If it happened in Germany the people responsible would have gone to the Eastern front.
Maneuverability vs Speed
- Thread starter JoblinTheGoblin
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Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 782
- Sep 30, 2021
The USN WWII torpedo problem was not made public during the war but was soon known post war. A torpedo shot apparently cost $10,000 versus the Air Force paying $129,000 for a DC-3 transport. So extensive testing was costly.
There were actually three problems. All of which began to be reported in December 1941. Code breaking supplied information as well. Of course individual commands did take action before the official system did. Things like using 16 torpedoes in a failed attempt to scuttle the dead in the water aircraft carrier USS Hornet in October 1942, 5 inch guns had to be used, the Japanese boarded the ship, then decided it was too far gone and put two of their torpedoes into it.
1) The depth keeping system consistently made the torpedoes run deeper than set. Tests begun in South West Pacific Command in mid 1942 revealed the average depth was 11 feet more than the settings. This was confirmed in the US in a series of tests ordered by Admiral King in July 1942, previous reports had been rejected by the Ordnance Department.
2) The new magnetic exploder, issued late in 1941 under strict secrecy rules, the people using the torpedoes found out about them after the war started. Testing consisted of firing dummy warheads at a cruiser in equatorial waters. No live tests were done. The officer in charge of the tests, Lieutenant Commander Ralph Christie did try for an old hulk to use for live tests but failed. Later he commanded one of the US Submarine bases against Japan and backed the exploder against the reports of the captains. The exploder often prematured. On 24 June for the Pacific Fleet submarines and 23 July 1943 for the destroyers came an official order to deactivate it.
3) The contact exploder, the pins were not strong enough, it meant an angled hit exploded more often but a torpedo hitting at near right angles usually did not. So the best attacks had a higher failure rate. In mid 1943 the Pacific fleet tried two torpedoes against a cliff, one failed. They then went to dropping dummy warhead torpedoes from a 90 foot crane onto a steel plate. All right angle hits caused the pins to distort rather than cause detonation, a 45 degree hit had the detonator working about half the time.
The immediate fix was to try and cut torpedo speed, plus look at captured German torpedoes. The German contact exploder at the start of the war also had real problems, solved when they used the Royal Navy design. Everybody's magnetic exploders had problems, for example helping save Sheffield during the Bismarck action, but responsible for the extensive damage to two Italian battleships at Taranto. Also if I remember correctly the original German magnetic mines were set up for ships built in the Northern Hemisphere, not the Southern.
In October 1943 the Pacific Fleet arranged for six torpedoes to be fired at a cliff, hitting at right angles, all exploded. There are all sorts of other factors involved, like the number of submarines operational and their bases but March to August 1943 allied submarines sank about 100,000 GRT of Japanese merchant shipping a month, September 1943 to February 1944 it was around 188,000 GRT a month.
There were actually three problems. All of which began to be reported in December 1941. Code breaking supplied information as well. Of course individual commands did take action before the official system did. Things like using 16 torpedoes in a failed attempt to scuttle the dead in the water aircraft carrier USS Hornet in October 1942, 5 inch guns had to be used, the Japanese boarded the ship, then decided it was too far gone and put two of their torpedoes into it.
1) The depth keeping system consistently made the torpedoes run deeper than set. Tests begun in South West Pacific Command in mid 1942 revealed the average depth was 11 feet more than the settings. This was confirmed in the US in a series of tests ordered by Admiral King in July 1942, previous reports had been rejected by the Ordnance Department.
2) The new magnetic exploder, issued late in 1941 under strict secrecy rules, the people using the torpedoes found out about them after the war started. Testing consisted of firing dummy warheads at a cruiser in equatorial waters. No live tests were done. The officer in charge of the tests, Lieutenant Commander Ralph Christie did try for an old hulk to use for live tests but failed. Later he commanded one of the US Submarine bases against Japan and backed the exploder against the reports of the captains. The exploder often prematured. On 24 June for the Pacific Fleet submarines and 23 July 1943 for the destroyers came an official order to deactivate it.
3) The contact exploder, the pins were not strong enough, it meant an angled hit exploded more often but a torpedo hitting at near right angles usually did not. So the best attacks had a higher failure rate. In mid 1943 the Pacific fleet tried two torpedoes against a cliff, one failed. They then went to dropping dummy warhead torpedoes from a 90 foot crane onto a steel plate. All right angle hits caused the pins to distort rather than cause detonation, a 45 degree hit had the detonator working about half the time.
The immediate fix was to try and cut torpedo speed, plus look at captured German torpedoes. The German contact exploder at the start of the war also had real problems, solved when they used the Royal Navy design. Everybody's magnetic exploders had problems, for example helping save Sheffield during the Bismarck action, but responsible for the extensive damage to two Italian battleships at Taranto. Also if I remember correctly the original German magnetic mines were set up for ships built in the Northern Hemisphere, not the Southern.
In October 1943 the Pacific Fleet arranged for six torpedoes to be fired at a cliff, hitting at right angles, all exploded. There are all sorts of other factors involved, like the number of submarines operational and their bases but March to August 1943 allied submarines sank about 100,000 GRT of Japanese merchant shipping a month, September 1943 to February 1944 it was around 188,000 GRT a month.
I joined that club yesterday!
Theres such a contrast between the respectful, engaged and interesting discourse of the other contributors to threads across the forum. Why engage with someone who's serially rude, hectoring and employs all the standard rhetorical devices of someone who wants to 'win' an argument, rather than having a conversation in which both parties might learn something?
Onwards and upwards.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
The Mark 13 torpedo's problems were not solved until 1944.
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cherry blossom
Senior Airman
- 506
- Apr 23, 2007
In a thread long ago, someone pointed out that USAAF P-47s had a higher loss rate than RAF Typhoons attacking similar targets in Normandy. However, nothing is ever simple as the Typhoons often used rockets and fired their guns at the target as they approached while the P-47s dropped bombs and then often attacked again using their guns, which gave the Germans two chances to hit them.
The Typhoon also has its radiator near the engine. By contrast, the P-51 has a relatively large radiator behind the cockpit (which is unusually far forward over the wing). The P-51's radiator probably didn't actually give net thrust but the thrust about equalled the drag to give the P-51 its superlative performance. However, the radiator was a big target.
One reason why the Hellcat's loss rate was lower than the Corsair's for similar missions may have been that the Corsair had aerodynamically good oil coolers in the wing leading edge whilst the Hellcat's were near the engine. However, it could just be easier to land a damaged Hellcat.
The Typhoon also has its radiator near the engine. By contrast, the P-51 has a relatively large radiator behind the cockpit (which is unusually far forward over the wing). The P-51's radiator probably didn't actually give net thrust but the thrust about equalled the drag to give the P-51 its superlative performance. However, the radiator was a big target.
One reason why the Hellcat's loss rate was lower than the Corsair's for similar missions may have been that the Corsair had aerodynamically good oil coolers in the wing leading edge whilst the Hellcat's were near the engine. However, it could just be easier to land a damaged Hellcat.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
The air launched Mark 13 did not have the exploder problems of the Mark 14. It it used the older Mark 4 exploder which did not have a magnetic influence capability and it's much lower speed did not overload the firing pins.
THE GREAT TORPEDO SCANDAL 1941-43 - NSL Archive
Naval rearmament, which began in the mid 1930s, and WWII had dramatic impact on U.S. torpedo programs. Three of the most significant changes were the…
archive.navalsubleague.org
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
It did happen in Germany.
BarnOwlLover
Staff Sergeant
I'd argue that the P-51's radiator was no more or less vulnerable than any other fighter that used a ventral radiator. Or even the Spitfire IX/VIII or later or Me 109E and later, or a even a Firefly or a Tempest I or Fury I that had leading edge radiators. Granted, those planes had two radiators (and 109F/G/K had the ability to shut down one radiator should it become damaged or just start leaking).
That being said, radials still had to have oil for lubrication (and may've helped with cooling to a degree), and once you start dealing with .50+cal HMGs and 20mm+ cannons, the issue of radial vs inline largely becomes immaterial. Same thing with radiator placement, though the RAF did object to the Tempest I and Fury I having leading edge radiators.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
... or Dachau ...
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
I think he's referring to the obstructive denialism, not the fact of poor design itself.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
If you read the paper you will see that 3 individuals served 6 months in prison
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
Was it because they actively obstructed a solution?
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
They certainly weren't giving straight answers. Their actual sentences were 2 to 4 years.
Are you suggesting that some Americans committed treason by basically sabotaging the war effort to hide their mistakes.
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
Wait are we talking about Germany or in the US?
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
In the case of BuOrd, yes.
Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
At the very least malfeasance. The system itself is largely to blame, though admittedly there is a lot of 'fog of war' in a Theater like the Pacific.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
Germany for the prison scentences.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
There was no fog around the issue of shitty American torpedoes. The issues were discovered immediately. Reports went up the line. They were ignored for over a year by NTS, until Admiral King ordered them to get to work solving the problems.
Snautzer01
Honourably banned
- 38,481
- Mar 26, 2007
Fuhrer reserve is more likely. Kind of boneyard reserve. Too old, to stupid or just not to be trusted
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The tendency for the sub's torpedoes to "boomerang" on them was certainly a harrowing trait.
While the USN only lost two subs (Tang and Tullibee), there were scores of close calls, including my Uncle's boat, the Grayling. During one of their early war patrol, the Skipper set up on a Japanese convoy and one of the torpedoes out of the spread circled back and only by the Skipper's quick thinking, did they miss being hit. When he was informed that one of the "fish" didn't sound right, he ordered an emergency dive and the torpedo passed directly overhead.
While the USN only lost two subs (Tang and Tullibee), there were scores of close calls, including my Uncle's boat, the Grayling. During one of their early war patrol, the Skipper set up on a Japanese convoy and one of the torpedoes out of the spread circled back and only by the Skipper's quick thinking, did they miss being hit. When he was informed that one of the "fish" didn't sound right, he ordered an emergency dive and the torpedo passed directly overhead.
