Did the 8th Air Force precision bomb or area bomb?

[wuzak]

The Official History of the RAAF describes which of its squadrons (460, 462, 463, 466 and 467) participated on which raids in the Oil Campaign in this chapter:

http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/pdf/RCDIG1070709--1-.PDF

This section caught my attention:

Apart from these main-force attacks, Mosquito aircraft of the Path-finder Group made six small-scale raids in June 1944. Four of these attacks, totalling only 80 sorties, were against the Scholven-Buer installations, while the other two, totalling 82 sorties, were directed to the Meerbeck works of Rheinpreussen, a typical Fischer-Tropsch plant about three miles north-west of Homberg . For the comparative outlay these small raids were far more effective than the main efforts, especially against the "thin-skinned" Fischer-Tropsch target. This was the result of the superior tactical freedom of the Mosquito in bad weather and also because each aircraft could be controlled by Oboe, and thus even when bombing blind a greater theoretical concentration of bomb pattern was possible. Only two R.A.A.F. pilots, Flight Lieutenant Molony of No. 105 and Flight Lieutenant Grant of No. 109, both experienced second tour men, have been identified in the first two attacks against Meerbeck, but, as this plant will henceforth be used as the yardstick of Bomber Command efficiency against this type of target, the raids warrant some analysis.

Meerbeck occupied an area of about 100 acres of which one-third was occupied by essential process structures and the remainder open ground, transport and supply facilities. It was defended in June by nearly 100 guns, was well camouflaged and had a decoy plant about three miles away. Previously the main plant had never been bombed but the decoy plant had been successful on several occasions in attracting bombs during raids in the Homberg area . On 25th-26th June, however, the Mosquitos did hit the main works although, of 44 tons of bombs dropped, only a ton and a half fell inside the plant perimeter. Even so the sulphide-removal sections, gas-holder, cracking section and many pipe-lines were damaged. This raid alone cut the daily production at Meerbeck of 175 tons by two-thirds. The second raid on 30th June-1st July employed heavier individual bombs, but of 55 tons dropped only six and a half fell on the plant. This was sufficient to cause severe damage to gas-holders and a compressed-air main which put the whole installation temporarily out of action.

These show low success rates of hitting the target (3.4% on the first raid and 11.8% on the second). From teh account it seems that the first raid was probably with 500lb bombs - meaning that 6 bombs hit (assuming short tons), whereas the second raid is likely to have used either 4000lb or 1000lb bombs, or a combination. If it were 1000lb bombs that would be 13 hits from 55 aircraft whch knocked the plant out.

 

[wuzak]

Just downloaded a couple of Operational Record Books for 109 and 139 Squadrons.

On the night of the 25th June 1944, 109 Squadron bombed the Oil facility at Homburg. 8 B.XVIs from 109 were sent - one with markers, 7 with 4000lb MC bombs. Several of the aircraft list "Bombed D.R. due to technical failure". I assume this is because they were using Oboe to bomb?

One aircraft "marked and bombed from 30,000ft by A.R. 5513" and another "bombed by A.R, 5513". Does anybody know what that means?

 

[mhuxt]

Just downloaded a couple of Operational Record Books for 109 and 139 Squadrons.

On the night of the 25th June 1944, 109 Squadron bombed the Oil facility at Homburg. 8 B.XVIs from 109 were sent - one with markers, 7 with 4000lb MC bombs. Several of the aircraft list "Bombed D.R. due to technical failure". I assume this is because they were using Oboe to bomb?

One aircraft "marked and bombed from 30,000ft by A.R. 5513" and another "bombed by A.R, 5513". Does anybody know what that means?

Hi Wuzak,

My *guess* is that it's the Automatic Release system which was tried for Oboe - ground signal released bombs instead of the aircrew. It was first tried on May 2 '44, so late June may still be realistic for it. It wasn't continued with as the system on at least one occasion released early.

Will PM you in a bit, sorry not to do so now but going out the door...

 

[wuzak]

I was posting the following but I couldn't access teh forum:

Also on the night of the 25th June, 139 Squadron bombed Homburg with 6 aircraft. Their ORB mentions a total force of 42 Mosquitoes, of which 39 bombed the target. Bombing was claimed to be good, with all but two falling in a tight concentration around a Target Indicator. No mention is made of the bomb load in this record, but since 4 of the attacking aircraft were B.IVs it stands to reason that the majority were 500lb MC bombs. Bombing was from between 20,000 and 24,000ft.

Both 109 and 139 Suqdrons had attacked another target the previous night. 109 Squadron had also marked 3 other targets on the morning of the 25th - 2 aircraft flew on both missions, but the crews were all different.


On the night of the 30th June, 139 reports that 40 Mosquitoes attacked Homburg, 24 of which were carrying 4000lb bombs (not identified as MC or HC). 139 had 7 aircraft in the attack which bombed between 20,000 and 23,000ft.

The report reads: "At 00.55 a large explosion was observed slightly in the North of the first T.I.s down. This large explosion started a very large fire, which could be seen up to a hundred miles from the target. Bombing was fairly concentrated in the vacinity of the markers."

109 Squadron had 6 aircraft in that attack. 3 of them identify carrying 4000lb HC bombs. 3 say bombed "D.R." and 3 "A.R. 5513", one of which follows with "(inaccurate)".

Two 109 aircraft attacked Homburg on the night of 1 July 1944 with 6 x 500lb MC bombs. 4 attacked Scholwen with the same bomb load.

 

[wuzak]

Hi Wuzak,

My *guess* is that it's the Automatic Release system which was tried for Oboe - ground signal released bombs instead of the aircrew. It was first tried on May 2 '44, so late June may still be realistic for it. It wasn't continued with as the system on at least one occasion released early.

That sounds reasonable. D.R. would, perhaps, then be "delayed release". 5513 must be some sort of grid or target reference.

 

[mhuxt]

That sounds reasonable. D.R. would, perhaps, then be "delayed release". 5513 must be some sort of grid or target reference.

Heya,

Sorry, should have said earlier, DR is "dead reckoning" - good old-style navigation.

 

[stona]

Heya,

Sorry, should have said earlier, DR is "dead reckoning" - good old-style navigation.

And not very accurate in terms of dropping explosives on relatively small targets, even when undertaken by very good and very experienced navigators. They would essentially navigate by the stars, fine for a Viking looking for the north east coast of England and a monastery or two to ransack, not so good for a bomber crew looking for a precise target hundreds of miles away and flying at several hundred miles an hour when any error is very rapidly compounded.
I do not under estimate the immense skill of some navigators, my own great uncle was one, but you have to be realistic. Without seeing a recognisable and correctly identified feature on the ground by which to accurately fix position the important part of the phrase 'dead reckoning' is the reckoning.
Cheers
Steve

 

[mhuxt]

Can't say I disagree - dead reckoning was what got BC into trouble during Pierse's tenure.

 

[Timppa]

It is frustrating that even today I pick up books and watch documentaries in which experts claim that unlike the RAF the Americans didn't area bomb.

But generally it is true (against Germany). USAAF targeted mainly industrial targets, while the RAF concentrated on "dehousing" (euphemism for simply killing as many people as you can ).

RAF had the capability to hit pinpoint targets,as Dams and Peenemunde raids proved. But as Harris himself have told in his book, "dehousing" was a deliberate decision.

stark reality was either area bomb Germany or be area bombed, invaded and then enslaved and murdered, there was no third option.

As the oil campaign showed, there was indeed a much better option.

what Bomber Harris said about sowing the seed and reaping the whirlwind was right and we need not feel ashamed of it.

Fortunately, now in this cynical nuclear era, everybody agrees that the "women and children first " -strategy is the right way to go (and not feel ashamed).

 

[stona]

Harris' failing not that he believed that he could defeat Germany by flattening her cities, but rather that he ignored the ever increasing evidence that this was not going to happen and refused to allow his bombers to take part in a joined up campaign, in support of the other services and an overall strategy to defeat Germany, until virtually forced to do so.
He didn't concede until the summer of 1944 and when Bomber Command did go after the targets famously and derisively described by Harris as panaceas it proved very effective indeed.
This reluctance to deviate from his city smashing strategy also led directly to what Bomber Command itself acknowledged as a defeat in the so called 'Battle of Berlin' which cost many lives and probably extended the war in Europe by a couple of months.
I don't mind that Harris was wrong in supposing that he might win the war his way and I admire his determination. He himself said that he didn't know whether the task was possible because it had 'never been tried'. What I find unpalatable is his refusal to acknowledge the evidence that, having tried, it was indeed impossible and alter his tactics.
Cheers
Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

Harris was a soldier if someone from either RAF high command or the Cabinet had told him not to carry out his plans he had 2 choices tender his resignation or follow orders. The fact that no one ordered him to stop is the fault of his superiors he was given a fairly vague and broad objective and he attempted to carry it out. The fact that some slippery politicians tried to rewrite history when they failed to reign him in at the time is more there crime than Harris's

 

[stona]

Portal forced him to toe the line eventually. He should have been fired or brought into line sooner, but that's another question. Harris never accepted the mounting evidence that a bombing campaign as part of a more subtle integrated strategy was the way to use Bomber Command. Bludgeoning German cities, particularly Berlin, was never going to win the war and might actually break Bomber Command. Even when he did finally do as he was told he did it reluctantly, though not as some would have you believe, half heartedly.
Cheers
Steve

 

[wuzak]

Reading through the Oil Campaign section of the Bomb Damage Assessment discussion paper mhuxt posted in http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bomb-damage-assessment-good-paper-41285.html, the conclusion is that the damage done by BC was more devestating than that by the 8th and 15th AFs.

The most spectacular success in this opening phase of the oil campaign went not to the 8th Air Force, which carried out all the attacks just reviewed, but to Bomber Command, whose 12-13 June night attack on the Gelsenkirchen-Nordstern Bergius plant caused severe damage.

Note that the 8th AF raids referenced were themselves quite damaging to the oil prodcution of Germany.

key reason for this success was the superb accuracy resulting from expert Pathfinder Force work with improved Oboe sets that allowed Pathfinder Mosquitoes to drop flares at precisely the right locations. The 286 Lancasters of the main force then dropped 1,500 of their 4,637 bombs—over 32 percent of all munitions— directly on the oil plant. The fact that 320 of these bombs were 4,000-lb. "Blockbusters proved highly significant because they caused severe structural damage and smashed both buried electrical and water conduits as well as overhead steam pipes, creating a nightmarish situation for repair crews. These British raids put a much greater weight of bombs on their targets than did 8th Air Force missions because Lancasters carried 14,000 pounds of bombs and B-17s only 6,000-9,000 pounds. The fact that British bombers attacked their targets in trail and individually rather than in combat boxes, which bombed in unison, also meant a heavier concentration of hits around the aimpoint.

This lends support to the idea that BC "precision bombed area targets" and the 8th AF "area bombed precision targets".

 

[stona]

I think late in the war the difference between precision and area bombing for Bomber Command becomes blurred. A successful area raid, like that on Dresden, was actually a very precise operation. Sector bombing depended on aircraft flying very accurately over well placed markers on slightly different bearings to totally devastate and area looking a bit like a slice of cake. The target is an area (that slice) but the method is very precise. The RAF could apply these techniques to so called precision targets to great effect.

I agree 100% that Bomber Command, by mid 1944, had the capacity to and did 'precision bomb area targets' as you put it. Whether we like it or not the USAAF was generally slightly less accurate than the RAF by this stage of the war. The nature of the American bombing technique, bombing on the leader, gives credence to your second contention, though I doubt the USAAF then or now would concede the point and I wouldn't like to force it

In defence of Arthur Harris, when he took over at Bomber Command that organisation had received 22 directives from the Air Ministry, many conflicting or imprecise, on how to go about the bombing of Germany. Harris was determined that this groping 'in the darkness for Germany's economic jugular', as Max Hastings so succinctly put it, would stop. No more 'panacea targets' like aircraft factories or oil plants. He saw these as a futile short cut and was determined to concentrate all available forces for the progressive, systematic destruction of the urban areas of the Reich. At the time this was effectively what he had been ordered to do and he would do his utmost to succeed.
The problem was that his conviction became an obsession and obsessives are blind to any alternative. On 12th August 1943 he wrote to Portal saying

'It is my firm belief that we are on the verge of a final showdown in the bombing war... I am certain that given average weather and concentration on he main job, we can push Germany over by bombing this year.'

He couldn't. He also upset many with his efforts to force a faster US build up of bomber forces in the UK and his efforts to get them to join his campaign.

'We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the USAAF will come in on it. It will cost between 400-500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war.'

It didn't. It led instead to a near catastrophic defeat for his own command. It was the compulsory transfer of Bomber Command to tactical operations in support of the invasion meant that Harris never really acknowledged the defeat. He deluded himself that had the preparations for the invasion not intervened then, true to his Trenchardist belief, he would have brought Germany to her knees.

He was not alone. The tactical deployment of the allied bomber forces in the 'Transport Plan', effectively a massive campaign of interdiction behind the allied bridgehead(s) in Normandy brought things to a head. He had an ally in Spaatz who also believed that any tactical use of the heavy bomber forces was a misuse. Spaatz believed that 'Overlord' was a bad mistake and that Germany was already on the brink of defeat. He, unlike Harris, also felt that he had found Germany's jugular and this would eventually mature as the 'Oil Plan'. Spaatz was correct. Harris also had support from Lord Cherwell and even Churchill (though his concern was French civilian casualties.)

In the end Harris had to be ordered to start the transport plan. In March 1944 Bomber Command attacked various transport targets in France with conspicuous success and very few civilian casualties. Harris had been confounded by the virtuosity of his own men. Churchill still resisted the 'Transport Plan' until May before bowing to American pressure. In March 1944 70% of British bombs were directed against Germany. In April this was under 50%, by May less than 25%. In June this figure was negligible.

'The panacea merchants' had triumphed, wrote Harris. 'Naturally I did not quarrel with the decision to put the bomber force at the disposal of the invading army once the die had been cast; I knew that the armies could not succeed without them' he continued somewhat disingenuously.

Bomber Command was forced into a different role and it is to Harris' credit that once 'the die had been cast', though it was a long time in the casting, he applied the same determination, at least initially, to this new role as he had the previous one. The aircrew of Bomber Command proved themselves more than capable of attacking these new targets effectively, employing skills, techniques and tactics developed over the previous five years.
It is to his discredit that by the end of the year he was returning to area bombing and neglecting the oil campaign. Once again Portal had to more or less force him to toe the line. There was a truculent exchange of letters leading to Harris threatening to resign. Portal should have accepted his resignation but once again failed to get rid of Harris.
Cheers

Steve

 

[gjs238]

Was BC able to fly lower altitude during their night missions than the US flew?

 

[wuzak]

Was BC able to fly lower altitude during their night missions than the US flew?

Certainly the Lancaster could not fly as high as the B-17 or B-24.

So, yes, I think generally they bombed from lower altitudes.

On the other hand, BC also used Mosquitoes to bomb. These bombed from varying altitudes - 109 squadron bombed Homburg from 30,000ft, while 139 bombed from 20-25,000ft.

 

[Balljoint]

Was BC able to fly lower altitude during their night missions than the US flew?

Actually, the pathfinders Mosquitos flew at higher altitudes that allowed them to focus on the target. FLAK seriously diminished the bombardiers' attention. Radio bombing navigation aids such as H2S, GeeH, Oboe and MicroH were British developments and better used by the RAF, particularly when based closer to the targets as ground was gained in Europe. The RAF marked the target and bombed largely as individual planes. The Eighth bombed as a block upon release by a lead bombardier.

Harris apparently recognized that oil target were better attacked by smaller formations in that the target was fairly small and well covered by smoke, both intentionally and bombing generated. And, as has been mentioned, the big RAF bombs were more effective than the AAF 500 pounders.

 

[mhuxt]

Bear in mind not all Pathfinders were Mosquitos, nor were all BC Mossies employed in a pathfinding role.

 

[wuzak]

Interestingly, in the Operational Record Books I have for 109 squadron, some say "marked", some say "bombed" and yet others say "marked and bombed".

That would suggest that they would sometimes carry a mixed load of TIs and bombs.

 

[stona]

Was BC able to fly lower altitude during their night missions than the US flew?

Generally yes. Main Force squadrons bombed over a range of altitudes from as low as 6,000 ft up to 17,000 ft. There may have been some higher. For example 5 Group attacked Dresden from between 12,000 and 13,500 ft. Main Force squadrons attacked Peenemunde from 6,000-10,000 ft.
Bombing heights were not rigorously regimented as in the USAAF because Bomber Command was flying in a stream at night, not in tight defensive formations. Different squadrons would receive slightly different orders about bombing heights depending on the mission and defences expected. The absolute minimum height, for safety reasons, was 4,000 ft.
It is often not appreciated that some of the markers, particularly the Blind Markers, actually flew higher than the Main Force squadrons in order to allow their radar to illuminate a large enough area to establish position. They often flew at 16,000ft.
Cheers
Steve