Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

[Shortround6]

At what point after May 1942 was the USN ever shoirt of F4Fs. At what point did the Avenger become an effective torpedo bomber. The latter was a very effective aircraft but it was not effective in its allotted role until well after 1943. There were no shortages of F4Fs after Coral Sea that I know of. The factory was NOT essential to the American war effort, or at least, not as essential as securing a better supply of carriers.

Its not my explanation either. You are arguing with the author of a pretty solid reference. good luck with that. I notice not a shred of evidence to support your claims incidentally. funny that....

Maybe it wasn't short of F4Fs because Grumman was making 90 or more a month in that factory you claim wasn't needed?
Factory had it's opening day ceremony Dec 7 1941, Prior peak F4F production was 47 planes back in April of 1941. Production topped only 30 planes a month in 3 other months until Jan 1942.

It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become an effective torpedo bomber but what was the alternative in the summer/fall/winter of 1942?

and by alternative the Devasator had been out of production for a couple of years so there are NO REPLACEMENTS and NO NEW AIRCRAFT to equip squadrons with.

Your idea is now to use LOTS of carriers with F4Fs and Dauntless's and nothing else? It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become effective in it's "allotted role" but that is more of a problem with the torpedo than the aircraft isn't it?

What kind of proof do you want?

Some production figures are from Grumman Aircraft since 1929 by Rene Francillon (dates for production by Grumman and Eastern Aircraft)
Some are from America's Hundred Thousand.
Some are from here, Exhibit 6.

Funny that, but I guess they are not good enough for you.

 

[Shortround6]

Another source for you to have an argument with........

Admittedly production did not get underway until the end of August, but its what it doesnt say that is interesting. Negotiations did not start until January 1942...if factory 3 had not been expanded and orders received pre-war , there is no reason not to expect grumman to have entered into a licence agreement with eastern before January/ April. It could just as well have been january/April 1940 or january April 1941. We are back to where we stsrted...factory number 3 was expanded to meet the expoected demands of the new fighter project, which is exactly what it did.

Building the Navy's Bases in World War II [Chapter 16]

"Bethpage, N.Y. -- The carrier-based fighter program required several expansions to the Grumman plant facilities at Bethpage, Long Island, N.Y. The first of these additions was begun on March 8, 1942. Included in the project was a wood-frame, two-story, 60-by-270-foot office building, on concrete footings and piers; also a U-shaped, 481-by-343-foot hangar, with brick walls and timber roof trusses.

In September 1942, a 480-by-840-foot additionwas started for the wing-assembly plant. This extension was erected with brick walls on structural-steel framing. Columns of steel, salvaged from the New York World's Fair, were spaced to form 20-by-40-foot bays. The roof was supported by 40-foot, laminated wood beams. The building was windowless. Open areas around three storehouses were enclosed to provide two sections, 230 feet long and 120 feet wide. The plant addition was occupied on October 5, 1942, and the warehouses were in use by the end of the year, although construction on the projects was not complete until July 1943.

In march 1943, construction was begun on another project, to provide a similar addition to the assembly shop. This extension was 420 feet wide and 502 feet long and was divided into assembly area and shops. Steel girders were used instead of laminated wood beams. Six, 100-by-320-foot warehouses, with cinder-block walls and structural-steel framing, were erected. On July 4, 1943, airplane production was begun in the assembly area of this addition. The warehouses had been put in use the previous May.

In November 1943, construction commenced on a building to house engineering and experimental work. The structure, 400 by 780 feet, had steel framing and 8-inch brick walls with 4-inch cinder-block lining. Most of the building was windowless. Its main portion was put in service by July 15, 1944.

By these wartime additions the Navy doubled the manufacturing facilities of the plant."

Now these additions are not described by Number (plant 2 or 3) but in Francillon's book (page 14) under 1940 it says " Construction of Plant 2, the main production facility during the war, was begun."

In 1941 number of employees tripled. (page 15)

Page 16, " As the Navy and Allies needed more Grumman designed aircraft than could be produced in the company's fast growing facilities at Bethpage (Plant 3 was opened in March), the Navy Dept instructed Grumman to transfer production of Wildcats and Avengers to the Eastern Aircraft Division of the General Motors Corporation and that of Ducks to Columbia Aircraft Corporation...........As a result of this programme, the last Grumman built Duck, Wildcat, and Avenger were delivered respectively in March 1942, May 1943 and December 1943."

I hardly think that the Grumman stopped production of the Wildcat in Sept or Oct of 1942 when Eastern first started and then waited until April/May to pop out 20 F4F-7s.

Avengers were being made by both Grumman and Eastern Aircraft for just over a year.

Grumman got their First contract for Avengers Dec 30 1940, 285 TBF-1s and 1 XTBF-2.
First Production Avenger (from Plant 2) was rolled out Jan 3 1942, Production hit 60 planes per month in June 1942, Production peak FOR Grumman was 163 planes delivered in August 1943.

all From Francillon's book.

Now Plant 3 may or may not have wound up as Grumman's largest plant. It may have wound up dedicated to F6F production ( as Plant 2 may have after Avenger production shut down). But it sure doesn't look like like "Plant 3" was "planed" in 1940 to be the future plant for the F6F to the extent that if it had not been built the US could have built another carrier for service in 1943/43.
Grumman paid for Plant 2 themselves I believe, unless you can show proof other wise.

 

[parsifal]

Maybe it wasn't short of F4Fs because Grumman was making 90 or more a month in that factory you claim wasn't needed?

I never said they werent needed. i said the factory was exapanded to accommodate the new fighters everybody knew were coming. Given that F4F production peaked when it wasnt being produced at bethpafe, what stopped that from occurring earlier. thats the issue you need to come to grips with. I think the expansion of Bethpage was done to accommodate the new fighter, which happened in the end to be the F6F. i think that was an uecessarary expansion, at least as a priority over earlier carrier deployment. The same reault could have been achieved if the factory had been expanded FY42, which means it would have begun serial production of the F6F in late'43 instead of early'43.

Factory had it's opening day ceremony Dec 7 1941, Prior peak F4F production was 47 planes back in April of 1941. Production topped only 30 planes a month in 3 other months until Jan 1942.

No question production needed to be increased, bu the US already had capacity that could absorb this. Grumman chose not to do that....they wanted more of the pie than that.

It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become an effective torpedo bomber but what was the alternative in the summer/fall/winter of 1942

?

Once the shortcomings of the Bliss Levitt were known, production of the TBF should have halted, with the CAGs replacing those squadrons with SBDs, until the topredo issues were solved. TBFs might be a shiny nice aircraft but as a weppon system they were a dud until the torpedoes were fixed. SBDs were an incomplete weapons package, but better than the inneffective torpedo squadrons Fitch the VTs until they can justify their existence....

and by alternative the Devasator had been out of production for a couple of years so there are NO REPLACEMENTS and NO NEW AIRCRAFT to equip squadrons with.

Wise after the fact, that much I will grant you, but putting Devastators on the carriers was a waste of time as well. These a/c were obsolete, and their wepons also defective. Far better to have SNDs in their place until a suitable VT was fully worked up...

Your idea is now to use LOTS of carriers with F4Fs and Dauntless's and nothing else? It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become effective in it's "allotted role" but that is more of a problem with the torpedo than the aircraft isn't it?

Four is not "lots", but its enough to maintain momentum during your winter 1943. Aircraft losses would actually decrease if that occurred as the allies would lessen the need to just slug it out with the Japanese in the SWPA from land bases.

What kind of proof do you want?

Some production figures are from Grumman Aircraft since 1929 by Rene Francillon (dates for production by Grumman and Eastern Aircraft)
Some are from America's Hundred Thousand.
Some are from here, Exhibit 6.

Funny that, but I guess they are not good enough for you.

steady up, let me have a look first....

 

[parsifal]

Building the Navy's Bases in World War II [Chapter 16][/url]

Bethpage, N.Y. -- The carrier-based fighter program required several expansions to the Grumman plant facilities at Bethpage, Long Island, N.Y. The first of these additions was begun on March 8, 1942. Included in the project was a wood-frame, two-story, 60-by-270-foot office building, on concrete footings and piers; also a U-shaped, 481-by-343-foot hangar, with brick walls and timber roof trusses.

In September 1942, a 480-by-840-foot additionwas started for the wing-assembly plant. This extension was erected with brick walls on structural-steel framing. Columns of steel, salvaged from the New York World's Fair, were spaced to form 20-by-40-foot bays. The roof was supported by 40-foot, laminated wood beams. The building was windowless. Open areas around three storehouses were enclosed to provide two sections, 230 feet long and 120 feet wide. The plant addition was occupied on October 5, 1942, and the warehouses were in use by the end of the year, although construction on the projects was not complete until July 1943.

In march 1943, construction was begun on another project, to provide a similar addition to the assembly shop. This extension was 420 feet wide and 502 feet long and was divided into assembly area and shops. Steel girders were used instead of laminated wood beams. Six, 100-by-320-foot warehouses, with cinder-block walls and structural-steel framing, were erected. On July 4, 1943, airplane production was begun in the assembly area of this addition. The warehouses had been put in use the previous May.

In November 1943, construction commenced on a building to house engineering and experimental work. The structure, 400 by 780 feet, had steel framing and 8-inch brick walls with 4-inch cinder-block lining. Most of the building was windowless. Its main portion was put in service by July 15, 1944.

By these wartime additions the Navy doubled the manufacturing facilities of the plant."

Very useful information, which tends to confirm that the plant underwent steady expansion in 1942-3. Doesnt say though that the plant was built in 1940, or what was happening in 1940-41, which is what we are interested in....

Now these additions are not described by Number (plant 2 or 3) but in Francillon's book (page 14) under 1940 it says " Construction of Plant 2, the main production facility during the war, was begun."

which is not inconsistent with what ive said. Why was the plant built? I think the answer was to accommodate the navy's plans for a new fighter....not "to accommodate the Navy's plans for expansion, though it seems it ended up doing that as well, for a time.

In 1941 number of employees tripled. (page 15)

Anderton says it differently....he says the hellcat program from '41 employed more than 20000 people. Maybe 20000 = three times the 1040 workforce.

Page 16, " As the Navy and Allies needed more Grumman designed aircraft than could be produced in the company's fast growing facilities at Bethpage (Plant 3 was opened in March), the Navy Dept instructed Grumman to transfer production of Wildcats and Avengers to the Eastern Aircraft Division of the General Motors Corporation and that of Ducks to Columbia Aircraft Corporation...........As a result of this programme, the last Grumman built Duck, Wildcat, and Avenger were delivered respectively in March 1942, May 1943 and December 1943."

This is very good information for which I commend you. However it doesnt prove or decide anything either way. The way Im reading that is that more carrier aircraft were needed and as a result of that two things happened....there were further exapansions at the grumman plant, and Wildcat and TBF production (ignoring Duck production) were moved off site, from March 1942. This could have happened anytime. And if the F6F had not been built, we would have been no worse off in 1942, and most of 1943. Additional orders for F4Fs could have been placed by the Navy, and Grumman would have found it necessary to seek licence production earlier than it did. thats not an additional cost, like the F6F program generated....its a managerial war production issue that required a bit of administration.

I hardly think that the Grumman stopped production of the Wildcat in Sept or Oct of 1942 when Eastern first started and then waited until April/May to pop out 20 F4F-7s.

. yep probably, but also probably not in the exapanded area set aside for the F6F, which appears to have been built progressively from 1940-43

Avengers were being made by both Grumman and Eastern Aircraft for just over a year.

Grumman got their First contract for Avengers Dec 30 1940, 285 TBF-1s and 1 XTBF-2.
First Production Avenger (from Plant 2) was rolled out Jan 3 1942, Production hit 60 planes per month in June 1942, Production peak FOR Grumman was 163 planes delivered in August 1943

.

which confirms thay already had considerable capacity, but needed more for the f6F, which they built....but at what cost in other production priorities. And TBF was another unecessary aircraft until it had a weapon that would actually work

Now Plant 3 may or may not have wound up as Grumman's largest plant. It may have wound up dedicated to F6F production ( as Plant 2 may have after Avenger production shut down). But it sure doesn't look like like "Plant 3" was "planed" in 1940 to be the future plant for the F6F to the extent that if it had not been built the US could have built another carrier for service in 1943/43

.


I dont think it was planned that way either. But gruman I think undertook exapansion of its production facilities to grab a bigger slice of the pie for the replacement fighter that they, and a lot of other people, knew was comiing. It may have been F4F, it may have been F5F, or it may have been F6F (it may have been something else entirely. As it traspired, it was the f6F that was built at bethpage, and it was Bethpade that was being greatly expanded from 1940, to build fighters and TBFs that had next to no impact on the early fighting through to late 1943. The Navy could have re-rdered its priorities, survived on existing production faciltiers and had its decisive carriers by early to mid'43.

Grumman paid for Plant 2 themselves I believe, unless you can show proof other wise.

Which means what....its still investment capital being squandered on a project not absolutely necessary for the immediate war needs. Private, public, heck, even if the japanese were paying for it, it still represents the expenditure of resources that could have been used elsewhere. The plant was built for a purpopse....to build aircraft....this would have been done on the understanding or the belief that a lot of money was going to be spent by government in thaat area of military acquaisition. The govt would have had to "promise" that money up front at least from FY41, the same as they dont pay for ships until delivered...they still have to show they have the money, the same as the rest of us....

 

[zjtins]

Hellcat over Spit. Range and ruggedness. The rest of the factors the pilots would try to control to his benefit. Range lets you follow the Spit back to land and then destroy ala ME262.
Ruggedness lets you take some hits and keep going, something the Spit was NOT known for.

 

[drgondog]

Hellcat over Spit. Range and ruggedness. The rest of the factors the pilots would try to control to his benefit. Range lets you follow the Spit back to land and then destroy ala ME262.
Ruggedness lets you take some hits and keep going, something the Spit was NOT known for.

Ruggedness over rated for air superiority fighter - otherwise you should take P-61 over Hellcat.

P-47D very rugged - but took backseat to Mustang as air superiority fighter.

Range permits greater tactical footprint and when fighters are comparable in performance, gives the edge to the longer range fighter

 

[Shortround6]

which confirms thay already had considerable capacity, but needed more for the f6F, which they built....but at what cost in other production priorities. And TBF was another unecessary aircraft until it had a weapon that would actually work.
I dont think it was planned that way either. But gruman I think undertook exapansion of its production facilities to grab a bigger slice of the pie for the replacement fighter that they, and a lot of other people, knew was comiing. It may have been F4F, it may have been F5F, or it may have been F6F (it may have been something else entirely. As it traspired, it was the f6F that was built at bethpage, and it was Bethpade that was being greatly expanded from 1940, to build fighters and TBFs that had next to no impact on the early fighting through to late 1943. The Navy could have re-rdered its priorities, survived on existing production faciltiers and had its decisive carriers by early to mid'43.

You seem to be under a misapprehension that some american companies were much bigger than they were in 1939-40.

They did expand tremendously during the war but many of them started 1-2 years (or more) behind the British expansion and shadow factories.

A Short Grumman Production History:

FF model, 64 built Between Dec 1931 and Nov 34. Parts later supplied to Canada for a batch.
J2F Duck, 315 built between April 1933 and March 1942, I don't now how many by late 1940.
F2F-1, 56 built between Oct 1933 and Oct 1935
F3F, 169 built between March 1935 and May of 1939.
XSBF, 1 in Dec 1935.
G-21 Goose, appears to be 57 from May 1937 to late (Nov?) 1940
F4F, 106 from July 1940 through Dec 1940, does not include prototypes?
Avenger is taking shape on paper if not mock-up?
Widgion makes first flight in 1940.
Grumman builds ONE F5F in 1940 and is working on ONE P-50.

Grumman is certainly expecting more business but also, even by going to multiple shifts, cannot handle existing business. Some expansion is needed even without Avenger production.
Claiming at this stage that production can be farmed out to the Auto makers (who are not even close to shutting down in 1940) is really using 20/20 hindsight.

If we accept the idea that the war could have been won with the F4F we also have to look at the production of fighters. There were 7825 F4Fs built and 12,275 F6Fs built for a total of 20,100 Grummans, granted much of the 1945 production do not see combat. (or even a training squadron) Now how many F4Fs are going to be needed? 1/2 the total? 60%? 70% Even with Eastern Aircraft tooled up and running Grumman is going to have to make thousands more F4Fs than they did historically and that probably cannot be done in the 1939-40 plant.


The whole "don't make torpedo bombers" thing is a red herring.
Given the "knowledge" that the torpedoes don't work was it actually harder to fix the torpedoes than play silly buggers with aircraft and ship production?

How long did it take and how much did it cost to fix the torpedo problem once they admitted they had one?

AS for US excess capacity in car production see;

U.S. Automobile Production Figures - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

US car factories don't shift until very late 1941/early 1942.

 

[zjtins]

Ruggedness over rated for air superiority fighter - otherwise you should take P-61 over Hellcat.

P-47D very rugged - but took backseat to Mustang as air superiority fighter.

Overrated, no. And P-61 does not perform like a Hellcat its not an absolute... aside from the question was Hellcat or Spit.

Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited. I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome.

Also the P-51 was pushed into service in part due to low cost vs the P-47 and P-38.

 

[bobbysocks]

the mustang was pushed into service because of the dire need for long range escorts. in the fall of 43 the 8th AF loses were so horrific that they suspended daylight bombing beyond what could be covered by escorts....which basically left the whole heart of germany untouched. that doesnt sound like there was little doubt about the outcome. the LW was still a strong and viable threat that had to be dealt with....they might have been hurting but they werent beat at this time.

 

[Njaco]

Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited. I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome.

So why bother? Why need a long range fighter? Why anything. Germany was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, the planes were just "modest successes" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.

 

[drgondog]

Overrated, no. And P-61 does not perform like a Hellcat its not an absolute... aside from the question was Hellcat or Spit.

I was addressing your statement regarding the importance of Rugged in air superiority. The Zero kicked the living crap out of Allied Fighters in 1941-1943 with not much to say about it. Rugged is very important if the other guy is on your ass and won't let go... but if the other guy has more firepower, is faster and more manueverable (Spit) usually one of those will work for you in combat. Hellcat had range, and could fold its wings, could carry an external ordnance load and was 'tougher' - and it was painted an impressive Blue.

Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited.

You need to get a time line figured out, look at the LW massive transfers from Ost and Sud fronts starting mid 1943 into the defense of Germany, and recalculate your statements.
I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome.

You are incorrect, again.

There was a HUGE doubt that the Allies would have air superiority over the Invasion Beach by June. Read a littel bit about the background of the 8th AF and how close it came to joining the RAF at night in the Fall of 1943. At that time only one P-38 Group was operational and the one P-51B Group in England but Not operational belonged to the 9th AF. The heat from Arnold, passed from Roosevelt via Marshall - resulted in Eaker getting fired and replaced by Spaatz/Doolittle.

Also the P-51 was pushed into service in part due to low cost vs the P-47 and P-38.

You are incorrect again. They P-51A was not even ordered until June 1942 when the USAAF finally got off its dead ass - as reports from UK were raving about the potential of the Merlin/Mustang X. The A-36 was ordered to keep the line going as NAA was given a contract for the P-51B, then most of the P-51A orders were re-written to P-51B. Until the Brits took over and converted a great airframe to a great fighter at all altitudes, the Army had not even started the Flight Tests of the XP-51 - allegedly because it wasn't ordered by the Army - only the Brits.

Short answer - the US Army screwed up big time and Arnold freely admitted it - then threw resources at North American to get it to the ETO.

It was ramped to a two factory production line because it was going to be the best long range fighter available in Europe for 8th AF Strategic Operations.

If you read a little deeper into operational histories you will note how OUTNUMBERED the Mustang was over Germany until May 1944. The Battle for Germany starting over during Big Week and running through to D-Day saw the P-51B destroying more German aircraft than all the P-47C and D victory credits combined from April 1943 through June 6... despite flying 4-6x the number of sorties than the P-51B/C.

 

[Aozora]

Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited. I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome.

Also the P-51 was pushed into service in part due to low cost vs the P-47 and P-38.

Don't know where you got this horse pucky from - the USAAF strategic bombing campaign almost died in October 1943 because of a lack of escort fighters and because the Luftwaffe were knocking down too many B-17s and B-24s; there were still lots of good pilots available to the Luftwaffe. As it was the P-38s and P-47s were struggling, partly because of the weather conditions, but mainly because of poor tactics on the part of 8th FC. The only reason the campaign was able to be revived was because of the availability of the P-51 coupled with a change of leadership in 8th FC and a change in tactics.

Do some quality reading before making ridiculous assertions.

 

[VBF-13]

So why bother? Why need a long range fighter? Why anything. Germany was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, the planes were just "modest successes" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.

I know an opportunity when I see it...

The idea that hellcat "won the air battle" is one of those urban myths. They did a lot of excellent work, but by the time they arrived on the scene in Septemeber, the Japanese were already on the canvas as far as losing air superiority was concerned.

So why bother? Why need a better bomber-fighter? Why anything? Japan was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, they were "losing air superiority" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.

 

[parsifal]

Hellcat over Spit. Range and ruggedness. The rest of the factors the pilots would try to control to his benefit. Range lets you follow the Spit back to land and then destroy ala ME262.
Ruggedness lets you take some hits and keep going, something the Spit was NOT known for.

the range difference between hellcat and seafire III is not as much as might be expected. Hellcats operated out to a maximum of 230-260 miles, unless you have combat examles to the contrary. seafires were undertaking offesnsive escort missions out to the 180 mile radius. Thats a good range advanatage to the hellcat, but not decisive.

 

[parsifal]

I know an opportunity when I see it...


So why bother? Why need a better bomber-fighter? Why anything? Japan was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, they were "losing air superiority" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.

Because in 1940-41, when the f6f was being designed and developed, nobody knew what the next generation of Japanese aircraft were going to be like. Total obsolescence does make a difference, but the f4F for the entire duration was never outclassed to that extent. moreover, my position is not that better technology is uneeded or undesirable. but the thing the US needed the most in 1943 was extra carriers. not a new fighter (which did not appear in numbers until November). That could have come later, and no impact on US progress would have occurred. Give the US additional 3 or 4 carriers in early 1943, and big changes to the war are likely.

If the US had taken a risk, and just relied on the Corsair for its 1944 (late) and 1945 frontline operations (not that 1945 operations would have arisen), would not have suffered because of the absence of the hellcat in the inventory....provided the numbers are there. Shortround has presented some information that does make me think twice about that second assumption, I will grant you.

ive never said that defeating the japanese was easy. you did. On numerous occasions. Which not only direspects the japanese, it also disrespects the US and allied flyers who died trying to defeat them.

What I did say, (and am repeating for the gazillionth time), is that slight differences in performance, wont affect the loss exchange rates very much, unless there are other factors assisting. Interesting that you have tried to use an argument that concerns the germans....despite our good friends claims about them being outnumbered, in fact in the actual battles, they significantly outnumbered the escorting mustangs (and others) undertaking the deep penetration raids into germany in 1944. The US had vastly better pools of replacement aircraft and pilots. the US had better trained pilots than previous, and better tactics. the germans had arguably better tech (but not decisive), a modicum of good pilots, massive logistic problems (shortages of fuel mostly) and poor tactical direction. They were not ready for the effect of the long range Mustangs...result, a decisive, war winning victory by the US.

if the US Hellcats had been facing in like numbers, with good logistic support, better trained pilots, and a range of other issues, things would have been different with the hellcat. The US would still have won, but these "other factors" that you refuse to acknowledge, would have made a big difference to the exchange rates. One "other factor not normally considered' but which im suggesting, is the importance of maintaining the initiative and the pressure on the japanese. and this seems to have slackedned, or lessened in early 1943, the most obvious reason being a lack of carriers.



However, if the US had not received the hellcat, but had received an adequate supply of Wildcats plus 4 additional carriers in early 1943, they would not have needed to slow down their offensive against the japanese, as they did, and i think there is every possibility that the war would have concluded sooner.

Im not saying technology is unimportant. im not saying it was easy, im not saying you dont need "anything". im saying that the Hellcat was not as decisive as it is made out to be, and it wasnt reponsible for the japanese losing air superiority to the US. it helped, it was very effective, but it did not single handedly win the war in the pacific.

 

[zjtins]

A number of air forces had already tried this including both the RAF and Luftwaffe. They found, contrary to Douhet's thesis, that the single engine fighters were more than able to catch a multi-engine bomber and outgun it easily. The RAF had worried about this before the start of the war and had decided in the mid-1930s to produce an all night-bomber force, but when the war started they had these planes operate during the day. Both forces lost so many planes during initial operations that they quickly switched to night operations.

The USAAF reasoned that their bombers' higher altitudes and more powerful defensive gun load would be enough to turn the tide in favour of the bomber. The limited numbers of B-17's made large scale operations impossible until late 1943, with only small, well-escorted raids being made in the meantime over France to shake out the crews and planes.

The numbers had improved enough by late summer of 1943, that the USAAF decided to attempt large scale operations. Picking the German ball-bearing industry as a vital choke point of aircraft production, they launched several massive raids in October that flew deep into Germany. The results were disastrous with over 10% of the planes failing to return to England from each mission and many more written off due to heavy damage. A few more raids and there would be no bombers left.

It was clear that the bombers required fighter escort, but no fighter had anywhere near the range of the bombers. The Lockheed P-38 Lightning came close, but this was a very expensive plane to construct and maintain. The Mustang changed all that. In general terms, the Mustang was as simple or simpler than other aircraft of its era. It used a single well-understood and reliable engine, and had internal space for a huge fuel load. With the addition of external fuel tanks it could protect the bombers all the way to Germany and back.

Numbers were available when the 8th and 9th Air Forces had re-grouped over the winter of 1943/44, and when the raids recommenced in February, 1944, things changed dramatically. Bomber losses prior to that point had been primarily (in percentages at least) from rocket-firing twin-engine designs, and these were chased from the skies.

However the Luftwaffe pilots learned how to avoid the US fighters by grouping in huge numbers well in front of the bombers, then attacking in a single pass and leaving. This gave the escorting fighters little time to react. But in May a new policy was instituted which allowed the fighters to roam away from the bombers and attack the German planes wherever they were found. The numerical superiority of the USAAF fighters and the flying qualities of the P-51 made this policy highly effective, and after the Luftwaffe had suffered heavy losses both in defense of the Reich and in the failed attempt to fight off the Allied invasion in France, the US, and later British, bombers had little to fear from German day fighters after the summer of 1944.

So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west. The P-38 and P-47 had more experienced pilots (in general) and were more numerous till around Aug-Oct 1944. That means (to me) the majority of the fighter aircraft between Feb 1944 - Jun 1944 were not from P51's. If you have data to the contrary please present it.

They did not know then but we know now the air raids on Germany did only a modest affect on the production of necessary material, aside from keeping troops home as anti-aircraft units which was a significant factor. It was in Oct 1944 when we went after transportation and fuel that shut Germany down. However US, English And Russian production ramped up so high by late 1943 we all were outproducing our losses so yes the fate of Germany was sealed although what people thought back then was not so accepting.

 

[Glider]

So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west. The P-38 and P-47 had more experienced pilots (in general) and were more numerous till around Aug-Oct 1944. That means (to me) the majority of the fighter aircraft between Feb 1944 - Jun 1944 were not from P51's. If you have data to the contrary please present it.

Do you have anything to support your belief?

 

[Shortround6]

Because in 1940-41, when the f6f was being designed and developed, nobody knew what the next generation of Japanese aircraft were going to be like. Total obsolescence does make a difference, but the f4F for the entire duration was never outclassed to that extent. moreover, my position is not that better technology is uneeded or undesirable. but the thing the US needed the most in 1943 was extra carriers. not a new fighter (which did not appear in numbers until November). That could have come later, and no impact on US progress would have occurred. Give the US additional 3 or 4 carriers in early 1943, and big changes to the war are likely.

If the US had taken a risk, and just relied on the Corsair for its 1944 (late) and 1945 frontline operations (not that 1945 operations would have arisen), would not have suffered because of the absence of the hellcat in the inventory....provided the numbers are there. Shortround has presented some information that does make me think twice about that second assumption, I will grant you.

Thank you

Just so we are clear, I am not saying you are either right or wrong about not needed the Hellcat, given the way things played out you may very well be right about not NEEDING the Hellcat although things would have been much tougher.
I am not disagreeing about the need for more carriers in late 1942, early 43 or the effect they would have on the war as a whole, you have studied that much more than I.

I am disagreeing with idea that funding the design/research/development of the F6F and the funding of increased production capacity for that aircraft would have paid for the extra carrier/s.
Especially the amounts spent in the 1940/41 time frame when it would have had to have been spent in order to affect carrier production for 1943.

By the end of 1942 it appears that Grumman was building more F4Fs in one month than they had built total aircraft in their best years before 1940. Even going to triple shifts will not give you a 12 fold increase in production so SOME investment in Grumman production starting in 1940 was needed just to fill the historic needs for F4F in late 1942/early 1943.

Further down on the page/link I gave you is a description (without dollar amounts) of the work the Navy paid for at the 5 GM plants that made up Eastern Aircraft including the construction of two runways for the testing of the finished aircraft.
The GM Plants performed admirably and got work done and planes completed AHEAD of schedule but they only completed 20 aircraft by the end of Dec 1942 and that includes an Avenger or two. Even converting existing plants and work forces is neither quick or easy. And before the US was in a shooting war????

Perhaps the US did spend too much money setting up factories that only paid off in production in late 1943/44 when the war was already decided (but not won, the allies were going to win at that point, the questions remaining were when and at what cost) but the big investment came too late to affect programs for major ships needed in 1943.

 

[Jugman]

Arguing that it was expenditure being absorbed by the company is another furphy that i have been waiting for someone to raise. Whether or not the expenditure was company funds or government funds is irelevant, as irrelevant as saying research not bearing the label F6F but eventually used as a critical element of the F6F, is not a cost that can be laid at the feet of the F6F. if it was used in the design and development of the F6F and its production, its a cost that needs to be acknowledged. if the money was private or public, it was national wealth still spent in a certain direction, and in a controlled wartime economy, like the US economy of 1940, every dollar counts.

Research in many respects is a "joint product". Much like the cost of growing bacon can not be separated from the cost of growing ham, seperating the intellectual impact of some design from another is imposable. How does one go about measuring the impact of the G-33 (A proposed development of the F4F-2 with a R-2600) on the G-36 (F4F-3 ) and G-50 (F6F)? The cost of paper studies is rather small and inconsequential. The detailed engineering of a design and its actual construction is were the bulk of the cost of designing lies and that doesn't start typical untill there is a contract in the works. The Navy didn't approach Grummon untill Jun 1941 for a counterpart to the F4U.

The source of funding is extremly important. The fact that it was Grumman's money and not the Navy's means that it has little or no bearing on naval decision making. Another point the US economy was not a wartime economy in 1940 and it was never "controlled".

So I dont think it is misleading to say the factory was built for the Hellcat. maybe a little incorrect, since it might well have been used to build the f5F instead, had that fighter been adopted, but good enough. If the choice on the navy fighter had been XF5F, instead of the Hellcat, we'd be sitting here arguing about the F5f rather than the F6F. but that isnt how things panned out. It was the hellcat that was selected (for good reason), the design and research for the hellcat began well before 1941 (Source: "F6F Hellcat" by Hal Andrews, http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f6f-5.pdf). It doesnt matter that the new fighter was the Hellcat. The Navy already had a new fighter in the XF4U under design. They decided that was too risky and embarked on the development of at least two other prototype designs that i know of....the F6F and the F5F, both of which i think were done at the expense of carrier construction. I think a better priority would have been to continue development of the F4U, delay development of the F6F until FY42 increase production of F4f (which was done in existing factory space from the summer of 1941 anyway) abandon Essex production in FY 41, and instead build 4 Yorktowns instead of the measely 1 Essex they actually authorised.

The F4U, F5F, and FL were ordered at the same time (mid 1938 ). They all had their first flights in April-May of 1940. By which time there were FOUR Essex class carriers on order. By September there was an additional SEVEN. Money was not the issue. Even so, the total spent in FY40 on airframe, engine, and propeller R&D from all sources (government and private) was in the $30-$40M or one Yorktown class.

The only way to get more fleet carriers sooner is to free up slips. This can only be done by postponing or canceling battleships. That was not very likely to happen.

 

[drgondog]

So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west.

They didn't, nor did I say that they did. What I said is that the P-51B, (with a force that started in Devember 1943 with one FG, the 354th, built up to six operational Mustang Groups by the 1st week of May, 1944 and to seven by D-Day 6th of June, 1944) destroyed more German fighters in the air than ALL of the P-47C and P-47D's that flew air combat against the Luftwaffe for the 8 months preceeding P-51 Operation and the siz months after initiation of P-51 Operations.

That is what I say.

The P-38 and P-47 had more experienced pilots (in general) and were more numerous till around Aug-Oct 1944. That means (to me) the majority of the fighter aircraft between Feb 1944 - Jun 1944 were not from P51's. If you have data to the contrary please present it.

I agree with you (in General) - which makes the combat record of the P-51B even more remarkable.. In February 1944 there were two P-38 and two Mustang FG's operational in the 8th and 9th AF combined. There were 11 P-47D FG's.

With that same exact mix for operations during Big Week (2/20-2/25/1944), the score for air victory credits was; P-47 (78), P-51 (64.5) P-38 (10)..

Extended further
Total P-47 air victory credits - 8/9th AF from beginning ops in March 1944 through June 30, 1944 (1370)
Total P-51 air victory credits - 8/9th AF from beginning ops in December 1943 through June 30,1944 (1370)
Total P-38 air victory credits - 8/9th AF from beginning ops October 1943 through June 30, 1944 (205)
At the end of June 1944 the total number of 8th/9th AF Fighter Groups
P-47 - 13
P-51 - 9
P-38 - 6
Again - through 9/30/1944
P-47 - 1870
P-51 - 2402
P-38 - 352

Note - the 9th AF quit escorting 8th AF bombers but did continue escort duties for 9th AF Mediums as well as CAS starting in June so the engagement with LW in Germany dropped off somewhat for P-47s.
At the end of September the TOE looked like this for 8th/9th AF Fighter Command Fighter Groups
P-47 - 15
P-51 - 10
P-38 - 3
Are you beginning to see a pattern of Mustang effectiveness - air to air? And this does not include the large advantage the Mustang had for Ground destruction of LW aircraft. Very few Mustangs to guard very many bombers along an 80-100 mile stream bombing as many as six different targets - deep in Germany beyond P-38 range and well beyond P-47 range.
End of War total air victory credits for ETO
P-47 2658
P-51 4179
P-38 452

It was only in December 1944 when the 78th FG converted to Mustangs that the number of USAAF Mustang Fighter Groups matched the number of Thunderbolt Fighter Groups in the ETO.

As to 'experienced pilots'?? Well many P-47 and P-38 experienced pilots became 'experienced Mustang pilots" when they converted in Spring/Summer anf Fall 1944.




They did not know then but we know now the air raids on Germany did only a modest affect on the production of necessary material, aside from keeping troops home as anti-aircraft units which was a significant factor. It was in Oct 1944 when we went after transportation and fuel that shut Germany down. However US, English And Russian production ramped up so high by late 1943 we all were outproducing our losses so yes the fate of Germany was sealed although what people thought back then was not so accepting.

We went after Transportation and Fuel in May 1944 - If you wish to become acquainted with material and useful facts in this debate, look to "Inside the Third Reich"-Speer, USSBS, "A few Great Captains" and "Forged in Fire" - Dewitt Cooper, "Air Force Spoken Here" - Ira Eaker, "Day Fighters in Defense of Germany" - Caldwell.