Was the Sea Hurricane a superior naval fighter than the F4F?

[Shortround6]

Really, ~1280 miles on internal fuel?

Calculated,
not real,
Only if launched by high speed catapult on a mountain and starting the engine in the air.
and fly to fuel exhaustion.
Terminal glide not counted in the calculation.

Just like

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-40/P-40B_Official_Performance_Summary.jpg

P-40B could fly 1010 miles on 120 US gallons of fuel.

Ocean front property will be available for sale soon, send your deposits NOW.

 

[RCAFson]

Sea Hurricanes carried only enough fuel to sustain themselves for 1 hour at combat power, and 4.5 hours at full-economical settings. The Fulmar and Martlet could stay aloft for 2 hours and 2 hours 45 minutes under combat power, and 6 hours economical.

Something is way off. Way Way Way off.

You could keep a Merlin running (economical settings) at a bit under 30 Imp gal an hour. which means 135 imp gallons for 4 .5 hours.(what kind of drop tanks on the Hurricane?)
Now the problem really comes in the the "combat power"
6lbs of boost?
9lbs of boost? 88inp gal an hour?
12lbs of boost?
16lbs of boost? (could be 150imp gallons an hour for a Merlin 45)

The Martlet IV/F4F-4B data card shows us the probable formula used:

Allowance for TO and climb to 15K ft.
15 minutes at combat power
20 min loiter at MECS at 2K ft

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-IV-ads.jpg

Plugging those number into a SH1B we get:

~18 IG for TO and climb to 15K ft (79IG remaining)
~30IG for 15min combat (49IG remaining)
~10IG for 20min loiter at 2K ft (39IG remaining)
~39IG = 1.3 to 1.5 hours loiter vs 2.1 for the Martlet IV/F4F-4B with 120IG internal fuel.

It's interesting that the data card predicts a non-combat loiter time of 3.4 hours at 15K ft, while at Midway the 10 F4F-4s suffered forced landings from fuel starvation after ~3.5hrs.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Individual petformance differs dramatically from unit performance. Lots more throttle jockeying to join/maintain formation.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yeah,
Parameters like.
fuel used for warmup.
fuel used to take off and even climb to 2500ft.
Fuel reserved for emergency (like finding the carrier, or heaven forbid, circling the carrier after the plane in que ahead crashed and it took 10 minutes to clear the flight deck.

Every time these discussions about range come up, in which it is pointed out by me or anyone else that range was a factor that mattered in air warfare during WW2, out comes the complaints that WW2 era range figures are all wrong, and the misleading comparisons of one type for another based on all the many parameters. I've speculated as to why and my conclusion is that many enthusiasts prefer to think only of high speed and altitude performance as relevant factors in air combat, and find mentions of other traits irritating diversions to that poetic simplicity.

Just a guess though.

But here's the thing. I don't think anyone reading the forum, even the most willfully deluded among us, is under any illusions that maximum range as typically reported on aircraft data sheets was anywhere near being the same as operational range. It's just a yardstick by which to measure like with like between different aircraft types. So you can do planning appropriately, for example "Gee, I guess we can't send our Hurricanes out to escort most of our bomber strikes since they have such short range compared to our other fighters".

Just as an aside, Wildcats did not only fly from carriers, and operational range or combat radius in carrier ops is of necessity always less than operational range from land bases, partly (but not only) because of the need to find carriers to land on.

The Wildcat had around 30-35% more range than the Hurricane except for the first few hundred Grummans built and with neither plane using drop tanks.
The drop tanks are within 1-2 gallons of each other once you convert from Imp to US gallons.
Neither was particularly streamlined.
Neither was in very good supply until 1943 or late 1943. US showed all kinds of range figures but if the tanks are not in the supply chain they are not being used (or used rarely).

External tanks of 58 gallons (I agree, not streamlined) seem to have been available in 1942 and fairly common in the South Pacific by 1943. I have yet to see good data on when drop tanks became available for Hurricanes anywhere, but I'm looking forward to learning.

 

[buffnut453]

Every time these discussions about range come up, in which it is pointed out by me or anyone else that range was a factor that mattered in air warfare during WW2, out comes the complaints that WW2 era range figures are all wrong, and the misleading comparisons of one type for another based on all the many parameters. I've speculated as to why and my conclusion is that many enthusiasts prefer to think only of high speed and altitude performance as relevant factors in air combat, and find mentions of other traits irritating diversions to that poetic simplicity.

Just a guess though.

But here's the thing. I don't think anyone reading the forum, even the most willfully deluded among us, is under any illusions that maximum range as typically reported on aircraft data sheets was anywhere near being the same as operational range. It's just a yardstick by which to measure like with like between different aircraft types. So you can do planning appropriately, for example "Gee, I guess we can't send our Hurricanes out to escort most of our bomber strikes since they have such short range compared to our other fighters".

Just as an aside, Wildcats did not only fly from carriers, and operational range or combat radius in carrier ops is of necessity always less than operational range from land bases, partly (but not only) because of the need to find carriers to land on.



External tanks of 58 gallons (I agree, not streamlined) seem to have been available in 1942 and fairly common in the South Pacific by 1943. I have yet to see good data on when drop tanks became available for Hurricanes anywhere, but I'm looking forward to learning.

I think you're being rather condescending here. Many of us recognize that range is clearly an issue in air combat. The problem is that you're comparing range figures that have different underlying assumptions which makes the comparisons effectively meaningless. Per the post by S Shortround6 , many US range figures do not factor in start-up, taxy, climb-out, minimum reserve etc. Using those figures to beat up airframes from other nations, that did include those factors, is comparing apples to oranges.

It's not that we think range is unimportant. It's that you're taking performance figures out of context and using them to prove an excess of superiority without ensuring that you're making a like-for-like comparison. Yes, the F4F had longer range than the Sea Hurricane but was it 3 times? I very much doubt it.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The Martlet IV/F4F-4B data card shows us the probable formula used:

Allowance for TO and climb to 15K ft.
15 minutes at combat power
20 min loiter at MECS at 2K ft

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-IV-ads.jpg

Plugging those number into a SH1B we get:

~18 IG for TO and climb to 15K ft (79IG remaining)
~30IG for 15min combat (49IG remaining)
~10IG for 20min loiter at 2K ft (39IG remaining)
~39IG = 1.3 to 1.5 hours loiter vs 2.1 for the Martlet IV/F4F-4B with 120IG internal fuel.

It's interesting that the data card predicts a non-combat loiter time of 3.4 hours at 15K ft, while at Midway the 10 F4F-4s suffered forced landings from fuel starvation after ~3.5hrs.

I'm sure the 1940s era Royal Navy, the Fleet Air Air, the RAF, and the USN, Marine Corps, and Grumman aircraft company were all conspiring to frustrate forum fan fiction enthusiasts in the 21st Century in their fervent beliefs about their favorite aeroplanes.

No doubt the people at the armoured carriers site also, similarly, intended to even further frustrate this same demographic. For which I salute them.

That is all obviously far more likely than one particular flight running out of fuel after flying for slightly over the stated loiter time, either due to getting lost, hitting weather, using higher throttle settings at some point in their three and a half hour flight, flying at a lower altitude than that used in the endurance estimate, or etc. Or just being just over the limit in the rated time.

Stated flying endurance for the F4F-3 seems to be considerably higher than 3.4 hours if they are flying low (60%) throttle and 144 gallons of fuel (internal, no external tanks)

The 840 mile range (internal fuel) estimated for the F4F-4 is based on a conservative adjustment and considerable allowances for taxiing, warmup, takeoff etc., plus another 15%, eg:

 

[RCAFson]

I'm sure the 1940s era Royal Navy, the Fleet Air Air, the RAF, and the USN, Marine Corps, and Grumman aircraft company were all conspiring to frustrate forum fan fiction enthusiasts in the 21st Century in their fervent beliefs about their favorite aeroplanes.

No doubt the people at the armoured carriers site also, similarly, intended to even further frustrate this same demographic. For which I salute them.

That is all obviously far more likely than one particular flight running out of fuel after flying for slightly over the stated loiter time, either due to getting lost, hitting weather, using higher throttle settings at some point in their three and a half hour flight, flying at a lower altitude than that used in the endurance estimate, or etc. Or just being just over the limit in the rated time.

Stated flying endurance for the F4F-3 seems to be considerably higher than 3.4 hours if they are flying low (60%) throttle and 144 gallons of fuel (internal, no external tanks)

View attachment 758045

The 840 mile range (internal fuel) estimated for the F4F-4 is based on a conservative adjustment and considerable allowances for taxiing, warmup, takeoff etc., plus another 15%, eg:

View attachment 758047

The practical combat radius calculation for the F4F-4 yielded a radius of 105nm :

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4.pdf

 

[Shortround6]

seem to have been available in 1942 and fairly common in the South Pacific by 1943

That just covered 2 years and over 1/2 of the Pacific war.

Every time these discussions about range come up, in which it is pointed out by me or anyone else that range was a factor that mattered in air warfare during WW2, out comes the complaints that WW2 era range figures are all wrong, and the misleading comparisons of one type for another based on all the many parameters. I've speculated as to why and my conclusion is that many enthusiasts prefer to think only of high speed and altitude performance as relevant factors in air combat, and find mentions of other traits irritating diversions to that poetic simplicity.

Range does count an awful lot.
But real ranges and some of the "calculated" max ranges or some of the Stuff on Wiki.

People that complain about not using the max ranges seem to have agendas of their own.

I am quite happy with the Hurricane having a clean range of 460-500 miles at 210-212mph at around 20,000ft.
At least it is a starting point.

Unfortunately some of those Navy sheets seem to be either rooted in fantasy or are bring misapplied.

Helps to use the latest sheets.
Somehow we go from 840 miles of range (or 4.9hours at 60% of something?) to 105 NM (121 Statute miles) radius which is about 1.61 hours at 150mph.
So our Hurricane is good for 65NM ( 75S miles) or about 1 hour at 150mph?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I think you're being rather condescending here. Many of us recognize that range is clearly an issue in air combat. The problem is that you're comparing range figures that have different underlying assumptions which makes the comparisons effectively meaningless. Per the post by S Shortround6 , many US range figures do not factor in start-up, taxy, climb-out, minimum reserve etc. Using those figures to beat up airframes from other nations, that did include those factors, is comparing apples to oranges.

Here is the problem though. One person attempts to point out actual real life data, and is accused of wanting to "beat up airframes from other nations". That isn't actually what is happening here. Hurricanes stood out as a problem. Many other aircraft also did and do, many of them US made. I pointed out that the Buffalo, the P-51A, the P-66 did poorly in the CBI, and both P-47 and P-38 did not do nearly as well as hoped (or as one would expect) in the CBI, while the Spitfire VIII and Merlin engined P-51 clearly did well. But I don't see anyone getting upset about that.

The pattern I notice, rather than anyone "beating up airframes from other nations", is that when any criticism strays into British aircraft types. it's suddenly treated by some as an attack against the Union Jack, the cross of St. George, the monarch, the Commonwealth, the Beatles, and the games of rugby and cricket. When in fact, it's just part of the long process of determining what really happened during WW2 air combat, as distinct from anyone's personal fantasy, LARP, or Fanfic.

I think some in here, not all of them British or fans of British aircraft types, seem to want to enforce this unwritten rule of never criticizing British aircraft. I don't believe in that religion, so you'll have to just endure it I'm afraid.

It's not that we think range is unimportant. It's that you're taking performance figures out of context and using them to prove an excess of superiority

Again, I'm definitely not using any data to prove any particular aircraft has an "excess of superiority". In this case I'm pointing out some of the actual performance data, which certain people find really irritating, but which helps (partly) explain the operational history.

I personally want to know about our mistakes made during WW2 and at other times. Far from shying away from criticizing the nation where I was born, I have personally talked at length in this very forum about the dismal, catastrophic failure of American Mark 13 and Mark 14 torpedos, about the poor performance of the TBD "Devestator", about the failures of the P-39 (except in Russia), about the limitations of the F4F and P-40 and early P-51, about the serious teething problems of the P-38 and P-47, and about the mistaken policies of Strategic Bombing by the USAAF and "Bomber Mafia", just to name a few.

Sometimes that did make people mad. But certain people seem to only come alive with outrage whenever a British aircraft is mentioned. And then forget about all the other criticism of US types, or praise of other British types which seemed to be successful in combat. I have in the past focused on the later model Spitfires, the Sunderland, on the Beaufighter, on the Mosquito, the Tempest, and the Wellington. The sprightly but neglected Whirlwind. And even the Hurricane during it's heyday (prior to 1942).

I tend to base most of my analysis on operational history. I like to know what really happened. I prefer to cut through the fantasy, because I found that very limited during the years when it was almost all you could find. The advantage of forums like this, and books like some of the sources we have been discussing recently, is that the real data is sometimes available now. But that does not mean everyone will welcome it.

without ensuring that you're making a like-for-like comparison. Yes, the F4F had longer range than the Sea Hurricane but was it 3 times? I very much doubt it.

I will concede that it seems closer to twice, except for the very early F4F types.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Everyone, lets not get snippy in here please.

 

[Shortround6]

I will concede that it seems closer to twice, except for the very early F4F types.

Well, he down to twice. Maybe in another year he will be down to only 30-40% better, which is close to the difference in fuel capacity

 

[RCAFson]

External tanks of 58 gallons (I agree, not streamlined) seem to have been available in 1942 and fairly common in the South Pacific by 1943. I have yet to see good data on when drop tanks became available for Hurricanes anywhere, but I'm looking forward to learning.

The first indication of drop tanks in 'Bloody Shambles V3' for the Hurricane IIB in Burma is 5 March 1943 in a photo of Jack Storey's IIB. DTs don't seem to get much mention unless something goes wrong:

Flt Lt W.J. 'Jack' Storey seen in the cockpit of his 135 Squadron Hurricane IIb after claiming three Ki 43s shot down during two sorties on 5 March 1943. This is the Hurricane IIb, AP894 'C' in which Jack Storey claimed the three Japanese aircraft shot down over Akyab. (photo shows DTs) 'Bloody Shambles V3'.

On 26 April 1944 Chris Ditmas recounted a 15 minute dog fight with a Ki-43 , after his IIC was bounced; his DTs failed to release, and the air supply to his 20mm cannon was damaged. Ditmas managed to escape and made a forced landing at his base.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Well, he down to twice. Maybe in another year he will be down to only 30-40% better, which is close to the difference in fuel capacity

Probably not, because I can count

 

[Shortround6]

And very strangely we have.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-VI-ads.jpg

FM-2 Wildcat with Wright Cyclone engine.
98 Imp gallons of fuel (smaller tank in the FM-2)
22 Imp gal of Fuel allowance.

76 imp gallons usable fuel
203mph at 15,000ft.
595 miles of range.
7.85 miles per imp gallon


Hurricane IIA
97 Imp gal
29 imp gal Fuel allowance
68 imp gallons usable fuel
212mph at 20,000ft
500 miles range
7.35 miles per imp gallon


I guess I can't count. I am having a lot of trouble finding where double the range comes from.
A Wildcat with the 144 US gallon tanks (120 Imp) should be good for 770-800 miles?

 

[Shortround6]

The Wildcat and drop tanks is a bit twisted.
Grumman provided some non-detachable drop tanks before the war broke out, but none were at Pearl Harbor. This made reinforcing Wake impossible.
A shipment of tanks were sent to Pearl Harbor by a Pan American Clipper. American engineers/mechanics jury rigged a single tank under the fuselage in a jettison able mount.
These were 42 US gallon tanks.

These were used on Guadalcanal to ferry the planes back and forth to Espiritu Santo for repairs/overhaul. There is little or no evidence of combat use. There is photo of plane in flight on page 133 of "Grumman Aircraft since 1929" This book doesn't give a date for the introduction of the 58 gal tanks except to say that the late production F4F-4s had the underwing tank provisions and eliminated the need for the ventral tank.

 

[nuuumannn]

I'm gonna throw my 2 cents into this discussion because there is a lot of hyperbole in this thread and I think that context behind the Sea Hurricane goes some way in defining its performance and characteristics. The Original poster asks "Was the Sea Hurricane a superior naval fighter than the F4F?" My opinion is no, it wasn't, not to begin with, anyway. My reasons why are not necessarily to do with performance, but to do with the "naval fighter" bit.

I reckon the Hawker Hurricane gets a lot of misunderstanding and underestimation (George Bush-ism "misunderestimation") about its overall impact and a lot of that is because of its performance, but it was a good fighter, that had had its day early on, though. It was produced in numbers throughout the war because of the need for a fast and handy ground attack aircraft for use in adverse conditions, such as North Africa and the CBI, which is why it was kept in production until 1944. It was an excellent dog fighter and could easily best a Bf 109 (statistics show that Hurricanes shot down more Bf 109s than Spitfires did during the Battle of Britain) but that kind of thing aside, the Hurricane I was declared obsolete in late 1940. The first navalised Hurricanes, it is worth remembering were converted used ex-squadron aircraft and that hints at why the type was built in the first place.

In 1939, when the FAA was taken over by the Admiralty out of Air Ministry hands, the stark realisation that the navy had no modern single-seat fighter project meant the admirals had to do what they could to get hold of a single-seat fighter as quickly as possible until its expected fighter, the Blackburn Firebrand was ready for service (that it never was as a pure fighter is beside the point in this case, but the navy pinned its single-seat fighter hopes on it in 1940). Spitfires were out in 1940, which is what the navy wanted, so in the interim, F4Fs were ordered from Grumman, Lord Beaverbrook (MAP) suggested the Miles M.20, which was investigated and Hawker was approached for an expedient naval fighter based on the Hurricane. The bare minimum was done to the Hurricane to create the original Sea Hurricane. Camm offered a more extensively modified airframe with the right strengthening, folding wings, properly redesigned oleos, better performance and so on, but expediency was the key, not outright efficiency.

This is where the Wildcat/Martlet's superiority as a naval fighter comes to the fore. It was designed from the outset as a naval fighter. It was the first "modern" single-seat naval fighter that the FAA received, and it was purpose-built. The Sea Hurricane was only meant to be a temporary expedient. This can be seen in the awkwardness the aircraft suffered on carrier decks (the same can be said for the early Seafires because they, like the Sea Hurricane were expeditious measures). Eric brown begins his chapter of the Sea Hurricane in his book Wings of the Navy with the following:

"Short on range, with the ditching propensities of a submarine, harsh stalling characteristics, a very mediocre view for deck landing and an undercarriage that was as likely as not to bounce it over the arrestor wires. What less likely candidate for deployment aboard aircraft carriers as a naval single-seat fighter than the Hurricane could have been imagined when, more than two-score years ago the FAA found itself at war!"

I also know the answer to that, the Miles M.20, which Brown also tested and had even less complimentary things to say about it.

To put this into context, though, it was an expedient, the things done to it to make it a naval fighter were the bare minimum, which were designed to be added to existing airframes. Had Camm been given the nod to produce a better, more comprehensively navalised variant of the Hurricane, this criticism probably would not be as harsh.

The problem with this thread is that too much weight has been put on performance, which, as we know, took a back seat with the Sea Hurricane to achieve speedy delivery times. The F4F proved an excellent aircraft. The British liked it because it was a purpose-built naval fighter, whereas the Sea Hurricane wasn't. Suffice to say, the Sea Hurricane did prove its worth, however, and to completely rubbish it would be unfair. It played a crucial role in the FAA in providing a single-seat fighter when the FAA did not have large numbers of them. It could out-perform the Fulmar and it was better than the Skua in almost every respect as a fighter. Several top notch FAA pilots flew Sea Hurricanes and got the best out of them and this is part of the point, it served its purpose as an expedient because it was needed and proved ultimately useful.

These threads always descend into silly discussions, "what if the Germans had Zeros/F4Fs during the Battle of Britain???!!!" but ultimately, as a naval fighter, the F4F and Hurricane both served a vital role with the FAA, although as the original poster said, the "superior naval fighter" in my opinion has to be the Wildcat, BUT that does not in any way diminish the necessity of the Sea Hurricane.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Wild_Bill_Kelso,

re

The 840 mile range (internal fuel) estimated for the F4F-4 is based on a conservative adjustment and considerable allowances for taxiing, warmup, takeoff etc., plus another 15%, eg:

Please read the above more carefully, it does not say the 840 mile [maximum] range [or endurance] on internal fuel is based on "considerable allowances for taxiing, warmup, takeoff etc". - it only says that "fuel consumption data increased by 15%" and the practical combat radius is based on allowances for taxiing, warmup, takeoff, etc.

Relative to the 840 mile max range at 150 mph [TAS] it only says that "range and radius are based on engine requirement", ie the engine fuel usage (sfc) is increased by 15% because the original estimates of fuel usage (sfc) they were given were incorrect. Experience required a better estimate of fuel usage.

I realize what they are saying is not particularly clear.

 

[Shortround6]

we also have the slightly confusing interwoven paths of the Sea Hurricane and the Martlet.
The Early Martlets used the 9 Cyclone and didn't have the folding wings. Yes they were designed to land on carriers. But you couldn't fit more of them on a carrier than the Hurricane, or maybe you could fit one more? 38ft wing instead if 40ft?
The folding wings wouldn't show up for while, the Martlet had fixed wings. the first 10 Martlet IIs had them. the 30 Martlet IIIs had them.

It took until the fall of 1942 for two stage Merlins to show up in Sea Hurricanes, over 18 months after the land planes started getting them.
Granted most of the sea combat was at lower altitudes and they compensated somewhat by using higher boost pressure in the Sea Hurricane Is In Operation Pedestal.
So the two speed Sea Hurricanes only started to show up about the time the folding wing Martlets do.
However the RN doesn't get 2 stage supercharged Martlets until the the "V" shows up in Dec 1942 (or that is when they roll out the factory door.)
Of the 1082 (?) British Martlets/Wildcats only 311 had two stage superchargers and it could very well be that they didn't need them. Naval combat was often at lower altitude than over land. Some of the Martlets, depending on engine and armament and load were rather leisurely in climb. The later ones were better.

But the Hurricane always had the bare minimum done to it for sea duty.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

RAF tests, The ranges of fighters are shown as ranges at maximum economic cruising power on the fuel available, after deducting fuel used in 15 minutes at maximum power at sea level. This allowance is for warming up and climbing to operational height.

Martlet I 107 gallons for cruise, 29 gallons for allowance, total on board 136 gallons, cruising at 15,000 feet at 257 mph range 690 miles, 2.7 hours endurance, at 165-175 mph range 845 miles endurance 5 hours.

Hurricane I 77.6 gallons for cruise, 19.4 gallons for allowance, total on board 97 gallons, cruising at 15,000 feet at 275 mph range 455 miles (DH) or 445 miles (Rotol propeller) endurance 1.65 hours, at 170 to 180 mph range 600 miles, endurance 3.4 hours.

The F4F-3 had 120 imperial gallons on board, the F4F-3 engine was more powerful which would increase the allowance. It was also was around 500 pounds heavier. Or to put it another way fuel allowance for Spitfires in pounds, mark I 146, mark II 191, mark V 216.

In May 2022 I emailed the editor at hyperscale.com about differences between what I have and the information at
The Grumman Wildcat in FAA Service by Bruce Archer
no reply. The author Bruce Archer did participate in some discussions about the differences a while ago now but the web page has not changed.

Pulling everything together, notes from RAF contract cards and USN record of acceptances. There are some disagreements with the web site's Wildcat article.

Martlet I ex French order F-292, requisition 2/E1/40 for 95 mark I (14 mark III serials reported as mark I, AX725 to 38) Wright GR-1820-G205A-2, the 81 Martlet I serials were AL236-AL262 (At RNAS Donibristle November and December 1940), AX824-AX829 (at Scottish Aviation August 1940), BJ507-BJ527 (At Scottish Aviation September 1940 on) and BJ554-BJ570 while BT447-BT456 were allocated to the 10 lost at sea. AL231 to 235 cancelled, replaced by AX824 to 829, so 5 cancelled, 6 replacements.

Martlet II/F4F-3/G-36B, order A-1548, requisition 2/E1/40, P&W R-1830-S3C4G. AM954 to AM999 and AJ100 to AJ153, with the first 10 built AM954 to AM963 having fixed wings and later considered mark III, total 100. Contract cards have AM954, AJ107, 109 listed as lost at sea while AJ110 and 111 look like they share the fate of AJ109.

There is a question whether AM954 to AM963 possibly used the P&W R-1830-90 engine which helps explain them being redesignated mark III. USN order 68219 F4F-3 production ended in February 1941, with the R-1830-76, order 75736 F4F-3A production March to May 1941 with the R-1830-90, F4F-3 production from May 1941, the first 19 with R-1830-76, the remainder with the R-1830-86 (31 accepted to end June). Martlet II Order, 10 in March 1941 (became mark III), then June on, engine R-1830-S3C4G.

F4F-3A/Martlet III, Diversion from USN order 75736, requisition BSC.1465, P&W R-1830-90, AX724 to AX747, AX753 to AX754, AX761 and HK840 to HK842, total 30. Originally for Greece. AX725 to AX738 incorrectly listed as mark I in RAF Contract Card summary making the mark I order 95. AX741 to 747 and AX761 have RAF Serial Register entries. The import report has 27 Wildcat arriving in the Middle East in July 1941 and 3 more in October.

Martlet IV/Wildcat IV/F4F-4B, order LL-83734, requisition BSC.154 for 150, requisition BSC.7207 for 70, total 220. Wright R-1820-G205A furnished by Britain, given the bottleneck engine supply was at the time it suggests the engines were available from a British engine order, saving on R-1830, plus providing compatibility for the Martlet I. Serials FN100 to FN319 with FN205 to 207, FN240 and FN241 lost at sea.

Wildcat V/FM-1,from USN order 99036, requisition BSC N.4, P&W R-1830-86, the USN reports 311 accepted for RN as JV325 to JV636, which is 312 serials, BuNo. 15415/JV428 reported delivered to USN, then in 1943 to Britain. JV325 to 414 did not have USN BuNo.

Wildcat VI/FM-2 from USN order NOa(s)-227 (99036), requisition BSC N.4, Wright R-1820-56/72W in 1943, -72W in 1944, -56W in 1945, serials JV637 to JV924 and JW785 to 836, total 340. The USN reports 98+242 = 340 FM-2 accepted for RN, indicating serials JZ860 to 889 were not used. FM-2 acceptances for Britain ceased in May 1945, which is 3 months before FM-2 production ended.

USN orders,

Contract 46973, 2 March 1936 became 63072, 3 October 1938, for 1 XF4F-3 (ex XF4F-1 and XF4F-2) P&W XR-1830-76, BuNo 0383
Contract 68219, 8 August 1939, for 78 F4F-3, P&W R1830-76, plus 1 X4F-4 with the same engine, 2 XF4F-5 with Wright R-1820-40 and 1 XF4F-6 with a furnished by contractor P&W R-1830-90, BuNos 1844 to 1897, 2512 to 2538 and 7031.
Contract 75736, 5 August 1940, for 19 F4F-3 with P&W R-1830-76 (BuNos 3856 to 3874) and 88 with P&W R-1830-86 plus 95 F4F-3A with P&W R-1830-90 and 596 F4F-4 with P&W R-1830-86 and 21 F4F-7 with P&W R-1830-86, BuNos 3856 to 5283, 01991 to 02152 and 03385 to 03544.
Contract 99340, 16 May 1942, for 573 F4F-4 with P&W R-1830-86 plus 2 XF4F-8 with Wright R-1820-56 and 100 F4F-3 with P&W R-1830-86/76. BuNos 11655 to 12329
Contract 99036, 18 April 1942, for 1,150 FM-1 (311 for RN) with P&W R-1830-86, BuNos 14992 to 15951 and 46738 to 46837
Contract NOa(s)-227 (99036), 31 December 1943, for 4,100 FM-2 (340 for RN) plus another 1,423 in 1945 of which 746 were cancelled, with Wright R-1820-56/72W in 1943, -72W only in 1944, -56W in 1945, a total of 4,777 built. BuNos 15952 to 16791, 46838 to 47437, 55050 to 55649, 56684 to 57083, 73499 to 75158, 86297 to 86973 with 86974 to 87719 cancelled.

Contract NOas-1662, N.A.M. 1107 for 3 XF2M-1 dated 31 October 1944, cancelled.

Martlet I production July to October 1940, F4F-3 production 2 in August 1940, then November 1940 to February 1941, May to December 1941, February to March 1942, January to May 1943, F4F-3A production March to May 1941. F4F-4 production November 1941 to December 1942, F4F-7 production January, March, May to September, November and December 1942. FM-1 production September 1942 to December 1943. FM-2 production September 1943 to August 1945. Total production 7,905.

From USN Aircraft performance charts, propellers
F4F-3, F4F-7 Curtiss Elec. CS 3 Blade 9 ft 9 in, Blade Design No. 512
F4F-4, FM-1 Curtiss Elec. CS 3 Bl. 9 ft 9 in, Blade. Design No. 512-ICL-5-15
FM-2, Curtiss electric CS 3 blade 10 foot, blade design No. 109354-12

Admiralty Fleet Order 3186/1943

Martlet I and IV Aircraft Types of Engines Fitted. A.M.R. 2498/43. - 15 July 1943.

Some confusion may at present exist concerning the types of Cyclone engines which can be fitted in Martlet I and IV, due to the large variety of type numbers which may be found stamped on the engine date plates.

2 (a) Engines suitable for the Martlet I : Cyclone G.205A, Cyclone G.205A-2

2 (b) Engines suitable for the Martlet IV : Cyclone G.205A-3, Cyclone G.251A, Cyclone R.1820-40B

3 Apart from minor differences between the engines listed in 2(a) and 2 (b) above, such as ignition harness elbows, tachometer drives etc., the main difference is that 2(a) are fitted with 3 jaw starter shaft dog suitable for an electric-inertia starter, while 2(b) are fitted with a 12 jaw starter shaft dog suitable for a cartridge starter.

4. Engines shown within groups 2(a) and 2(b) respectively are interchangeable with other engines shown in the same group.

5. All engines shown in group 2(b) are fitted with an external oil scavenge line running from the oil pump at the rear of the engine to the sump at the front of the engine. Engines in group 2(a) were not originally fitted with this external scavenge line, but are being fitted on overhaul by the incorporation of Mod. Cyclone/45 so that this line alone may NOT be taken as a criterion by which to identify Martlet IV engines.

 

[yulzari]

The Sea Hurricane was a superior naval fighter for the Royal Navy because it existed when it was needed.

The Martlet was a better naval suited design but, at the time of need, it did not exist in any consequential numbers for Royal Navy use. It could have been an AH wonder weapon outperforming all others but it simply was not there to be used.

No amount of technical nitpicking can alter those basic facts. If the Royal Navy had access to folding wing Martlets, in numbers at the time, they would never have used any Sea Hurricanes. The Royal Navy was still using Martlets over Norway against Me109Gs in the spring of 1945. They liked it.

Their Lordships were fighting a war not a competition race. They needed a single seat fighter now. Not when it was ready. The enemy were not going to wait obligingly for a fair fight. When finally allowed to draw upon the RAF production resources the Sea Hurricane was what was available fast. Rightly they used it there and then.

The block on a peer single seat fighter was the RAF supremacy in priority and the priority of the air defence of the UK. Their Lordships were seeking to standardise on a Sea Spitfire long before the war but were trumped by the above. Fewer Spitfires would mean fewer BoB Axis bombers lost and more bombs dropped on the UK. As it was the government were acutely aware that items like the Bren gun, the 2 and 6 Pounder anti tanks gun, BESA machine gun and many others were dependent upon single factories. Indeed Supermarine themselves lost their factory. These priorities affected more than the sea war. It kept Spitfires in the UK and even Hurricanes were late into the Middle East and Far East. The defence of the Home Islands was the bottom line. Thus my first line of the post. The corollary is that the Martlet was an inherently superior naval fighter in itself but the choice of the Royal Navy was necessary expediency despite acknowledging a preference for the Martlet.

So we are back with the old problem of what defines 'best' or 'superior'. To the Royal Navy the Martlet was the 'superior' naval fighter but the Sea Hurricane was the 'best' choice for a naval fighter at the time the decision had to be made in the light of the situation at the time.

A bit like Americans being puzzled as to why the British continued to build their own tanks when the USA had an over capacity to make the perfectly serviceable Sherman or why Britain continued to build naval aircraft when there were plenty of US ones being made. Had they not British aircraft carriers would, from the autumn of 1945, be armed with cardboard cut out aeroplane silhouettes and British armoured regiments consist of men running around in groups of four shouting 'rumble, rumble, we are a tank' as the lend lease aeroplanes had been pushed overboard and the tanks sent to scrap.