Number of aircraft in a squadron?

[EwenS]

EwenS,

I'm not certain we are using the same nomenclature. The doctrinal size of an ABRN Squadron--there were no FAA Squadrons during WWII--was 9 aircraft. Operating strengths varied considerably--the well-known strength returns for Victorious and Ark Royal during the Bismarck actions are an excellent example of how the operating size of a squadron was altered to fit the capabilities of the aircraft carrier they were embarked on.

So...I quite agree with your assertion that the operating deployment of ABRN Squadrons--particularly fighter squadrons--increased as the war progressed; indeed, it might be fair to assert, as it seems you do, that deployment rarely even paused to note establishment strength, though I would want more information to feel secure in such a conclusion. A key question is whether or not the Admiralty changed the doctrinal strength on establishment, and thus the basis upon which it dealt with the Air Ministry.

I'm curious as to where the operating strengths you cite originate? I'm not arguing that ABRN Squadrons were always deployed strictly according to the doctrinal establishment--I should say it was quite clear that they were not, any more than the doctrinal all-TSR complement was adhered to. The realities of war, and the desire to deploy powerful squadrons on carriers in action, had to be balanced by the lack of modern aircraft allotted to the ABRN by the Air Ministry, so I'd like to know where your data originates, and how it compares to the other times and places.

One of the key factors effecting ABRN strength on any given carrier was the number of carriers engaged on operations at any given time.

That said, you are quite right to point out the difference between supposed sizes and actual sizes.

KAH

Few points to pick up on.

I agree that between 1924 and 1939 it was the Fleet Air Arm of the RAF. At that point yes it became officially the Air Branch of the RN. But the plain fact is that it continued to be known as and referred to as the "Fleet Air Arm" both by the personnel in it and by the Board of the Admiralty itself in official documents and reports. For example there are a series of documents in the archives dated Sept 1939 from the Fifth Sea Lord, just over 3 months after the RN gained full control over it, that use the term Fleet Air Arm. A number of these can be viewed in the preview available here:-

The Fleet Air Arm in the Second World War

This is the first of three volumes detailing the history of the Fleet Air Arm, the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers and naval air squadrons, during the Second World War. It deals with the formative period between 1939 and 1941 when the Fleet Air Arm tried to recover from the impact of dual control...

books.google.co.uk

Document numbers 11, 13, 14 and 15 are a case in point. Document 13 actually uses both terms!

And so it continued throughout the war and into the postwar period, even when the Air Branch had become Naval Aviation. Because the use of "Fleet Air Arm" had become so common it was decided to formally adopt it again. Interesting exchange from Hansard in 1952

Naval Aviation (Hansard, 17 December 1952)

Naval Aviation (Hansard, 17 December 1952)

api.parliament.uk

As for the question of numbers of aircraft in an FAA squadron, if you go back to the 1920s the FAA unit was the Flight generally of 3 or 6 aircraft. It was only on April/May 1933 that these were amalgamated into squadrons and right from that point some had 9 and some had 12 aircraft. So I'm really not sure what you mean by saying "doctrinal" strength was 9.

800 squadron - formed from 402 & 404 Flights with 9 Nimrods & 3 Ospreys
801 squadron - formed from 401 Flight with 3 Flycatchers and 6 Nimrods
802 squadron - formed from 408 & 409 Flights with 9 Nimrods and 3 Ospreys
803 squadron - formed by expanding 405 flight to 9 Ospreys

810 squadron - combined 463 and 464 Flights with 12 Darts
811 squadron - combined 465 & 466 Flights with 12 Ripons
812 squadron - combined 461 & 462 Flights with 12 Ripons

And so it remained throughout the 1930s. Further squadrons formed from 1937, sometimes with 9 aircraft and sometimes with 12.

Amongst the documents in the link I posted above you will find a report on the state of the FAA in Sept 1939 (number 15) on the outbreak of WW2 that lists the numbers of aircraft on each carrier. Coupled with other information I have to hand

Courageous - 2 Swordfish squadrons each of 12 aircraft
Glorious - 3 Swordfish squadrons each of 12 aircraft plus a Gladiator squadron with 12
Eagle - 2 Swordfish squadrons each with 9 aircraft.
Ark Royal - 2 Skua squadrons each with 9 aircraft and 4 Swordfish squadrons, 810 & 821 with 12 and 820 & 818 with 9 for a total of 42
Hermes - 814 had formed on 6 Swordfish in Dec 1938 and after spending time on Ark Royal, increased its complement to 9 on transfer to Hermes on 1 Sept 1939.

Nothing that I can recall reading suggests that there was a "doctrine" for 9 aircraft squadrons in the FAA whether under RAF or RN control. Can you tell me what your source is for that?



Edit:- I forgot the following squadrons formed in April 1933 in the rush to get this post finished last night (she who must be obeyed was threatening me with "your dinner is in the dog"!)

820 squadron - formed from 450 Flight and half of 445 Flight with 9 Fairey IIIF. By Dec 1934 the squadron had been expanded to 12 Blackburn Shark.
821 squadron - formed from 446 Flight and the other half of 445 Flight with 9 Fairey IIIF. By autumn 1935 it had been expanded to 12 Fairey Seals
822 squadron - formed from 442 & 449 Flights with 12 Fairey IIIF.
823 squadron - formed from 441 & 448 Flights with 12 Fairey IIIF.
824 squadron - formed from 460 Flight with 9 Fairey IIIF. Expanded to 12 aircraft by absorbing 440 Flight on arrival at Hong Kong 2 months later. Renumbered 825 squadron in Oct 1934 while serving in Eagle

Then -
824 squadron - new formation Oct 1934 with 9 Fairey Seals for service in Hermes, and later Eagle.

 

[kah]

Vigors was only speaking about 453 Sqn which was the dedicated support to Force Z. In the actual event, 243 Sqn was also scrambled and 67 Sqn was still on the ground at Singapore. Bottom line is that the RAF could have provided more than just 3 Buffalos over Force Z. Operating the Buffalos from Kluang could have provided more time over Force Z rather than constantly flying back to Singapore.

While the Buffalo wasn't a great fighter or interceptor, it could have done decent damage against the Type 96 and Type 0 bombers. Doug Vanderfield shot down a Ki-48 with his undercarriage still down, and the Ki-48 had better performance than the G3M. The Buffalos performance at low level was pretty good....and torpedo drops happen at low level.

buffnut453,

Let us agree on this much--the Buffalo was sufficiently potent as a single-engine, single-seat, day fighter, that it's presence off Kuantan would have had an impact on the Japanese conduct of their attack.

Now...I rather feel as though you are mixing the terms of reference. Was it possible to have deployed more fighters over Force 'Z'? Of course it was. Was it possible for the Japanese to deploy Navy Type 0 fighters over Force 'Z' in the same period? Of course it was. What I was writing about was the possibilities as they existed on the day.

The SOP for provision of coverage to Force 'Z' was to provide three-aircraft patrols in daylight hours. More a/c would be called up if contact occurred, but the flying time to Singapore--where the Buffalos (or Buffaloes) available to cover operations in the area were based--meant that this was only plausible in waters close to Singapore. No plan had been drawn up to use Kluang or Kuantan, which meant no facilities were available--albeit both were eventually employed to extend the operations of Flights of Buffaloes (Buffalos). Communications in Malaya were so poor that it was often easier--even late in the campaign--to send a runner than to attempt telephone or teletype communication. So there was almost no chance that the RAF could just ring-up Kluang or Kuantan and have them get ready to service fighters as part of a response to the call for fighter cover over Force 'Z'.

Malaya was a serious of calamitous decisions culminating in catastrophe, of which the loss of Force 'Z' was but one. The responses the Army, the RAF, and the RN, were all crippled by confusion, disorder, and vacillation. The confusion over air cover and reconnaissance for Force'Z' was emblematic of the confusion reigning in Malaya overall. If the Army and the RAF could have used some of Admiral Phillips' aggressiveness, the RN could have used some of their caution. Malaya was not ready for war in December of 1941, and that must lie at the feet of HM Government.

For all that, the sortie could and should have been better handled. It certainly appears as though parochialism laid its heavy hand upon the command relationship amongst the C-in-C Eastern Fleet and AOC Malaya, which is where one would like to see a vigorous GOC Malaya take a hand. The idea that three aircraft could provide any kind of meaningful cover for the only two Capital Ships in the theatre, is absurd, full stop. The idea that a Section could summon help "when needed" was preposterous by 1941; the only aspect more infuriating is that AOC Malaya appeared not to know that.

Apologists for Admiral Phillips point out that he was informed by Rear Admiral Palliser that the RAf would not be able to provide fighter protection on the 10th. The signal, available in its entirety in ADM 199, makes no stipulation as to distance or time, merely that "fighter protection on Wednesday 10th will not, repeat not, be possible". One might be inclined thus to imagine that Admiral Phillips sole and only information about the RAF in Malaya comprised that signal, and that Phillips therefore believed there were no RAF a/c available anywhere in Malaya. That is rubbish. RADM Palliser's signal dealt with cover for the attack on Singora, and not with cover within range of Singapore's airfields, which had been dealt with separately. Captain Tenant, OC Repulse, was under no such delusion.

Lastly, a word about the use of singular instances as illustrative examples. Modern industrial war is not about the singular achievement of an individual, it is about the aggregate effects of the interplay of systems; there is a limit to both quality and quantity in relation to one another. In Malaya, the NEI, and Burma, the Japanese disposed aircraft of qualitative and quantitative superiority. The RAF put up three, six, or ten aircraft against 80+ fighters and 60+ bombers. They raided Japanese airfields with three bombers escorted by two fighters, out of a raid begun with six and four. Aircrew and ground forces were grossly under-trained. The British Empire was completely outfought in Malaya.

By the end of the war, fleet carrier (CV) air groups generally comprised 1 VF with 36 Corsairs of Hellcats,, 1 VBF with 36 Corsairs or Hellcats, + a handfull of nightfighters, 1 VB with 18 later reduced to 15 SB2C, 1 VT with 18 later reduced to 15 TBF/TBM. There were a lot of fluctuation. The drastic reduction of bombers as stated above resulted from the ability of the fighters to serve as fighter bombers and also certainly from the troubles concerning the SB2C.
A light carrier CVL air group had just one VF with 24 Hellcats or Corsairs and one VT with 9 TBF/TBM, just slightly more than an escort carrier and also with a lot of fluctuation. They were important however because they helped plug the hole pending the arrival of the Essex class.
An escort carrier (CVE) had a mere composite VC squadron with generally 18 fighters (most FM2, sometimes Hellcats or even Corsairs) and 9 TBF/TBM. There were also a lot of exceptions. For example, USS Tulagi (CVE 72) USS Kasaan Bay (CVE 69) had just a complment of Hellcats during opeeration Dragoon.

Hey Frog!

Some number of the CVEs in the Pacific also seem to have been a sort of fleet train--aircraft ferry--for the big CVs. Do you know any of the details on those compositions?

KAH

 

[MIflyer]

That said, the std squadron take off was four flights of four - for 16.

I read of a squadron flying P-51's for 15th AF escort missions from Italy that added an extra flight. The Germans would try to bounce the Mustangs while they were still over Italy, trying to get them to drop their tanks so they could not escort the bombers the whole way to the target. So they added an extra flight of four to intercept the Germans so to allow the others to keep their tanks.
And even for a normal mission of 16 aircraft they actually needed more than 16 airplanes and pilots. Not every pilot flew every mission and of course they had spares.
The exact number or personnel a unit has tends to be a variable number. At one assignment we were understrength while another organization on the base, "fair haired boys," were at 150% to 200%. The USAF tends to handle that on a per-base basis, and if you have too many people in one unit and not enough in another they expect you to address that locally and not ship you more people to fill the vacancies in a particular specialty until you have sorted things out.

 

[Frog]

buffnut453,

Let us agree on this much--the Buffalo was sufficiently potent as a single-engine, single-seat, day fighter, that it's presence off Kuantan would have had an impact on the Japanese conduct of their attack.

Now...I rather feel as though you are mixing the terms of reference. Was it possible to have deployed more fighters over Force 'Z'? Of course it was. Was it possible for the Japanese to deploy Navy Type 0 fighters over Force 'Z' in the same period? Of course it was. What I was writing about was the possibilities as they existed on the day.

The SOP for provision of coverage to Force 'Z' was to provide three-aircraft patrols in daylight hours. More a/c would be called up if contact occurred, but the flying time to Singapore--where the Buffalos (or Buffaloes) available to cover operations in the area were based--meant that this was only plausible in waters close to Singapore. No plan had been drawn up to use Kluang or Kuantan, which meant no facilities were available--albeit both were eventually employed to extend the operations of Flights of Buffaloes (Buffalos). Communications in Malaya were so poor that it was often easier--even late in the campaign--to send a runner than to attempt telephone or teletype communication. So there was almost no chance that the RAF could just ring-up Kluang or Kuantan and have them get ready to service fighters as part of a response to the call for fighter cover over Force 'Z'.

Malaya was a serious of calamitous decisions culminating in catastrophe, of which the loss of Force 'Z' was but one. The responses the Army, the RAF, and the RN, were all crippled by confusion, disorder, and vacillation. The confusion over air cover and reconnaissance for Force'Z' was emblematic of the confusion reigning in Malaya overall. If the Army and the RAF could have used some of Admiral Phillips' aggressiveness, the RN could have used some of their caution. Malaya was not ready for war in December of 1941, and that must lie at the feet of HM Government.

For all that, the sortie could and should have been better handled. It certainly appears as though parochialism laid its heavy hand upon the command relationship amongst the C-in-C Eastern Fleet and AOC Malaya, which is where one would like to see a vigorous GOC Malaya take a hand. The idea that three aircraft could provide any kind of meaningful cover for the only two Capital Ships in the theatre, is absurd, full stop. The idea that a Section could summon help "when needed" was preposterous by 1941; the only aspect more infuriating is that AOC Malaya appeared not to know that.

Apologists for Admiral Phillips point out that he was informed by Rear Admiral Palliser that the RAf would not be able to provide fighter protection on the 10th. The signal, available in its entirety in ADM 199, makes no stipulation as to distance or time, merely that "fighter protection on Wednesday 10th will not, repeat not, be possible". One might be inclined thus to imagine that Admiral Phillips sole and only information about the RAF in Malaya comprised that signal, and that Phillips therefore believed there were no RAF a/c available anywhere in Malaya. That is rubbish. RADM Palliser's signal dealt with cover for the attack on Singora, and not with cover within range of Singapore's airfields, which had been dealt with separately. Captain Tenant, OC Repulse, was under no such delusion.

Lastly, a word about the use of singular instances as illustrative examples. Modern industrial war is not about the singular achievement of an individual, it is about the aggregate effects of the interplay of systems; there is a limit to both quality and quantity in relation to one another. In Malaya, the NEI, and Burma, the Japanese disposed aircraft of qualitative and quantitative superiority. The RAF put up three, six, or ten aircraft against 80+ fighters and 60+ bombers. They raided Japanese airfields with three bombers escorted by two fighters, out of a raid begun with six and four. Aircrew and ground forces were grossly under-trained. The British Empire was completely outfought in Malaya.

Hey Frog!

Some number of the CVEs in the Pacific also seem to have been a sort of fleet train--aircraft ferry--for the big CVs. Do you know any of the details on those compositions?

KAH

Hey Frog!

Some number of the CVEs in the Pacific also seem to have been a sort of fleet train--aircraft ferry--for the big CVs. Do you know any of the details on those compositions?

KAH

My erudition does not go so far.
They certainly crammed as many planes of the relevant types in any available place as was available.
I simply know that, effectively, CVEs were used to ferry Army or Navy/ USMC planes, and not only in the Pacific but also in the ETO for Army planes and not only single engine ones (PBY for example).
On the return trip, they could also bring back damaged or captured planes.

 

[EwenS]

Frog,

I do not know if they were doctrinally different, or if it was a straightforward administrative convenience--it would be of interest to know what the intent was.

In 1945 the USN drew no distinction between VF & VBF squadrons. They both flew CAP, fighter sweep and strike work as required.

By the end of the war, fleet carrier (CV) air groups generally comprised 1 VF with 36 Corsairs of Hellcats,, 1 VBF with 36 Corsairs or Hellcats, + a handfull of nightfighters, 1 VB with 18 later reduced to 15 SB2C, 1 VT with 18 later reduced to 15 TBF/TBM. There were a lot of fluctuation. The drastic reduction of bombers as stated above resulted from the ability of the fighters to serve as fighter bombers and also certainly from the troubles concerning the SB2C.
A light carrier CVL air group had just one VF with 24 Hellcats or Corsairs and one VT with 9 TBF/TBM, just slightly more than an escort carrier and also with a lot of fluctuation. They were important however because they helped plug the hole pending the arrival of the Essex class.
An escort carrier (CVE) had a mere composite VC squadron with generally 18 fighters (most FM2, sometimes Hellcats or even Corsairs) and 9 TBF/TBM. There were also a lot of exceptions. For example, USS Tulagi (CVE 72) USS Kasaan Bay (CVE 69) had just a complment of Hellcats during opeeration Dragoon.

Some carrier air groups in 1945 had 2 Hellcat, some 2 Corsair and some one of each. Here is a link to the air group compositions at 7 Aug which highlights the mix both aboard ship and in the replacement air group pipeline.

4 Aug 1945

www.history.navy.mil

The CVL VF squadrons never got Corsairs.

On the USN CVEs the Hellcats and Corsairs were pretty much restricted to the larger Sangamon and Commencement Bay classes. Tulagi & Kasaan Bay, being Casablanca class, are a notable exception.

By mid-1945 the USN had concluded that the swing away from SB2C/TBM to fighters had gone too far. In June 1945 BuAer issued orders for a new shape of CAG for each type of carrier, which was just beginning to be implemented firstly with the CVLs by the end of the war. See Friedman "Fighters over the Fleet".

CVB (Midway)- move from 97 VF and 48 VSB to 73 VF and 64 VSB
CV (Essex)- move from 73 VF, 15 VSB & 15 VTB to 55 VF, 32 VSB & 12 VTB
CVL (Independence)- move from 24 VF & 9 VTB to 36 VF and 0 VTB

Further changes were proposed in Oct 1945. Carriers would then be equipped with either F4U or F8F as fighters, with the F6F remaining only in specialist night fighter and photo roles until versions of the other aircraft became available. Given that the first F8F squadron only arrived in the fleet at the beginning of Sept 1945 the F6F would have remained on the front line as a fighter for a bit longer had the war gone on.

And note that the plan was to phase out the TBM in 1946. The torpedo was being used less and less during 1945 (in fact in the July/Aug strikes on Japan and the remaining Japanese fleet they weren't used at all IIRC), the destruction of Yamato being a notable exception. As a bomber the SB2C was considered the better aircraft. In case torpedoes were to be needed again the SB2C was requalified as a torpedo bomber.

 

[EwenS]

My erudition does not go so far.
They certainly crammed as many planes of the relevant types in any available place as was available.
I simply know that, effectively, CVEs were used to ferry Army or Navy/ USMC planes, and not only in the Pacific but also in the ETO for Army planes and not only single engine ones (PBY for example).
On the return trip, they could also bring back damaged or captured planes.

As for the CVE supporting the main carrier task forces, they broke down into 3 groups:-

1. Those required for CAP and ASW support of the tankers and supply ships. These carried a normal VC type squadrons / CVEGs.
2. Those required to supply replacement aircraft, and return duds, from/to forward supply bases. They still required to operate the aircraft they carried but did not have a formal squadron aboard.
3. Those shipping aircraft from the USA to forward bases. These carried as many aircraft as could be put aboard in the hangar or on the flight deck, including larger flying boats or land based aircraft or indeed USAAF aircraft.

So, for example, in July/Aug 1945 the Chenango (with CVEG-33) and Gilbert Islands (with MCVG-2) provided protection while Thetis Bay, Hollandia, Rio & Munda supplied replacement aircraft.

The CVE under 2 & 3 were formally part of Carrier Transport Squadron Pacific, an organisation to which the RN contributed about 5 of its CVE to for periods in the first 6 or 7 months of 1945.

Edit - RN escort carriers with the USN Carrier Transport Squadron Pacific in 1945

Tracker: Jan-June 1945
Patroller: Jan-April 1945
Rajah: Jan-July 1945
Ranee: Feb-April 1945
Atheling - Jan-July 1945

 

[Frog]

...The CVL VF squadrons never got Corsairs...

Effectively, not in US service.

However USS Belleau Wood (CVL 24), transferred on september 5, 1953 to the French Navy as Bois Belleau for service in Indochina had the Corsairs (AU-1) from Flotille 14F as fighter component by the mid 1954. Its Corsairs were also used for strikes during the war in Algeria.

USS Langley (CVL-27) transferred on january 8, 1951 to the French Navy as Lafayette, also for service in Indochina, received in 1956 the Corsairs (F4U7) from Flotille 15 F.

 

[EwenS]

Effectively, not in US service.

However USS Belleau Wood (CVL 24), transferred on september 5, 1953 to the French Navy as Bois Belleau for service in Indochina had the Corsairs (AU-1) from Flotille 14F as fighter component by the mid 1954. Its Corsairs were also used for strikes during the war in Algeria.

USS Langley (CVL-27) transferred on january 8, 1951 to the French Navy as Lafayette, also for service in Indochina, received in 1956 the Corsairs (F4U7) from Flotille 15 F.

If we are extending it postwar, then don't forget Bataan CVL-29 which operated USMC Corsairs during the Korean War.

 

[Frog]

If we are extending it postwar, then don't forget Bataan CVL-29 which operated USMC Corsairs during the Korean War.

Deck landing could be tricky (pic from Service Historique des Armées) :

 

[drgondog]

I read of a squadron flying P-51's for 15th AF escort missions from Italy that added an extra flight. The Germans would try to bounce the Mustangs while they were still over Italy, trying to get them to drop their tanks so they could not escort the bombers the whole way to the target. So they added an extra flight of four to intercept the Germans so to allow the others to keep their tanks.
And even for a normal mission of 16 aircraft they actually needed more than 16 airplanes and pilots. Not every pilot flew every mission and of course they had spares.
The exact number or personnel a unit has tends to be a variable number. At one assignment we were understrength while another organization on the base, "fair haired boys," were at 150% to 200%. The USAF tends to handle that on a per-base basis, and if you have too many people in one unit and not enough in another they expect you to address that locally and not ship you more people to fill the vacancies in a particular specialty until you have sorted things out.

Absolutely - both the 8th and 15th had enough fighters to begin sending A and B Groups out with five and six squadrons each. Unusual in fall 1944, common in winter and spring 1945. The difference is that 8th didn't have LF3 trying to intercept a Group beelining to make R/V just west of Berlin, because the Penetration escort of P-47s were the first that they would usually encounter.

Losses separated the filled to brim TO&E from the 'hell of a time cobbling up a full group'. Usually by the time Big Week began, the Flights had 10 pilots and 25 Fighters on a given day per squadron, which included Gp officers 'personal' fighters. As for 8th vs USAF later, there were very few transfers to level out the operations availability between FG's.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The following 8th AF data is mostly monthly averages which requires calculating the average number of fighter groups operational for the month.

April 1943, 1 group operational at start of month, 2 groups become operational on the 8th
August 1943, 1 group becomes operational on the 12th
September 1943, 2 groups become operational on the 9th
December 1943, 1 group becomes operational on the 13th, 1 on the 20th, 1 on the 28th
January 1944, 1 group becomes operational on the 21st
March 1944, 1 group becomes operational on the 3rd
April 1944, 1 group becomes operational on the 30th
May 1944, 1 group becomes operational on the 26th

As expected the total number of aircraft and crews grows until late 1944 but if you look at the average number of operational aircraft and available crews per group they remain more constant. Also as expected the number of monthly sorties per aircraft or per crew varies according to season plus what operations were being done. From May 1943 to April 1945 the 8th AF managed to have about 1.3 available crew per operational fighter, which shows the aircraft could be used more than the personnel.

Av. = Average, Oper. = Operational (aircraft), Avail = Available (crew).

Month

Number

Average

Average

Average

Average

Average

Per Group

Per Group

Per Group

Per Group

Sorties

Sorties

Month

Credit

Groups

Aircraft

Aircraft

Crews

Crews

Av. Aircraft

Av. Aircraft

Av. Crews

Av. Crews

Per Group

Per Group

Month

Sorties

Oper.

On hand

Oper.

Assigned

Available

On hand

Oper.

Assigned

Available

Av. Oper

Av. Avail

Apr-43​

514​

2.53​

139​

66​

210​

178​

54.87​

26.05​

82.89​

70.26​

7.79​

2.89​

May-43​

2166​

3.00​

211​

144​

261​

209​

70.33​

48.00​

87.00​

69.67​

15.04​

10.36​

Jun-43​

1862​

3.00​

223​

171​

264​

223​

74.33​

57.00​

88.00​

74.33​

10.89​

8.35​

Jul-43​

2266​

3.00​

212​

171​

256​

216​

70.67​

57.00​

85.33​

72.00​

13.25​

10.49​

Aug-43​

2124​

3.65​

253​

204​

328​

274​

69.41​

55.96​

89.98​

75.17​

10.41​

7.75​

Sep-43​

2945​

5.47​

372​

274​

533​

398​

68.05​

50.12​

97.50​

72.80​

10.75​

7.40​

Oct-43​

2971​

6.00​

559​

426​

749​

591​

93.17​

71.00​

124.83​

98.50​

6.97​

5.03​

Nov-43​

3955​

8.00​

635​

478​

771​

631​

79.38​

59.75​

96.38​

78.88​

8.27​

6.27​

Dec-43​

4519​

9.13​

725​

565​

865​

664​

79.42​

61.89​

94.75​

72.73​

8.00​

6.81​

Jan-44​

6061​

11.35​

909​

707​

1028​

810​

80.05​

62.26​

90.53​

71.34​

8.57​

7.48​

Feb-44​

8131​

12.00​

883​

678​

1177​

888​

73.58​

56.50​

98.08​

74.00​

11.99​

9.16​

Mar-44​

10175​

12.94​

1016​

720​

1252​

998​

78.54​

55.66​

96.79​

77.15​

14.13​

10.20​

Apr-44​

12586​

13.03​

1060​

784​

1279​

953​

81.33​

60.15​

98.13​

73.12​

16.05​

13.21​

May-44​

14374​

14.19​

1174​

882​

1449​

1053​

82.71​

62.14​

102.09​

74.19​

16.30​

13.65​

Jun-44​

24035​

15.00​

1112​

906​

1703​

1230​

74.13​

60.40​

113.53​

82.00​

26.53​

19.54​

Jul-44​

16667​

15.00​

1178​

947​

1871​

1317​

78.53​

63.13​

124.73​

87.80​

17.60​

12.66​

Aug-44​

18500​

15.00​

1070​

875​

1937​

1293​

71.33​

58.33​

129.13​

86.20​

21.14​

14.31​

Sep-44​

13892​

15.00​

1143​

904​

1884​

1229​

76.20​

60.27​

125.60​

81.93​

15.37​

11.30​

Oct-44​

12686​

15.00​

1219​

1000​

1901​

1353​

81.27​

66.67​

126.73​

90.20​

12.69​

9.38​

Nov-44​

13236​

15.00​

1294​

1037​

2025​

1362​

86.27​

69.13​

135.00​

90.80​

12.76​

9.72​

Dec-44​

13287​

15.00​

1257​

1026​

1892​

1288​

83.80​

68.40​

126.13​

85.87​

12.95​

10.32​

Jan-45​

10642​

15.00​

1262​

1031​

1747​

1267​

84.13​

68.73​

116.47​

84.47​

10.32​

8.40​

Feb-45​

12305​

15.00​

1197​

970​

1970​

1240​

79.80​

64.67​

131.33​

82.67​

12.69​

9.92​

Mar-45​

17105​

15.00​

1177​

938​

1819​

1376​

78.47​

62.53​

121.27​

91.73​

18.24​

12.43​

Apr-45​

12986​

15.00​

1266​

1059​

1793​

1318​

84.40​

70.60​

119.53​

87.87​

12.26​

9.85​

The number of operational aircraft per group stars to climb in the final quarter of 1944, the number of available crews starts to climb in mid 1944. It does look like the ability of an individual fighter group to fly a larger number of sorties on a given day is not obviously related to having on average more aircraft and crews available on the day, until mid/late in 1944. At least according to the monthly averages.

The average number of operational bombers per group grew from 32 in October 1943 to 47 in May 1944.

 

[drgondog]

Absolutely - both the 8th and 15th had enough fighters to begin sending A and B Groups out with five and six squadrons each. Unusual in fall 1944, common in winter and spring 1945. The difference is that 8th didn't have LF3 trying to intercept a Group beelining to make R/V just west of Berlin, because the Penetration escort of P-47s were the first that they would usually encounter.

Losses separated the filled to brim TO&E from the 'hell of a time cobbling up a full group'. Usually by the time Big Week began, the Flights had 10 pilots and 25 Fighters on a given day per squadron, which included Gp officers 'personal' fighters. As for 8th vs USAF later, there were very few transfers to level out the operations availability between FG's.

Forgot to mention that there were several instances of Group strength = four squadrons. In the case of the 4th FG Shuttle mission, a squadron of352nd FG was added. In the case of the last Shuttle Mission led by my father, he led it with a composed Borax squadron made up of 354FS ships plus 'loaner Mustangs' from 361st and 4th FG to fill out the 16 ship 'extra squadron'.

That said, the 332nd always, or nearly always flew with all four squadrons on every escort mission. They were unique in USSTAF 8th and 15th AF with four squadrons assigned to the group. The 99th joined them circa Jan -Feb 1944?

 

[MIflyer]

8th didn't have LF3 trying to intercept a Group beelining to make R/V just west of Berlin

And of course in daylight during at least the the second half of 1944 there were probably enough RAF fighters looking for trouble over France to make a Luftwaffe attempt to interfere with an 8th AF mission in the early stages rather challenging.

Then there was that time that Bud Anderson and Chuck Yeager flew as spares and then went on a tour of Europe - only to get back and discover they had missed one of the biggest fights the 357th ever got into.

For Overlord did the RAF transfer fighters from the MTO to the ETO? That would perhaps explain why the RAF could not help cover the early stages of a 15th AF mission.

 

[EwenS]

For Overlord did the RAF transfer fighters from the MTO to the ETO? That would perhaps explain why the RAF could not help cover the early stages of a 15th AF mission.

From Feb to April 1944 about a dozen single engined RAF fighter squadrons returned to the UK, along with some transport and GR units. This was a process that continued into late 1944 with the run down of the Med night fighter force. A number of these units changed roles on arrival in the UK. As for the single engined fighter squadrons, I recognise some number plates that ended up with Mustangs and Tempests from the latter part of 1944 in Britain.

But prior to that, from late 1943, a number of squadrons of single and twin engined day and night fighters, transport aircraft and GR aircraft had been moved to the Far East as a response to the Japanese assault on eastern India.

At the same time however it should be recognised that the RAF re-equipped 3 Free French units in Corsica and North Africa in Dec 1943 to form a Spitfire Wing that then went to France after Operation Dragoon.

Also, look at the geography. During the winter of 1943/44 the front line in Italy ran across the Italian peninsula south of Rome. That placed it about half way between the 15th AF bases around Foggia and the latitude of Rome.

https://c7.alamy.com/comp/2AGNF7C/italian-front-september-1943-june-1944-world-war-2-italy-cassino-1954-map-2AGNF7C.jpg

It is still a long way from the northern Adriatic.

RAF squadrons in the Med began to use Mustang III starting in April 1944, but their activities seem to be restricted to fighter bomber work across Italy & Yugoslavia rather than in support of the heavy bombers.

 

[MIflyer]

RAF squadrons in the Med began to use Mustang III starting in April 1944, but their activities seem to be restricted to fighter bomber work across Italy & Yugoslavia rather than in support of the heavy bombers.

Yes, and that was true of the ones in the ETO as well, which replaced Whirlwinds among other things, on fighter bomber sorties. At that point the RAF was still considering the Mustang III for the same kinds of missions as the Mustang II.

Of course, the USAAF retasked 9th AF from the MTO to the ETO.

As far as Italy, we took Rome on 6 Jun 1944, which must have seemed rather unimportant considering what was happening in Normandy.

And the RAF was still using P-40's in Italy in 1945.

 

[EwenS]

Yes, and that was true of the ones in the ETO as well, which replaced Whirlwinds among other things, on fighter bomber sorties. At that point the RAF was still considering the Mustang III for the same kinds of missions as the Mustang II.

Of course, the USAAF retasked 9th AF from the MTO to the ETO.

As far as Italy, we took Rome on 6 Jun 1944, which must have seemed rather unimportant considering what was happening in Normandy.

And the RAF was still using P-40's in Italy in 1945.

In Britain the Mustang III was a replacement for the Spitfire not the Whirlwind. 6 out of the first 7 squadrons to get them before D-Day traded Mk.IXs and the other Mk.V. Initial RAF ops on the type included escorting 8th AF heavies as far as Berlin, as well as light/medium bombers over France and Coastal Command Beaufighters of the Strike Wings even though they were part of 2nd Tactical Air Force. Bombing missions with the type only began at the end of April 1944. One Wing was withdrawn to ADGB at the end of July to chase doodlebugs and then as escorts to RAF Bomber Command on which duties the other Wing joined them at the end of Sept.

Of the 2 Whirlwind squadrons, 137 went to Hurricane IV in June 1943 and then Typhoons in Jan 1944. 263 went straight to Typhoons in Dec 1943.

In the Med the Mustang III began by replacing Kittyhawks and an odd Spitfire squadron. But yes there was the odd Kittyhawk squadron still in the Med in May 1945, although Mustangs continued to replace them after that. There was also the odd Hurricane squadron. 6 squadron used Hurricane IV with RP all the way through until Jan 1947 (alongside Spitfire IX from Dec 1945) as did 351(Yugoslav) squadron until disbanding in June 1945. It was perfectly adequate for fighter bomber missions over the Balkans.

 

[drgondog]

And of course in daylight during at least the the second half of 1944 there were probably enough RAF fighters looking for trouble over France to make a Luftwaffe attempt to interfere with an 8th AF mission in the early stages rather challenging.

Then there was that time that Bud Anderson and Chuck Yeager flew as spares and then went on a tour of Europe - only to get back and discover they had missed one of the biggest fights the 357th ever got into.

For Overlord did the RAF transfer fighters from the MTO to the ETO? That would perhaps explain why the RAF could not help cover the early stages of a 15th AF mission.

Yeager and Anderson flew as spares becaue it was theirlast mission before going home after the Jan 14 mission. It was not only the biggest fight the 357th had, but certainly the largest in ETO/MTO/PAC/CBI for AAF.

I'm not aware that RAF sent anything to ETO from MTO other than mentioned above. 2TAC and Fighter Command combined with 8th and 9th AF were struggling to find parking space on Airfield Anglia.

Most Fighter squadrons flew at least two sorties on June 6 and 7.

 

[drgondog]

In Britain the Mustang III was a replacement for the Spitfire not the Whirlwind. 6 out of the first 7 squadrons to get them before D-Day traded Mk.IXs and the other Mk.V. Initial RAF ops on the type included escorting 8th AF heavies as far as Berlin, as well as light/medium bombers over France and Coastal Command Beaufighters of the Strike Wings even though they were part of 2nd Tactical Air Force. Bombing missions with the type only began at the end of April 1944. One Wing was withdrawn to ADGB at the end of July to chase doodlebugs and then as escorts to RAF Bomber Command on which duties the other Wing joined them at the end of Sept.

Of the 2 Whirlwind squadrons, 137 went to Hurricane IV in June 1943 and then Typhoons in Jan 1944. 263 went straight to Typhoons in Dec 1943.

In the Med the Mustang III began by replacing Kittyhawks and an odd Spitfire squadron. But yes there was the odd Kittyhawk squadron still in the Med in May 1945, although Mustangs continued to replace them after that. There was also the odd Hurricane squadron. 6 squadron used Hurricane IV with RP all the way through until Jan 1947 (alongside Spitfire IX from Dec 1945) as did 351(Yugoslav) squadron until disbanding in June 1945. It was perfectly adequate for fighter bomber missions over the Balkans.

I am very aware of mid-range escort by RAF Mk III's but did not know that they were capable of Berlin as most - if not all never modified them for 85gal tanks, and IIRC pulled the 85gal tank from the B-10/C-5s that were equipped from factory. The longest such mission I have a record for is a Withdrawal Support from Nw Augsburg on a track toward the Ruhr. On that day, the 8th was bombing Fridrichshafen-Munich axis targets.

More on this?

 

[EwenS]

I am very aware of mid-range escort by RAF Mk III's but did not know that they were capable of Berlin as most - if not all never modified them for 85gal tanks, and IIRC pulled the 85gal tank from the B-10/C-5s that were equipped from factory. The longest such mission I have a record for is a Withdrawal Support from Nw Augsburg on a track toward the Ruhr. On that day, the 8th was bombing Fridrichshafen-Munich axis targets.

More on this?

I had picked up the reference as a brief comment in a book in my library. Now done a dive on the 19 squadron ORB for March 1944. These are the longer ranged flights for that month with sufficient detail to identify range. Squadron base was Gravesend in Kent.

4 March 1944 - 10 aircraft dispatched as withdrawal cover for "Forts returning from bombing Berlin area". "Made rendezvous with Forts 90 miles S.W. of Leipzig, some 450 miles from base". 1 aircraft lost (possible engine trouble) and another returned early.

6 March 1944 - 13 aircraft dispatched at 1140 to provide withdrawal cover for "Forts bombing Berlin". 1 returned after an hour (airborne spare?). Another experienced "tank trouble" and returned with his wingman at 1355 and another pair at 1445. Rendezvous made 110 miles west of Berlin. [Berlin is about 560 miles from Gravesend. So picked up the bombers at about 450 miles from base]

9 March 1944 - 11 dispatched with 1 returning after 25 mins (airborne spare?). "Fighter cover to Forts bombing Berlin". "Rendezvous made with bombers at Celle near Hanover. Forts some distance off course". 1 aircraft lost to flak. [Celle is about 420 miles from Gravesend]

So they seem to be pushng out about 450 miles from base on these missions but not so far as Berlin itself. The other squadrons in the Wing were 65 & 122. The monthly squadron ORBs are downloadable FOC from the National Archives if you want to delve deeper.

 

[drgondog]

I had picked up the reference as a brief comment in a book in my library. Now done a dive on the 19 squadron ORB for March 1944. These are the longer ranged flights for that month with sufficient detail to identify range. Squadron base was Graveesend in Kent.

4 March 1944 - 10 aircraft dispatched as withdrawal cover for "Forts returning from bombing Berlin area". "Made rendezvous with Forts 90 miles S.W. of Leipzig, some 450 miles from base". 1 aircraft lost (possible engine trouble) and another returned early.

6 March 1944 - 13 aircraft dispatched at 1140 to provide withdrawal cover for "Forts bombing Berlin". 1 returned after an hour (airborne spare?). Another experienced "tank trouble" and returned with his wingman at 1355 and another pair at 1445. Rendezvous made 110 miles west of Berlin. [Berlin is about 560 miles from Gravesend. So picked up the bombers at about 450 miles from base]

9 March 1944 - 11 dispatched with 1 returning after 25 mins (airborne spare?). "Fighter cover to Forts bombing Berlin". "Rendezvous made with bombers at Celle near Hanover. Forts some distance off course". 1 aircraft lost to flak. [Celle is about 420 miles from Gravesend]

So they seem to be pushng out about 450 miles from base on these missions but not so far as Berlin itself. The other squadrons in the Wing were 65 & 122. The monthly squadron ORBs are downloadable FOC from the National Archives if you want to delve deeper.

That is about right for 184 gal internal (all wing) and 2x 75gal external. With 85gal fuse tank, they could have gone to Prague or Posnan.

Do you have a search ID to find at NARA?