Mustangs could be referbed and shipped over from the USA.

The Mustang was not at all the best attack aircraft for the mission in Korea but it was all they had. Jets did not have the range or bombload. The USN was much better off with the F4U and AD. The F-47N would have been much better than the F-51 but they had been phased out. P-47's stored at Tinker AFB Ok were sold at prices so cheap that selling the fuel in the airplanes enabled the buyer to pay for them. The F-82 would have been good but all they had were night fighters.

The A-26 replaced the A-20, B-25 and B-26, but in Korea it was used in strike and interdiction roles rather than strafing and CAS, in other words, level bombing and some rockets.

Vietnam finally forced the USAF to realize they needed some "A" airplanes.
Materiel Command labored on fat, ugly sisters until an Army Board convened in early 1943 to evaluate attack fighter existing production aircraft (A-24, A-25, XA-32, etc) alternatives to P-39, P-40 and P-51/A-36, recommended that MC 'cease and desist from developing slow battlefield attack aircraft.

The Mustang gets a little too much criticism compared to 'alternative P-47 and P-38' as well as F4U. The loss/sortie rate of the P-51D in Korea was just barely above the F4U and average mission distance was far greater, particularly in first year of Korean War when missions were flown from Japan. In context of 'less vulnerable', the F6F was superior to all of them save the AD.
 
One F-51 pilot in Korea summed it by saying, "I was ready to buy a P-47 with my own money, if I could have found one."

Another said he would have rather been flying the P-40 in Korea.

But...... Note this is November 1945.
Aviation_Week_1945-11-26p11.jpg
 
A friend of mine, a lover of old airplanes, said that in the late 50's he went over to a junkyard in SW Florida and they still had P-40's stacked up on their firewalls like that picture shows. What could you have bought some for? Maybe $50 to $100 each? In 1955 the USN sold off their F8F Bearcats for $500 each.

Years later, the early 70's, another friend of mine bought an F-80 in a junkyard in Florida. I think he paid $500 for it.
 
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The evolution of battlefield air for US morphed from Army doctrine of battlefield Observation/short recon in the mid 30s to fast attack/fast reconnaissance in 1940 with the advent of the A-20 and the implied promise of the P-39 and P-40. That said, the Army still insisted on light s/e observation, while recognizing that the NAA O-47 was a 'tweener' with greater range but increasingly vulnerable - and no bomb capability,
I do remember the USAAC had observation planes that included single & twin-engined designs. I'm guessing the singles were light-observation?

Regardless, I figure the idea was that they preferred to do away with the observation planes and have the role handled by fighters and light-bombers?

Political pressure on Arnold 1940-41 to adopt Wermacht/LW model of Ju 87 dive bombing and light/medium attack bombers for tactical support. That triggered adoption of the A-24 and A-25, but even without the experience of combat (for US) it was clear that air superiority was required for survival of classic dive bomber
It was also required for the four-engined heavies too (something I could imagine would have been wildly unpalatable) unless they were going to operate at night (and even the RAF used night-fighters to support their bombers).

I'm curious if the USAAF took heavier losses with their A-24's compared to the USN/USMC's SBD's. I'm curious because if the loss rates were higher for the USAAF, it would indicate one of the following.
  • A-24 tactics and training could be a problem.
  • The targets the A-24's are sent after may not be the same ones the USN/USMC are sent after.
  • Fighter cover is not provided in the same way.
Nobody's going to argue with the idea of using fighters, and the timing (12/1941) could not have been more perfect.
An important 'behind the scene' player was General Lawrence Kuter. He could be considered the most respected 'theoretician' in AAF, shaped the concept that "gaining air superiority is the first requirement for the success of any land based operation'. He was the author of FM 100-20 and shaped the doctrine that the air war superiority must be won by fighters - not bombers.
Usually that implies sweeping the skies of enemy fighters so the bombers can hammer the hell out of what they need to, correct?

The USAAF did not abandon attack aircraft until tests of XA-41, which resembled the AD Skyraider's fatter, uglier sister. They concluded that compared to the P-51, P-47, and P-38 the A-41 could not defend itself nor be used for air superiority.
The XA-41 had a number of problems (range & speed). The Skyraider was able to carry more payload (2000 vs 1000 lb.) over greater range, though I'm not sure what range the USAAF deemed essential and preferable.
The A-26 replaced the A-20, B-25 and B-26, but in Korea it was used in strike and interdiction roles rather than strafing and CAS, in other words, level bombing and some rockets.

Vietnam finally forced the USAF to realize they needed some "A" airplanes.
Yep.
 
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One F-51 pilot in Korea summed it by saying, "I was ready to buy a P-47 with my own money, if I could have found one."

Another said he would have rather been flying the P-40 in Korea.

But...... Note this is November 1945.
View attachment 639223
One F-51 pilot in Korea summed it by saying, "I was ready to buy a P-47 with my own money, if I could have found one."

Another said he would have rather been flying the P-40 in Korea.

But...... Note this is November 1945.
View attachment 639223
Unfortunately for the guy that said he would rather have flown the P-40 in Korea, his logic engine wasn't working too well. For early FB missions his first trip with a 500 pound bomb puts him in the water between Japan and Korea on his return trip. For the P-47 drivers, you could get there and back to middle S.Korea with one 1000 pound bomb and one 150 gal fuel tank. P-47N could Match load and range of the P-51D w/ 1000# plus 160 gal tank.

The decision to use the P-51D in Korea was simple, actually. There were several FBG/FG equipped with P-51D in Japan as well as ROC on peninsula. SAAF and RAAF were equipped with P-51D. Common training, common logistics (in a pinch) for all four of the theatre air forces.

There were zero P-47N FG - all reserve, closer that US. There were more National Guard P-51 equipped Groups. Training and Logistics once again. I would have to look, but wonder how many depot stored spare parts or engines (R-2800-57) were available for P-47N
 
According to the book "F-51 Units Over Korea" FEAF listed no F-51's on its inventory when the Korean War started. They did have Mustangs that had been used for target towing and they managed to round them up; they found about 10. And even in the earliest days of the war there were F-51's in South Korea flying CAS missions barely outside their airfield perimeter; P-40's would have done just fine. Mustangs pretty much flew out of Korea, not Japan.

FEAF quickly brought about 30 retired Mustangs they had had sitting around the Pacific up to operational status and transferred pilots from other units to fly them. Meanwhile, 145 F-51's were quickly referbed and put on the USS Boxer CVE, which headed for Korea with the throttles wired to Full Power.

There was a NZ unit flying Mustangs in the area; they had been ordered home. That was changed right away.

By the way, in his book Fork Tailed Devil Martin Caiden claims that there were 50 P-38's that had been retired so the unit could equip with F-51's. But the US State Dept objected to the ROK Air Force from being equipped with the surplus Lightnings for fear of offending the North Koreans. And as a result the P-38's were destroyed with bulldozers, which is really too bad since 50 P-38's could have done wonders in the early days of the North Korean invasion. In reality, the 49th FG did have P-38's at the end of WWII and did stay in the far east, but they reequipped with Mustangs YEARS before the Korean War started and in fact had converted to F-80's by the time things got hot, yet another F-51 unit that Was Not There.
 
According to the book "F-51 Units Over Korea" FEAF listed no F-51's on its inventory when the Korean War started. They did have Mustangs that had been used for target towing and they managed to round them up; they found about 10. And even in the earliest days of the war there were F-51's in South Korea flying CAS missions barely outside their airfield perimeter; P-40's would have done just fine. Mustangs pretty much flew out of Korea, not Japan.

FEAF quickly brought about 30 retired Mustangs they had had sitting around the Pacific up to operational status and transferred pilots from other units to fly them. Meanwhile, 145 F-51's were quickly referbed and put on the USS Boxer CVE, which headed for Korea with the throttles wired to Full Power.

There was a NZ unit flying Mustangs in the area; they had been ordered home. That was changed right away.

By the way, in his book Fork Tailed Devil Martin Caiden claims that there were 50 P-38's that had been retired so the unit could equip with F-51's. But the US State Dept objected to the ROK Air Force from being equipped with the surplus Lightnings for fear of offending the North Koreans. And as a result the P-38's were destroyed with bulldozers, which is really too bad since 50 P-38's could have done wonders in the early days of the North Korean invasion. In reality, the 49th FG did have P-38's at the end of WWII and did stay in the far east, but they reequipped with Mustangs YEARS before the Korean War started and in fact had converted to F-80's by the time things got hot, yet another F-51 unit that Was Not There.
You are correct about opening day inventory. Both the 18th and 35th FG had just transitioned from F-51Dto F-80C (I had forgotten that) and all the pilots were Mustang rated - but the US shipped 145 plus and reequipped both groups w/F-51D. The 8th FG also transitioned to F-51 and the 49th transferred to Korea, then western states ANG units with Mustangs were transferred to Korea.
 
drgondog drgondog M MIflyer P pbehn S Shortround6

I'm curious about two things that I can't seem to pin down

A-26: I've seen combat radius figures ranging all over the place: Most sources seem to list around 560-720 miles (range of 1400-1800 miles) with 3000 lb. of bombs onboard; two Characteristics Summary sheets list 790-839 nm. @ 198-200 kn. (TAS) w/ 4000 lb. onboard. I assume the typical cruise speed is higher than the last item (different figures in various searches indicate around 265-275 mph)

XB-42: Maximum load-factor. I have no figures. It was said to be quite maneuverable and was said to fly like a Mosquito, but people said the A-26 could turn inside an Me-109 and that's not true (that said, they were able to turn into an Me-109 attack and sometimes disrupt their attacks).
 
A-26: I've seen combat radius figures ranging all over the place: Most sources seem to list around 560-720 miles (range of 1400-1800 miles) with 3000 lb. of bombs onboard; two Characteristics Summary sheets list 790-839 nm. @ 198-200 kn. (TAS) w/ 4000 lb. onboard. I assume the typical cruise speed is higher than the last item (different figures in various searches indicate around 265-275 mph)
First thing you need to find is the gross weight. Saying varied is charitable. Normal Gross weight was 26,000lbs according to one source, but with a basic empty weight of 22,300 that is not realistic. Combat max gross was 35,000lbs. Max internal fuel was 925 gallons.
A book I have on the A-20 (so secondary or further out?) source gives 3 different ranges with the power used listed.
42in/2400 rpm max continuous power, range 780 miles at 334mph true (290 KTAS). 12,000ft
30.5in/2200rpm "normal" power, range 1,365 miles at 296mph (258 KTAS)(includes warm up and climb) 12,000ft
29/1950rpm (10,000ft) Max range 1710 miles at 255mph (222 KTAS)((includes warm up and climb)

A-26 had two main tanks at 200 gal each, two aux tanks at 100 gal each all in the wing. There was a 125 gal bomb bay tank, a 625gal bomb bay ferry tank, a 125 gal fuselage tank or two 165 gal under wing drop tanks.

You are going to need a spread sheet ;)
 
Have you looked at the actual A-26/B-26 manuals and the associated performance charts?

And note that many of the postwar models had one or both of the turrets deleted.
 
drgondog drgondog M MIflyer P pbehn S Shortround6

I'm curious about two things that I can't seem to pin down

A-26: I've seen combat radius figures ranging all over the place: Most sources seem to list around 560-720 miles (range of 1400-1800 miles) with 3000 lb. of bombs onboard; two Characteristics Summary sheets list 790-839 nm. @ 198-200 kn. (TAS) w/ 4000 lb. onboard. I assume the typical cruise speed is higher than the last item (different figures in various searches indicate around 265-275 mph)

XB-42: Maximum load-factor. I have no figures. It was said to be quite maneuverable and was said to fly like a Mosquito, but people said the A-26 could turn inside an Me-109 and that's not true (that said, they were able to turn into an Me-109 attack and sometimes disrupt their attacks).
The A-26 was a multi role aircraft, some roles demanded more range than others so a trade off was made between fuel, payload and mission profile.
 
Regarding the A-26 Invader

First thing you need to find is the gross weight. Saying varied is charitable. Normal Gross weight was 26,000lbs according to one source, but with a basic empty weight of 22,300 that is not realistic. Combat max gross was 35,000lbs. Max internal fuel was 925 gallons.
Understood
A-26 had . . . two 165 gal under wing drop tanks.
Gotcha...
You are going to need a spread sheet ;)
Agreed.


Regarding the XB-42
Anybody have anything here?
 
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Regarding the A-26 Invader

Firstly: They wanted to develop the A-24, A-25, XA-32 in lieu of the P-39, P-40 and A-36?

Secondly: I don't recall hearing the expression 'fat, ugly sisters' in that context before but I kind of get "inbred bureaucracy" and "bozos"

Understood
Gotcha...
Agreed.


Regarding the XB-42
Anybody have anything here?
I have a lot - but reserving for next book.
 

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