What if? - Battle of Midway in July 1942 rather than June

[oldcrowcv63]

It seems to me that the IJN would have won the Battle of Midway if they had changed there codes and not handed the USN the oportunity to ambush them.
I agree that the USN had better aerial recon than the IJN in that area - but the IJN also had submarines out scouting and it was more by bad luck on the IJN's part that they did not locate the US carriers in time.
Once the battle had begun, the USN torpedo bombers pulled the Zero's down to sea level to beat them off - leaving no top cover to disrupt the dive bombers. It was also a stroke of good look for the USN that there attack ended up being disjointed as it was this that allowed the dive bombers to follow a IJN destroyer and hence find the un protected carriers.
Like most battles, it is not always the best prepared or larger force that prevails, sometimes you just have to hope lady luck is on your side. At Midway she smiled on the USN!

No offense Vinnye, but that's the old long-accepted myth restated. It's been published so many times it's become Canon. The SBDs would have gotten through in any event. Proven time and time again. (perhaps the only possible exception being the Akagi which only attracted three SBDs. The Zero CAP, of which many were pulled down to low altitude by the first two squadrons had ample time to ascend to the dive bomber's altitude, if altitude was the only criteria for an intercept. However, lateral positioning also plays an important role and both USN and IJN aviators were saavy enough to avoid the other's defending CAP if at all possible. The Dive bombers would often stalk their targets from other than the threat axis.

If anyone deserved credit for drawing the ZERO cap down (for however much benefit to the USN it may have done) is Yorktown's VT-5 and Thach's 6 escorting F4F's.

I do agree that changing IJN codes earlier would have posed real problems for the USN which at that time was typically keeping two carriers close to PH. The YKTN had to return to PH for repair but that might not have been expedited had IJN code's been changed much earlier instead of (IIRC) right before the battle.

The Yorktown strike which took out the Soryu didn't follow anything but their preflight orders. They didn't need to find the IJN by following a destroyer. They flew essentially directly to the IJN fleet because they took off later with better intel as to its actual location, IIRC. In this case, I think Fletcher's decision to delay launching his strike for about 30 minutes worked to his benefit.

 

[syscom3]

I would sum it up this way:

"The IJN had no effective control of their fighters once an attack started. Once multiple attacks developed over a period of time, their defenses would be stretched to the breaking point."

Thats what I understood from "Shattered Sword".

 

[vinnye]

Hey Oldcrowcv63, no offense taken.
I was just repeating what I had seen / heard from documentaries.
I have recently seen that Thatch and his F4F's were jumped by Zeros - and had to defend themselves rather than attempt to protect the SBD's.
I was not aware that ther IJN did not have control over their fighters once the attacks began!

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Fortunately the USN had a big brother in the RN/RAF who taught it something about RADAR directed fighter defense. That technology and its implementation tended to somewhat (occasionally) neutralize the otherwise effective IJN VB and VT attacks. Although, in 1942, with the F4F-4, A-Scope display and without height-finding RADAR, The USN defense remained very porous and suffered at the hands of the very skilled IJN airman. By late 1943, that defensive porosity had diminished significantly with the introduction of the F6F, F4U, PPI scope and height setting RADAR (and of course, the attrition suffered by the IJN's first team aviators). The IJN developed RADAR for early warning but as I understand it, never devised a Fighter direction system to defend its high-value targets.

USN CAP defensive impermeability endured for the most part until the advent of the massed kamikaze raids which finally overwhelmed it. Although the high-value targets seemed to have faired reasonably well, with some notable exceptions.

 

[syscom3]

The introduction of an effective combat information center with far more disciplined CAP is what put the USN far ahead of the Japanese.

The CIC which took its modern form as we know it, wasn't a reality until middle 1943. It integrated most of the concepts and ideas that had been purchased with blood during the battles in 1942.

 

[vinnye]

Sir Hugh Dowding was the man who saw the potential of the developing radar technologies just before the onset of the war. Thank god he did!
Without the development of an integrated air defence system we would have lost the BoB and been put out of the war altogether.
Fortunately the US had the foresight to see that these developments would be of significant benefit to them and learned some valuable lessons from our hard earned expereience as well as that of their own. We both benefited from sharing technologies and strategies as well as intelligence. Long may it remain so!

 

[parsifal]

The code reading efforts were critical to the victory, not during the battle, but before it. without it the USN would not have known the timing of the operation, its target, its disposition and its strength. With the codes broken, and virtually all the main signal traffic being read, it allowed the USN to finally concentrate, and greatly simplified the battle problem for them. Superior CAP is something I am not so sure about, at least in the 1942 engagements.....there were some disadvantages to the US system as well, as the excessive chatter at Santa Cruz well demonstrates. The Japanese used the sytems they did, firstly because they relied on the exceptional pilot skills of their aircrew, which among other things possessed very good pilot discipline (no substitute for directed responses, but a partial offset you might say). Secondly ship to craft communications were at best problematic, given the poor quality communications they possessed. The Japanese had to keep their CAP close by if they wanted to control it, and had to rely on the skill and observational skills of the aircrew themselves, but particulalry the flight leaders.

The peak performance of the Japanese CAP was probably Phillipine Sea, where just 35 surviving aviators, believed to be the very last of the Pearl veterans, fought off more than 200 USN attackers. In failing light they managed to limit the damage to the loss of just one carrier. Far more damage should have occurred, but a combination of light and exceptionally skilled flying by the Japanese limited it to just one carrier

 

[Conslaw]

It seems to me that the IJN would have won the Battle of Midway if they had changed there codes and not handed the USN the oportunity to ambush them.
I agree that the USN had better aerial recon than the IJN in that area - but the IJN also had submarines out scouting and it was more by bad luck on the IJN's part that they did not locate the US carriers in time.
Once the battle had begun, the USN torpedo bombers pulled the Zero's down to sea level to beat them off - leaving no top cover to disrupt the dive bombers. It was also a stroke of good look for the USN that there attack ended up being disjointed as it was this that allowed the dive bombers to follow a IJN destroyer and hence find the un protected carriers.
Like most battles, it is not always the best prepared or larger force that prevails, sometimes you just have to hope lady luck is on your side. At Midway she smiled on the USN!

In proposing this hypothetical, I was in part proposing an alternative universe where the Japanese might have had the opportunity to make other choices, and luck might have gone the other way. As you can tell from the majority of the posts - some great ones, by the way - the majority of the commentators believe it wouldn't have made much difference if the Japanese had delayed another month, changed their codes and brought one or two additional carriers to the fray. The Japanese would have bettered their odds if they would have fought their decisive battle on a more neutral ground, such as the Solomons. Indeed, during the Guadalcanal campaign, in their second shot at American carriers in the Battle of Santa Cruz, the Japanese came close to a decisive victory. Only stellar damage control by the crew of the Enterprise, and superhuman performance by Lt. Robin Lindsay allowed for the crews of 57 aircraft to land safely on the bombed-out deck of the Enterprise. After the battle, the Japanese went home to lick their wounds. The Enterprise stayed in the theater, and its planes (mostly flying from Guadalcanal) contributed to the defeat of Japan's last effort to resupply and reinforce its garrison.

 

[Conslaw]

I hate corporate mission statements, but Leroy Grumman's design philosophy summarizes the strengths of the Hellcat beautifully.

"Grumman will only build an easily produced, maintained and reliable combat aircraft that can be readily mastered by a 200-hour, war-time pilot trained to fly from a carrier, engage in successful combat, sustain combat damage, return to the carrier, and land his aircraft after dark so that he can be available for combat again the next day."

 

[RCAFson]

The reference you cite I've already acknowledged. I want to see those that claim the PBYs searching for the IJN on the 3rd and 4th were equipped with ASV type radar (USN: ASB or less likely ASA) I have searched high and low for any reference to PBYs being typically equipped with ASV in June. My understanding based on a long list of books on the subject and web references, is that ASV production began in the spring and only the 4 PBY-5A aircraft brought to Midway from PH specifically for that night action possessed RADAR. All others did not. The only black cat ops referred to in Knott aside from the 4 participating in the Midway night op are those in the Solomons after August and in the SW Pacific.

I was just flipping through an online copy of Campaigns of the Pacific War, when I ran across this passage:

With prevailing bad visibility the Aleutians early became an experimental and proving ground for
airborne search radar. The British ASV equipment, hastily manufactured in the United States, was installed
in the search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four beginning in March 1942. By the date of the Japanese attack
on Dutch Harbor all the flying boats of that wing were equipped with it. Assisted by this device, search
planes were able to locate the Japanese Second Mobile Force, and, in at least one instance, to avoid contact
with the Japanese fighter patrols. It enabled the weakly armed boats to conduct aerial search in darkness
and poor visibility, conditions favorable to their defense. Also, in an area so poorly equipped with radio
aids, the importance of radar in providing navigational fixes and in permitting instrument letdowns cannot
be overemphasized. Without radar the effectiveness of air search would have been reduced to practically
nothing. Without it the Japanese gave up as ineffective their flying boat searches from Kiska. Later in the
campaign, radar was made to serve yet another purpose when Ventura search land planes led blind bombing
attacks over Kiska.
p.85

 

[N4521U]

What if the British hadn't showed the Japanese how to build a carrier, how to fly off and back on to a carrier deck.
What if the British hadn't passed on secrets of big bombs on small planes.

Pearl Harbor might never have happened, and Midway may never have happened. Singapore may never have happened. etc, etc.

 

[meatloaf109]

What about Perry forcing his way into Tokiyo?

 

[RCAFson]

The reference you cite I've already acknowledged. I want to see those that claim the PBYs searching for the IJN on the 3rd and 4th were equipped with ASV type radar (USN: ASB or less likely ASA) I have searched high and low for any reference to PBYs being typically equipped with ASV in June. My understanding based on a long list of books on the subject and web references, is that ASV production began in the spring and only the 4 PBY-5A aircraft brought to Midway from PH specifically for that night action possessed RADAR. All others did not. The only black cat ops referred to in Knott aside from the 4 participating in the Midway night op are those in the Solomons after August and in the SW Pacific.

I was just flipping through an online copy of Campaigns of the Pacific War, when I ran across this passage:

With prevailing bad visibility the Aleutians early became an experimental and proving ground for
airborne search radar. The British ASV equipment, hastily manufactured in the United States, was installed
in the search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four beginning in March 1942. By the date of the Japanese attack
on Dutch Harbor all the flying boats of that wing were equipped with it. Assisted by this device, search
planes were able to locate the Japanese Second Mobile Force, and, in at least one instance, to avoid contact
with the Japanese fighter patrols. It enabled the weakly armed boats to conduct aerial search in darkness
and poor visibility, conditions favorable to their defense. Also, in an area so poorly equipped with radio
aids, the importance of radar in providing navigational fixes and in permitting instrument letdowns cannot
be overemphasized. Without radar the effectiveness of air search would have been reduced to practically
nothing. Without it the Japanese gave up as ineffective their flying boat searches from Kiska. Later in the
campaign, radar was made to serve yet another purpose when Ventura search land planes led blind bombing
attacks over Kiska.
p.85

You can read it here, page 85:
HyperWar: USSBS: Campaigns of the Pacific War

 

[VBF-13]

Does anyone know when the Japanese began their planning for Midway?

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I was just flipping through an online copy of Campaigns of the Pacific War, when I ran across this passage:


You can read it here, page 85:
HyperWar: USSBS: Campaigns of the Pacific War

Good find RCAFson, Clearly my post overreached with "all PBYs." I don't think it changes the perspective on PBY radar at Midway however. Aleutian flying weather is notoriously bad and airborne RADAR was a palliative to the inherent risks. If I was going to prioritize where to put RADAR by geographic region, I'd equip flying boats on antisub patrols in the North Atlantic, perhaps on PBYs flying Atlantic and North Pacific CONUS coastal waters and on PBY's in the Aleutian area, in roughly that oder and for perhaps slightly different reasons in each. More effective suppression of enemy sub activity in the first two and then a combination of crew and asset safety and threat early warning on a lightly defended theater flank. That's my understanding from references. the first RADAR equipped PBYs were operated in the Atlantic.

there remains the issue of bringing in radar equipped (and maybe more extensively trained?) crews to the island before June 4 to augment the results of the day PBY searches with a night strike. The references to the slow adoption of RADAR by the USN are sparse, but there does seem to be a trail (admittedly thin) of evidence that suggests it was slowest in the central and South Pacific Theater. On the other hand, based on the USN's spotty expertise in its use, it may be that they were equipped with RADAR but the crews didn't know how to use the gear.

 

[parsifal]

Does anyone know when the Japanese began their planning for Midway?

Ugaki first raised the necessity of capturing Midway, as well as Johnston and Palmyra as part of the overall containment strategy in January 1942. However not a lot was done until March and April 1942, as Japanese war strategy began to drift a bit after the completion of the first operational phase. I can only guess, but I get the strong vibe that the Japanese were expecting the US to sue for terms - a completely unrealistic appraisal if ever there was one

Ukagi initially came up with a plan to invade the Midway, Johnston and Palmyra Islands to act as forward bases for an invasion of Hawaii that would precipitate a decisive battle with the US Navy, and which was still at the heart of Japanese naval strategy. Ukagi's rationale was that Japan had to continue the offensive and not merely consolidate its initial gains, as doing so would hand the initiative over to the Allies who could then build their strength up once again and attack. Such a strategy would not only waste the proven effectiveness and technical efficiency of the Imperial Navy but the strategic advantage gained by the initial operations as well. These proposals were rejected by the Senior Fleet Operations Officer, Captain Kuroshima on the grounds that the United States was unlikely to risk the remainder of their fleet to save the islands in question. He offered an alternative plan to shift the strategic focus to the Indian Ocean and a seizure of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Ugaki accepted the criticisms of his own plan and while accepting the alternative put forward by Kuroshima, insisted it have a proviso that it be carried out within the context of a joint Axis offensive and timed to coincide with a German offensive in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Kuroshimas proposal is interesting and bears some justification for a closer look....

What might have been a major strategic opportunity came to nothing, as the Germans offered no proposals for joint operations under the new Tripartite Axis agreement signed on 19 December 1941. Even so, the Combined Fleet continued to explore the possibility with wargames aboard the new battleship Yamato but the plan eventually foundered on Army reluctance to provide additional divisions for the assault on Ceylon. The Navy once again returned to Ukagi's option for a strike towards the Eastern Pacific and modified the plan to overcome Army opposition by dropping the ambitious Hawaii invasion and concentrating on the Aleutian and Midway Islands. The planning was given an extra impetus by the limited attacks by the United States on the Marshall Islands, Rabaul, Wake Island, eastern New Guinea and Marcus Island. From the IJNs perspective, it was important that the Japanese lure the remainder of the US Pacific Fleet to battle around Midway and that the Imperial Navy achieve a strategic victory as Yamamoto believed that Japan could then offer peace to the United States from a position of strength.

Yammamoto was always conscious of the industrial and manpower resources of the United States and that unless victory could be achieved quickly, Japan would eventually be defeated after a long and costly war. Meanwhile, the Naval General Staff had been reviewing a number of options following the Army's veto of the Ceylon operation. Gradually there emerged the view that operations should be mounted to either occupy those areas of Australia that would most likely to be used as bases for an Allied counterattack, or at the very least, isolate them. As a major amphibious attack and occupation of parts of Australia would require a substantial Army force and likely to suffer another Army veto, the Navy decided to examine the more limited option of isolation and seize the island of Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby on the southeastern coast of New Guinea. Alkl these strategies became part of the "2nd operational Phase" series of planned offensives. Historically each of them was defeated.

Yamamoto added Carrier Division 5 to the naval forces assigned to the operation and inadvertently increased the risks to the Midway operation, as both these carriers were assumed to take part in that operation as well. The Combined Fleet plan was finalised and presented to the Naval General Staff on 2nd April. There followed a great deal of heated debate, but Yamamoto once again played the resignation card as he fervently believed that it was vital to draw the American carriers out into battle and destroy them. If they didn't engage then at least the defensive perimeter had been pushed out to Midway and the western Aleutians. The plan was finally agreed by Rear Admiral Fukudome, the Naval General Staff and IGHQ - the Army happy to pass the plan, as it actually required little in terms of ground forces. While the Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff debated the details, the Doolittle Raid took place, rapidly bringing discussions to a close. As April turned into May, preparations for the operation gathered pace.

Wargames were held on the Yamato between the 1st and 4th May to test the plans and explore the post-Midway operations, where it was apparent that what has been termed as 'victory disease' affected almost all levels of the senior staff. Such a mindset had its origins in the psychological view the Japanese had of themselves, their history, the samurai tradition and the belief in the divine righteousness of their cause. Such an attitude had warped the Japanese perceptions of the United States to the point where it was believed that there was really nothing to fear from this weak and decadent opponent, ignoring the immense military, industrial and moral potential of the great power. Therefore it was believed that the Japanese held the undisputed initiative in the up-and-coming operation and that the US carriers would only put to sea after the attack on Midway had begun.

That they might already be at sea and awaiting the Japanese was never really considered and when it happened to be brought up as a possibility to explore different aspects of the battle, it was dismissed and the results (the carriers Kaga and Akagi being sunk) were overturned. The Japanese began serious preparations for Operations MI and AL towards the end of April when the First Air Fleet returned from operations in the Indian Ocean. However, Nagumo had to accept the results of the Battle of the Coral Sea, which despite the victory trumpeted by the Japanese media had left the Shokaku badly damaged and in need of extensive repairs and the Zuikaku had lost a large percentage of her aircrew and had to wait for replacements.

 

[VBF-13]

Ugaki first raised the necessity of capturing Midway, as well as Johnston and Palmyra as part of the overall containment strategy in January 1942. However not a lot was done until March and April 1942, as Japanese war strategy began to drift a bit after the completion of the first operational phase. I can only guess, but I get the strong vibe that the Japanese were expecting the US to sue for terms - a completely unrealistic appraisal if ever there was one

Ukagi initially came up with a plan to invade the Midway, Johnston and Palmyra Islands to act as forward bases for an invasion of Hawaii that would precipitate a decisive battle with the US Navy, and which was still at the heart of Japanese naval strategy. Ukagi's rationale was that Japan had to continue the offensive and not merely consolidate its initial gains, as doing so would hand the initiative over to the Allies who could then build their strength up once again and attack. Such a strategy would not only waste the proven effectiveness and technical efficiency of the Imperial Navy but the strategic advantage gained by the initial operations as well. These proposals were rejected by the Senior Fleet Operations Officer, Captain Kuroshima on the grounds that the United States was unlikely to risk the remainder of their fleet to save the islands in question. He offered an alternative plan to shift the strategic focus to the Indian Ocean and a seizure of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Ugaki accepted the criticisms of his own plan and while accepting the alternative put forward by Kuroshima, insisted it have a proviso that it be carried out within the context of a joint Axis offensive and timed to coincide with a German offensive in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Kuroshimas proposal is interesting and bears some justification for a closer look....

What might have been a major strategic opportunity came to nothing, as the Germans offered no proposals for joint operations under the new Tripartite Axis agreement signed on 19 December 1941. Even so, the Combined Fleet continued to explore the possibility with wargames aboard the new battleship Yamato but the plan eventually foundered on Army reluctance to provide additional divisions for the assault on Ceylon. The Navy once again returned to Ukagi's option for a strike towards the Eastern Pacific and modified the plan to overcome Army opposition by dropping the ambitious Hawaii invasion and concentrating on the Aleutian and Midway Islands. The planning was given an extra impetus by the limited attacks by the United States on the Marshall Islands, Rabaul, Wake Island, eastern New Guinea and Marcus Island. From the IJNs perspective, it was important that the Japanese lure the remainder of the US Pacific Fleet to battle around Midway and that the Imperial Navy achieve a strategic victory as Yamamoto believed that Japan could then offer peace to the United States from a position of strength.

Yammamoto was always conscious of the industrial and manpower resources of the United States and that unless victory could be achieved quickly, Japan would eventually be defeated after a long and costly war. Meanwhile, the Naval General Staff had been reviewing a number of options following the Army's veto of the Ceylon operation. Gradually there emerged the view that operations should be mounted to either occupy those areas of Australia that would most likely to be used as bases for an Allied counterattack, or at the very least, isolate them. As a major amphibious attack and occupation of parts of Australia would require a substantial Army force and likely to suffer another Army veto, the Navy decided to examine the more limited option of isolation and seize the island of Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby on the southeastern coast of New Guinea. Alkl these strategies became part of the "2nd operational Phase" series of planned offensives. Historically each of them was defeated.

Yamamoto added Carrier Division 5 to the naval forces assigned to the operation and inadvertently increased the risks to the Midway operation, as both these carriers were assumed to take part in that operation as well. The Combined Fleet plan was finalised and presented to the Naval General Staff on 2nd April. There followed a great deal of heated debate, but Yamamoto once again played the resignation card as he fervently believed that it was vital to draw the American carriers out into battle and destroy them. If they didn't engage then at least the defensive perimeter had been pushed out to Midway and the western Aleutians. The plan was finally agreed by Rear Admiral Fukudome, the Naval General Staff and IGHQ - the Army happy to pass the plan, as it actually required little in terms of ground forces. While the Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff debated the details, the Doolittle Raid took place, rapidly bringing discussions to a close. As April turned into May, preparations for the operation gathered pace.

Wargames were held on the Yamato between the 1st and 4th May to test the plans and explore the post-Midway operations, where it was apparent that what has been termed as 'victory disease' affected almost all levels of the senior staff. Such a mindset had its origins in the psychological view the Japanese had of themselves, their history, the samurai tradition and the belief in the divine righteousness of their cause. Such an attitude had warped the Japanese perceptions of the United States to the point where it was believed that there was really nothing to fear from this weak and decadent opponent, ignoring the immense military, industrial and moral potential of the great power. Therefore it was believed that the Japanese held the undisputed initiative in the up-and-coming operation and that the US carriers would only put to sea after the attack on Midway had begun.

That they might already be at sea and awaiting the Japanese was never really considered and when it happened to be brought up as a possibility to explore different aspects of the battle, it was dismissed and the results (the carriers Kaga and Akagi being sunk) were overturned. The Japanese began serious preparations for Operations MI and AL towards the end of April when the First Air Fleet returned from operations in the Indian Ocean. However, Nagumo had to accept the results of the Battle of the Coral Sea, which despite the victory trumpeted by the Japanese media had left the Shokaku badly damaged and in need of extensive repairs and the Zuikaku had lost a large percentage of her aircrew and had to wait for replacements.

All I asked for was a date.

Excellent, Pars. Really, I enjoyed this read a lot. I was wondering how Midway integrated into the overall strategy. You sure filled that out.

Just a footnote. While I'm sure you already know this, Shokaku went on only to go down to a sub, two years later. We got Shoho, though, at Coral Sea. Hence, "Scratch one flattop." That's the carrier that report was referencing.

Thanks!

 

[parsifal]

You cant answer really with one date. One man - ugaki, is not the IJN, and the persauasion of the IJN was a process taking moths. Planning proper was well under way by March/April, but not really finalised until early to mid May. Choice of targets were for the IJN preferred to be Ceylon, but was torpedoed by the Imperial Army's refusal to co-operate. The IJN also favoured capture or isolation of Australia over the Midway operation, and lastly favoured a full on assault of Hawaii over the shadow boxing of isolation. They were forced into Midway essentially by Army intrasnigence. The Army was committed to a China first strategy which in retrospect could have been postponed for a year or so whilst the Americans were more effectively dealt with. In the end the reault would have been the same, but quite possibly at higher cost.

When we have playtessted this scenario, the best strategy we found for the japanese was to put the offensive in China on hold, or even retreat to the port areas temporarily. Midway was best taken in December 1941, using the returning Carriers from Pearl and the SNLF units in the Marshalls. We would hold off on the Wake assault for some time, but maintain seaplane suveillance into the Hawaiian island using a few LR seaplanes. Isolating wake and starving them out is bait that forces the USN to react. React before they are reading too much signal traffic and before they are ready to take on the IJN head to head....probably about January 1942. Sometimes it worked, sometimes not. But it was very tempting for inexperienced US players to try and mount either an evac or resupply of Wake, and provided the Japanese were ready, they could usually spring a trap for the USN....a kind of Midway in reverse.

Ther is no way for the Japanese to win outright. Any simulation that tries to show that is very wide of the mark. Japanese wartime strategy after the completion of the 1st op phase must be defensive, that means that by about June, ther are no further big assaults. The Japanese player(s) should be in possession of their outer defence perimeter (which includes Moresby anbd possibly Darwin), and be busily digging in as fast as they can. They have to surrender the initiative and conserve their strength. Carriers at truk, ready to react to either a central or southern thrust by the USN. USN will initially be occupied by re-capture of Midway....its just too much of a potential threat. Normally takes about three months, and that in turn delayes their next move, either in the central pacific or southwest, by about 4 months or so, that is about December.

In the meantime, whilst the fortification of the island bases is proceeding, the Japanese need to restart their offensive into China. They can never win outright here either, but establishing a rail link to IndoChina is a partial solution to what is coming.....the US surface and submarine offensive. Getting some resources from SE Asia to North China by rail reduces the strain on the Japanese merechant fleet, and allows a higher level of logistic support to the forward base areaas, and usually reduces shipping losses to subs 9not always though). That means that greater resources can be used for military construction ...more destroyers and more carriers mostly.

The big showdown almost always occurs in 1944 in "War In The Pacific". There simply is no stopping the Americans as their skill levels and numbers increase. By 1944 even under the most favoiurable conditions for the Japanese, the Americans will be advancing toward the key areas of Saipan and Truk. The Japanese do have to commit their fleet and air forces to a final forward defence battle around either of these base areas. Hopefully there are more Japanese carriers, better trained aircrews, better land based defences, and less US carriers to contend with, but even with all those advantages, its a difficult battle. Its nearly always necessary to initiate Kamikazes as part of your Saipan/Truk defence (ie somewhat earlier than historical), but usually also the improved preparations for this battle will see roughly 4 US carriers sunk in exchange for 8 japanesde carriers sunk or damaged. after the defeat of the "inner defence perimeter, (which is usually completed by December 1944), the Japanese no longer need or can afford carriers. The idea of the simiulation is simply to last until December 1945, (in which case the japanese players are the winner), if you can delay the destruction of the Saipan/Truk/Hollandia line until December 1944, you usually have the whole game in the bag.

But of course, you can never rely on your opponent doing exactly as you expect, and often the US Players can pull off some kind of upset. Historically Midway is one such upset. it was rightly described at the time as "the incredible victory" which is a description I believe well deserved.

 

[Francis marliere]

Parsifal, I would not say that the Japanese "were forced into Midway essentially by Army intransigence". I agree that many navy projects (most of them silly IMHO), such as the invasion of Ceylan, Australia or Hawaii were cancelled because the army refused to engage troops and shipping. But as far as I know, the strategy on which both army and navy HQ agreed was to isolate Australia by capturing bases in the South Pacific (from New Guinea to Fidiji). Midway was Yamamoto's own project and was opposed, like Pearl Harbor, by many people in the navy. Yamamoto won the day because of his popularity (he threatened to resign) and because of the Doolittle raid.

Best,

Francis Marliere

 

[VBF-13]

Parsifal, I would not say that the Japanese "were forced into Midway essentially by Army intransigence". I agree that many navy projects (most of them silly IMHO), such as the invasion of Ceylan, Australia or Hawaii were cancelled because the army refused to engage troops and shipping. But as far as I know, the strategy on which both army and navy HQ agreed was to isolate Australia by capturing bases in the South Pacific (from New Guinea to Fidiji). Midway was Yamamoto's own project and was opposed, like Pearl Harbor, by many people in the navy. Yamamoto won the day because of his popularity (he threatened to resign) and because of the Doolittle raid.

Best,

Francis Marliere

Francis, I think a better way of putting it is, they didn't know what they were doing in Southeast Asia, and it was that indecisiveness that left Midway on the table. If they did know what they were doing in Southeast Asia, what business did they have committing those resources to Midway? They would have hit right back with those resources at Coral Sea. Call it Coral Sea Part II. But it was their temporizing in that area that took that option off the table, and, what were they left with, "in the book?" Midway. What the hell? Let's see what happens. Yamamoto got his way there principally due to that indecisiveness and temporizing. As I'm seeing it, that's the straw that really broke the camel's back. Sitting around debating their policy in Southeast Asia was getting them nowhere quick. Doolittle was but a spark.