Number of aircraft in a squadron?

[JDCAVE]

33K: Your number for 428 Squadron and September 1944 is for aircraft on charge.

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record book... - Héritage

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record books : C-12301

heritage.canadiana.ca

Not all would be available for operations. 64 Base ORB records 19-21 serviceable aircraft depending on the date.

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record book... - Héritage

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record books : C-12428

heritage.canadiana.ca

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record book... - Héritage

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record books : C-12428

heritage.canadiana.ca

There are several code words here and from this forum:

Forums - RAFCommands Forums

vBulletin Forums

www.rafcommands.com

DERBY
(iv) Indicates the maximum effort from operational squadrons excluding crews which have operated on both of the two previous nights and crews screened for training, re-equipping or for any similar purpose.

GOODWOOD
(v) Indicates the maximum possible effort from Operational Squadrons, including all suitable 'freshmen'. All crews whether screened for training, re-equipping or for any similar purpose, irrespective of the number of previous consecutive nights on which they have operated are to be employed.

So there are serviceable aircraft and there are crews available. Also, aircraft were stored at the Base (64-Base Middleton St. George). These aircraft awaiting assignment to squadrons. So just because aircraft were at the Base, it does not mean that the squadrons have access to them, particularly during the period when 431 and 434 Squadrons were readying for reequipment with Lancaster X's.

Jim

 

[JDCAVE]

Further to this: This is the effort by the RCAF 6-Group for a raid to Dortmund,

The raid to Dortmund on October 6, 1944 was the largest effort of the war by RCAF 6-Group with 293 detailed to attack the target area .

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record book... - Héritage

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record books : C-12420

heritage.canadiana.ca

 

[MIflyer]

The naval force commander had decided not to take the available aircraft carrier with them because it was so small and slow. The resultant lack of fighter cover led to the IJN decsion to not send fighter escort with the bombers. The Buffalos would have been a rude shock to the bombers.

 

[33k in the air]

33K: Your number for 428 Squadron and September 1944 is for aircraft on charge.

Yes, that's right. The figures are from the respective squadrons' Summary of Events. I thought that was what you had posted as well.

Not all would be available for operations.

Agreed!

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

As has been noted a Squadron is a Squadron because the Air Force says it is a Squadron it will vary widely interms of number of aircraft, depending on place, time and type of aircraft.

The RAF on paper split squadron strength into Initial Equipment and Initial Reserve, I.R.+I.E, until late in the war, when this largely paper idea was replaced with Unit Equipment, U.E. counting all the aircraft, one report I have has the change over in June 1944. As a result it is easy to end up counting the I.R. numbers and think that is the total strength.

For Bomber Command Order of Battle See Air 14/2695 to 2697, often weekly during the war, July 1939 to December 1947. If there is a specific squadron strength wanted let me know. See also RAF Squadrons by Jefford which is a good reference for locations and equipment.

When the 8th Air Force arrived in Britain a heavy bomber squadron strength was 9 aircraft, so a group strength around 36, as of D-Day most groups held more than 50 and up to 72 aircraft, around 60 on average.

VIII Fighter Command, personnel as of 30th , aircraft as of 31st May 1944

Unit	Officers	Men	Aircraft	Note
HQ	183​	727​
Auxiliary	4​	79​		Hitcham
Auxiliary	6​	90​		Greyfriars
65th Wing	86​	833​
4th FG	186​	1379​	71​	P-51
56th FG	212​	1478​	94​	P-47
355th FG	179​	1416​	77​	P-51
356th FG	191​	1392​	86​	P-47
479th FG	196​	1390​	68​	P-38
66th Wing	76​	567​
55th FG	198​	1522​	70​	P-38
78th FG	215​	1464​	83​	P-47
339th FG	187​	1368​	68​	P-51
353rd FG	191​	1417​	82​	P-47
357th FG	193​	1409​	68​	P-51
67th Wing	83​	590​
20th FG	213​	1521​	68​	P-38
352nd FG	187​	1378​	74​	P-51
359th FG	191​	1461​	69​	P-51
361st FG	189​	1453​	74​	P-51
364th FG	203​	1505​	70​	P-38
Total	3369​	24439​	1122​
	195.4​	1436.9​	74.8​	average fighter group size

The USAAF official history has a table of (proposed) group strengths in 1945, fighter and very heavy bomber groups had 3 squadrons, others 4.

B-29, 45 aircraft, 60 times 11 man crews, 2,078 officers and men.
B-17/24, 72 aircraft, 96 times 9 to 11 man crews, 2,261 officers and men.
B-25/26, 96 aircraft, 96 times 5 to 6 man crews, 1,759 officers and men.
A-20/26, 96 aircraft, 96 times 3 to 4 man crews, 1,304 officers and men.
P-40/47/51, 111 to 126 aircraft, 108 to 126 pilots, 994 officers and men.
P-38, 111 to 126 aircraft, 108 to 126 pilots, 1,081 officers and men.
C-47 (troop carrier), 80 to 110 aircraft, 128 times 4 to 5 man crews, 1,837 officers and men.
C-46/47 (combat cargo) 125 aircraft, 128 times 4 man crews, 883 officers and men

The rest are squadron strengths,
P-61/70 night fighter, 18 aircraft, 16 times 2 to 3 man crews, 288 officers and men.
P-39/40/F-6/L-4/5 tactical reconnaissance, 27 aircraft, 23 pilots, 233 officers and men.
F-5 (P-38) photographic reconnaissance, 24 aircraft, 21 pilots, 347 officers and men.
F-9(B-17)/F-7(B-24) combat mapping, 18 aircraft, 16 times 9 man crews, 474 officers and men.

Force Z air cover, time line from the book Battleship by Middlebrook and Mahoney.
06.30 possible enemy aircraft sighted by Force Z.
10.05 HMS Tenedos, south of force Z signals is being attacked by enemy aircraft.
10.15 Japanese search plane spots force Z, and it spotted.
11.13 first bombing attack.
11.40 first torpedo attack, 11.44 HMS Prince of Wales is crippled.
11.58 HMS Repulse signals it is under air attack (received in war room 12.04)
12.20 HMS Prince of Wales signals torpedo hit and asks for destroyers. (received 12.40)
12.20 453 squadron takes off
12.30 (shortly before) HMS Repulse hit by multiple torpedoes, begins sinking.
13.04 Singapore receives a message from HMS Prince of Wales asking for tugs.
13.10 Singapore receives a message from HMS Electra reporting HMS Repulse sunk.
13.20 453 squadron arrives (82 minutes after Repulse signal)
15.21 Singapore receives a message from HMS Electra reporting HMS Prince of Wales sunk.

So if force Z had sent a sighting report at 10.15, 82 minutes later is 11.37, add 3 minutes for coding it is a 10.18 signal, 453 arrives at 11.40. Note the book has 10.18 signal, 453 arriving 11.30, so either a mistake in the arrival time or the theoretical arrival time.

 

[elbmc1969]

For the Armee de l'Air, the answer is "Squadron? What's a Squadron?"

There were the escadre and the escadrille and I can never keep the two straight. Different sizes for different aircraft types, in any case. Any the sizes change during the interwar period, naturally.

 

[Denniss]

Escadrille was more in size of a german Staffel so around 12 a/c, at least for fighters. They typically had two escadrilles per escadre.
Bomber escadrille were smaller, more around 6-9 a/c. Depending on size of bomber escadrille they had 2 or 3 of them in an escadre.
Note: all of this out of memory so no warranty fro correctness

 

[MIflyer]

Johnny Johnson pointed out that his Spitfire Wing had two squadrons of 12 aircraft each. He said that USAAF ETO fighter wings had 18 aircraft per squadron and three squadrons per Wing; he thought that very appropriate, since the USAAF went much further out into hostile airspace and if they ran into heavy opposition there was no one to call on for help but themselves.

 

[kah]

And can you imagine doing that when the commander of a naval force does not bother to ring up the air force and tell them he would like some air cover at such and such a place and time? Those IJN bombers that sunk the Prince of Wales and the Repulse did not even have fighter escort. They were sitting ducks for those Buffalos, which were well within range.

The Buffalo was only just in range of Force 'Z' off Kuantan, giving them perhaps ten minutes worth of patrol time. F/L Vigors was of the opinion he could have maintained a three-aircraft standing patrol for up to an hour, but considering the course of events over Malaya--and particularly over Singapore--I am not certain that would have been effected, nor that the presence of three Buffalo fighters alters the outcome for the Eastern Fleet.

That said, its is probable that the presence of fighters over Force 'Z' would have impacted the battle. Making a torpedo attack against a ship who's HA armament cannot effectively engage during approach or release is rather different than making a torpedo attack with enemy fighter aircraft present. The Buffalo in tropical climes was a poor fighter and worse interceptor, which militates against the idea the Navy Type 96 and Type 0 Land Attack Bombers were "sitting ducks". Again, the course of the fight over Malaya and Singapore does not substantiate that view.

It is just pssible that the presence of relays of three fighters are enough to save Repulse. But on balance, both Prince of Wales and Repulse are lost. There are too many Land Attack Bombers for three Buffalo fighters (Buffalos? Buffalo Is? Buffaloes?) operating in relays to make an effective intercept, which leaves all the margins to favour the Japanese.

It is clear that the sortie of Force 'Z' was badly managed and poorly commanded. There were grievous errors of command by Eastern Fleet, by the RAF, and by GOC Malaya. These, along with the hubris of the C-in-C Eastern Fleet, led directly to the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse.

As an aside, in respect of the OP, the Air Branch of the Royal Navy (ABRN, it was not the RAF Fleet Air Arm from 1936 until the FAA name was re-adopted post-War) operated 9 aircraft squadrons of three flights of three, with some unassembled spares--how many varied by the aircraft carrier they were based on.

KAH

 

[kah]

The naval force commander had decided not to take the available aircraft carrier with them because it was so small and slow. The resultant lack of fighter cover led to the IJN decsion to not send fighter escort with the bombers. The Buffalos would have been a rude shock to the bombers.

There was no carrier available to Eastern Fleet in December 1941.

The ship I believe you are referring to is Hermes, which Admiral Philips sent into Dock at Simonstown, SA during the transit of Prince of Wales to Ceylon in November 1941. Hermes never proceeded past Ceylon, off of which she was sunk during the Japanese raid of April 1942. Also, Hermes did not operate fighter aircraft--her air complement was 9 TSR (Torpedo-Spotter-Reconnaissance, the infamous Swordfish), though she may have been capable of operating 18 a/c. The Admiralty was not certain she could operate fighters, as her speed was down in the 20 knots region.

Indomitable, a new 'Improved Illustrious'-Class Fleet Carrier, was likewise unavailable, being in dock in the US. She did carry fighters, her intended complement being one squadron of Sea Hurricane II and one squadron of Fulmar II, each of 9 a/c.

The Japanese decision not to send fighter cover had nothing to do with British dispositions; the Japanese had no way of knowing that GOC Malaya could not communicate his thoughts, nor that C-in-C Eastern Fleet believed there was no real risk to heavy ships at sea from Japanese bombers. The Japanese did not send fighters because the mission combined search and strike, and was therefore unsuitable for the Reisen. The Japanese were looking for Force 'Z' along the track they felt it would take back to Singapore, but they did not know where along that track they might find it; the Navy Type 0 fighter required navigational minders for long-range operations and lacked the range for the type of mission conducted. As it was, the Land Attack Bombers were nearly at the limit of their endurance when Force 'Z' was found.

KAH

 

[MIflyer]

All good points, but presumably the Buffalos would have had good enough radios to call for help if the IJN showed up - although that is not assured, since even in the BoB many RAF fighter aircraft were equipped with radios less capable than a 1970's CB walkie talkie. But the Buffalos were US made and thus probably had decent radios, about as good as what the Flying Tigers in China and the USN at Midway had installed.

 

[SaparotRob]

Had one or two Buffalos been there, they may have been enough to disrupt the bombers' formations. I believe the RN ships had done a good job of dodging attack up to that point. The Drachinifel YouTube channel has a video on this very topic. I watched it a while ago. It was a series of events that led those ships to where they didn't plan on being.
A rather lengthy way of saying "Welcome to the Forum", kah!

 

[EwenS]

As an aside, in respect of the OP, the Air Branch of the Royal Navy (ABRN, it was not the RAF Fleet Air Arm from 1936 until the FAA name was re-adopted post-War) operated 9 aircraft squadrons of three flights of three, with some unassembled spares--how many varied by the aircraft carrier they were based on.

KAH

The standard size of an FAA squadron was not 9 aircraft. At the start of the war some had 9 but most had 12 but numbers could be adjusted as the situation dictated.

By way of example in the latter part of 1940 in the Med Illustrious embarked 815, 819 and 806 squadrons with respectively 9, 9 & 15 aircraft. 806 was the fighter squadron with Fulmars. In early 1942 3 of Indomitable's 4 embarked squadrons had 12 aircraft with only the Sea Hurricane equipped 880 having 9.

As the war progressed squadron aircraft numbers continued to vary. TBR squadrons generally remained at 9 or 12 by 1943 usually with one of each size in a fleet carrier in 1944 for a Naval Wing of 21. But in the Pacific in 1945 the fleet carriers had a single Avenger squadron operating 15-21 depending on the ship.

Fighter squadrons could be even more variable. In 1943 they were being formed on Hellcats and Corsairs with 10, then increased to 14 at the end of the year and then 18. By 1945 there were a number of carrier fighter squadrons with Corsairs, Hellcats or Seafires operating up to 24 aircraft.

In 1945 the RN carrier with the largest airgroup was the Implacable. 801 & 880 each had 24 Seafires, 1771 had 12 Fireflies and 828 had 21 Avengers for a total of 81.

And the ASW escort carriers in the Atlantic were different again but generally with single squadrons of 12 Swordfish or Avengers plus a fighter flight, usually of 4-6 aircraft.

 

[Frog]

For the Armee de l'Air, the answer is "Squadron? What's a Squadron?"

There were the escadre and the escadrille and I can never keep the two straight. Different sizes for different aircraft types, in any case. Any the sizes change during the interwar period, naturally.

During WW 2, the Armée de l'air équivalent of a squadron was named a groupe, normally led by a Commandant (Squadron Leader / Major) divided in escadrilles normally led by a captain (flighs).
The upper level was an escadre (british wing / US group).
The Free French squadrons wore their French designation along with a british squadron number (example : Groupe de Chasse n° 2 « Île-de-France » was squadron 340 RAF on Spitfires).
To line up with NATO practise, the groupes were reflagged squadron after war (1951).

 

[Frog]

The standard size of an FAA squadron was not 9 aircraft. At the start of the war some had 9 but most had 12 but numbers could be adjusted as the situation dictated.

By way of example in the latter part of 1940 in the Med Illustrious embarked 815, 819 and 806 squadrons with respectively 9, 9 & 15 aircraft. 806 was the fighter squadron with Fulmars. In early 1942 3 of Indomitable's 4 embarked squadrons had 12 aircraft with only the Sea Hurricane equipped 880 having 9.

As the war progressed squadron aircraft numbers continued to vary. TBR squadrons generally remained at 9 or 12 by 1943 usually with one of each size in a fleet carrier in 1944 for a Naval Wing of 21. But in the Pacific in 1945 the fleet carriers had a single Avenger squadron operating 15-21 depending on the ship.

Fighter squadrons could be even more variable. In 1943 they were being formed on Hellcats and Corsairs with 10, then increased to 14 at the end of the year and then 18. By 1945 there were a number of carrier fighter squadrons with Corsairs, Hellcats or Seafires operating up to 24 aircraft.

In 1945 the RN carrier with the largest airgroup was the Implacable. 801 & 880 each had 24 Seafires, 1771 had 12 Fireflies and 828 had 21 Avengers for a total of 81.

And the ASW escort carriers in the Atlantic were different again but generally with single squadrons of 12 Swordfish or Avengers plus a fighter flight, usually of 4-6 aircraft.

US Navy carriers fighter squadrons began with 18, then 27, 36, 54 (!) and because of the kamikaze menace, inflated to 72 ! As this was becoming unmanageable, they were divided by two of 36 each, one named VF, the other one VBF with the same number. This was manly for administrative reasons, as they performed the same mission and used the same planes pool.
There were also exceptions to the rule notably as to the use of embarked night fighters.

 

[kah]

The standard size of an FAA squadron was not 9 aircraft. At the start of the war some had 9 but most had 12 but numbers could be adjusted as the situation dictated.

By way of example in the latter part of 1940 in the Med Illustrious embarked 815, 819 and 806 squadrons with respectively 9, 9 & 15 aircraft. 806 was the fighter squadron with Fulmars. In early 1942 3 of Indomitable's 4 embarked squadrons had 12 aircraft with only the Sea Hurricane equipped 880 having 9.

As the war progressed squadron aircraft numbers continued to vary. TBR squadrons generally remained at 9 or 12 by 1943 usually with one of each size in a fleet carrier in 1944 for a Naval Wing of 21. But in the Pacific in 1945 the fleet carriers had a single Avenger squadron operating 15-21 depending on the ship.

Fighter squadrons could be even more variable. In 1943 they were being formed on Hellcats and Corsairs with 10, then increased to 14 at the end of the year and then 18. By 1945 there were a number of carrier fighter squadrons with Corsairs, Hellcats or Seafires operating up to 24 aircraft.

In 1945 the RN carrier with the largest airgroup was the Implacable. 801 & 880 each had 24 Seafires, 1771 had 12 Fireflies and 828 had 21 Avengers for a total of 81.

And the ASW escort carriers in the Atlantic were different again but generally with single squadrons of 12 Swordfish or Avengers plus a fighter flight, usually of 4-6 aircraft.

EwenS,

I'm not certain we are using the same nomenclature. The doctrinal size of an ABRN Squadron--there were no FAA Squadrons during WWII--was 9 aircraft. Operating strengths varied considerably--the well-known strength returns for Victorious and Ark Royal during the Bismarck actions are an excellent example of how the operating size of a squadron was altered to fit the capabilities of the aircraft carrier they were embarked on.

So...I quite agree with your assertion that the operating deployment of ABRN Squadrons--particularly fighter squadrons--increased as the war progressed; indeed, it might be fair to assert, as it seems you do, that deployment rarely even paused to note establishment strength, though I would want more information to feel secure in such a conclusion. A key question is whether or not the Admiralty changed the doctrinal strength on establishment, and thus the basis upon which it dealt with the Air Ministry.

I'm curious as to where the operating strengths you cite originate? I'm not arguing that ABRN Squadrons were always deployed strictly according to the doctrinal establishment--I should say it was quite clear that they were not, any more than the doctrinal all-TSR complement was adhered to. The realities of war, and the desire to deploy powerful squadrons on carriers in action, had to be balanced by the lack of modern aircraft allotted to the ABRN by the Air Ministry, so I'd like to know where your data originates, and how it compares to the other times and places.

One of the key factors effecting ABRN strength on any given carrier was the number of carriers engaged on operations at any given time.

That said, you are quite right to point out the difference between supposed sizes and actual sizes.

KAH

 

[buffnut453]

The Buffalo was only just in range of Force 'Z' off Kuantan, giving them perhaps ten minutes worth of patrol time. F/L Vigors was of the opinion he could have maintained a three-aircraft standing patrol for up to an hour, but considering the course of events over Malaya--and particularly over Singapore--I am not certain that would have been effected, nor that the presence of three Buffalo fighters alters the outcome for the Eastern Fleet.

That said, its is probable that the presence of fighters over Force 'Z' would have impacted the battle. Making a torpedo attack against a ship who's HA armament cannot effectively engage during approach or release is rather different than making a torpedo attack with enemy fighter aircraft present. The Buffalo in tropical climes was a poor fighter and worse interceptor, which militates against the idea the Navy Type 96 and Type 0 Land Attack Bombers were "sitting ducks". Again, the course of the fight over Malaya and Singapore does not substantiate that view.

It is just pssible that the presence of relays of three fighters are enough to save Repulse. But on balance, both Prince of Wales and Repulse are lost. There are too many Land Attack Bombers for three Buffalo fighters (Buffalos? Buffalo Is? Buffaloes?) operating in relays to make an effective intercept, which leaves all the margins to favour the Japanese.

It is clear that the sortie of Force 'Z' was badly managed and poorly commanded. There were grievous errors of command by Eastern Fleet, by the RAF, and by GOC Malaya. These, along with the hubris of the C-in-C Eastern Fleet, led directly to the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse.

As an aside, in respect of the OP, the Air Branch of the Royal Navy (ABRN, it was not the RAF Fleet Air Arm from 1936 until the FAA name was re-adopted post-War) operated 9 aircraft squadrons of three flights of three, with some unassembled spares--how many varied by the aircraft carrier they were based on.

KAH

Vigors was only speaking about 453 Sqn which was the dedicated support to Force Z. In the actual event, 243 Sqn was also scrambled and 67 Sqn was still on the ground at Singapore. Bottom line is that the RAF could have provided more than just 3 Buffalos over Force Z. Operating the Buffalos from Kluang could have provided more time over Force Z rather than constantly flying back to Singapore.

While the Buffalo wasn't a great fighter or interceptor, it could have done decent damage against the Type 96 and Type 0 bombers. Doug Vanderfield shot down a Ki-48 despite being unable to retract the undercarriage of his Buffalo, and the Ki-48 had better performance than the G3M. The Buffalos performance at low level was pretty good....and torpedo drops happen at low level.

 

[kah]

US Navy carriers squadrons began with 18, then 27, 36, 54 (!) and because of the kamikaze menace, inflated to 72 ! As this was becoming unmanageable, they were divided by two of 36 each, one named VF, the other one VBF with the same number. This was manly for administrative reasons, as they performed the same mission and used the same planes pool.
There were also exceptions to the rule notably as to the use of embarked night fighters.

Frog,

Actually, US Navy carriers began the Second World War with a Establishment Strength--I don't know the USN nomenclature--of 12 a/c in their Fixed-Wing Fighter and Fixed-Wing Torpedo Bomber Squadrons, designated VF and VT, respectively. The Fixed-Wing Scout Bomber and Fixed-Wing Bomber Squadrons each disposed 18 a/c during the first year of the war.

But as you rightly state, the progress of the war dramatically increased the demand for fighters, without a corresponding decrease in the demand for strike aircraft, though it seems that Torpedo Strike remained less critical than Bombing Strike.

The other pressure pushing up fighter strengths was the useful ordnance load the new F6F and F4U fighters could be fitted with, and their greatly superior performance compared with the older SBD and new SB2C carrier bombers--albeit the latter two a/c were superior dive platforms in the strike rôle. The employment of fighters in the strike rôle was the administrative rationale for dividing fighter squadrons into VF and VBF. I do not know if they were doctrinally different, or if it was a straightforward administrative convenience--it would be of interest to know what the intent was.

One would expect the USN to have documents detailing the change. Those would be informative, I should think.

KAH

 

[drgondog]

Johnny Johnson pointed out that his Spitfire Wing had two squadrons of 12 aircraft each. He said that USAAF ETO fighter wings had 18 aircraft per squadron and three squadrons per Wing; he thought that very appropriate, since the USAAF went much further out into hostile airspace and if they ran into heavy opposition there was no one to call on for help but themselves.

That said, the std squadron take off was four flights of four - for 16. Frquently for longer missions a couple (or more) would take off as 'spares' so that may have influenced Johnson's recollection. Would have applied in Korea when he served as exchange pilot with USAF.

OTOH he was correct about VLR attrition via aborts. I know of many examples of squadrons reduced to two flights - largely during early ops with P-38 and P-51.

 

[Frog]

Frog,

Actually, US Navy carriers began the Second World War with a Establishment Strength--I don't know the USN nomenclature--of 12 a/c in their Fixed-Wing Fighter and Fixed-Wing Torpedo Bomber Squadrons, designated VF and VT, respectively. The Fixed-Wing Scout Bomber and Fixed-Wing Bomber Squadrons each disposed 18 a/c during the first year of the war.

But as you rightly state, the progress of the war dramatically increased the demand for fighters, without a corresponding decrease in the demand for strike aircraft, though it seems that Torpedo Strike remained less critical than Bombing Strike.

The other pressure pushing up fighter strengths was the useful ordnance load the new F6F and F4U fighters could be fitted with, and their greatly superior performance compared with the older SBD and new SB2C carrier bombers--albeit the latter two a/c were superior dive platforms in the strike rôle. The employment of fighters in the strike rôle was the administrative rationale for dividing fighter squadrons into VF and VBF. I do not know if they were doctrinally different, or if it was a straightforward administrative convenience--it would be of interest to know what the intent was.

One would expect the USN to have documents detailing the change. Those would be informative, I should think.

KAH

By the end of the war, fleet carrier (CV) air groups generally comprised 1 VF with 36 Corsairs of Hellcats,, 1 VBF with 36 Corsairs or Hellcats, + a handfull of nightfighters, 1 VB with 18 later reduced to 15 SB2C, 1 VT with 18 later reduced to 15 TBF/TBM. There were a lot of fluctuation. The drastic reduction of bombers as stated above resulted from the ability of the fighters to serve as fighter bombers and also certainly from the troubles concerning the SB2C.
A light carrier CVL air group had just one VF with 24 Hellcats or Corsairs and one VT with 9 TBF/TBM, just slightly more than an escort carrier and also with a lot of fluctuation. They were important however because they helped plug the hole pending the arrival of the Essex class.
An escort carrier (CVE) had a mere composite VC squadron with generally 18 fighters (most FM2, sometimes Hellcats or even Corsairs) and 9 TBF/TBM. There were also a lot of exceptions. For example, USS Tulagi (CVE 72) USS Kasaan Bay (CVE 69) had just a complment of Hellcats during opeeration Dragoon.