RAF after BoB: mid-term strategy, tactics technology?

[Shortround6]

It is also a fact that many RAF fighters carried 4 small bombs during WW I, They carried 4 small bombs in the 1920s and into the early 30s. They had squadron after squadron of "army cooperation aircraft" that carried a pair of 230-250lb bombs ( or sometimes four 116lb bombs) all during the 30s. Which seemed to disappear just before WW II or got little press. They did order 200 Henley dive bombers even if they didn't use them as such. Over 1700 Lysanders?

It might not have been Fighter Command's job to attack tanks on the battlefield but fighter command was NOT the entire RAF.

Perhaps memories of the losses involved in trench strafing made them reluctant to engage directly over the battlefield again, or given the horrendous losses for minimal result in the Battle for France made them not want to repeat the process.

Not to pick too much on the British the US did the same thing, P-26s carried bombs, P-35s carried bombs, export Hawk 75s could carry all kinds of bombs* (domestic P-36s couldn't ?) and many people claim the P-40 was intended for ground support with no bombs and just two .50 cal MGs. P-39s couldn't carry bombs?
Why did the US drop the fighter bomber ( or trench strafer) concept right before WW II?

*Factory Brochure for Hawk 75 lists a single 500lb under the fuselage as an option and a 100lb bomb under each wing as an option and under wing loads (each wing) of 5 30lb fragmetation, 5 25lb chemical, 3 50lb demolition standard.

Max bomb load given as 850lbs, one 500lb bomb, two 100lbs bombs and six 25lb bombs. And yet the P-40 couldn't carry bombs until the C model?

I think there was a lot of game playing with procurement and budgets rather than actual capability of the aircraft.

 

[stona]

Those aircraft carrying a few bombs under the wings were precisely what I was referring to earlier when I mentioned cowing tribesmen in some far flung imperial out post into submission. The RAF was able to demonstrate that it was a very cost effective way of policing certain parts of the Empire and that contributed directly to its survival as an independent service.

It was not about to give up that independence in 1939/40 and become a subsidiary of the Army. This attitude was ingrained in the first generation of RAF officers, some of whom found themselves at senior posts at the Air Ministry by this time. It is the reason for Slessor's immoderate response to the War Office's 'demand'.

Even later, when a machinery for close air support was established in 1943/5 it was manned by two separate services neither of which had much experience of cooperating with the other before 1941/2 and it was operating in the face of sustained hostility from the junior service. The high command of the RAF was fundamentally opposed to the role and the Army General Staff were largely unfamiliar with air power and unable to appreciate either its potential or drawbacks. The relationship, particularly in Europe was characterised by a lack of commonality, bitterness and recrimination.

In 1940/41 the Army had demanded dive bombers, as they had seen successfully employed by the Germans. The RAF successfully resisted this and the Army never had a say in the types of aircraft deployed. At the time this was taken as proof of the RAF's unwillingness to cooperate and fuelled demands for an independent Army air arm.

When, finally, a joint school of instruction was set up the Army again was not satisfied.

"The object of the course has been confined almost entirely to teaching the soldier about the Air Force, a statement that might be qualified by substituting - to teach the Army what the Air Force thinks the Army ought to know about the Air Force."

As late as 1944 the Army was still complaining.

"In matters of high policy affecting the two Services the Army has deferred to the Air Force in almost every instance..... Whether a policy of appeasement was ever profitable is a matter of opinion. In any case it is difficult to believe in it under the present circumstances where, superficial affability and goodwill on the one hand, and behind the scenes criticisms and back biting on the other, constitute a poor substitute for genuine cooperation."

Never under estimate the influence of doctrine, dogma and inter service rivalries on what actually happened at the sharp end.

Cheers

Steve

 

[gjs238]

Perhaps the US Navy/Marines did it best with their organic air support.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

It might be possible This all results in a 'mobility' kill. Which is fine if the tank is on the march, If it is already engaged in battle (firing on friendly positions/vehicles) a mobility kill turns it into a pillbox/bunker still shooting at your ground troops. .

An immobile tank is a static target, and the crew would know that. When the A-10 was first shown at Farnborough, I got talking to one of the crew, who was walking around, carrying one of the 30mm rounds; somebody got very sarcastic "What would that do to a Russian tank?" "On its own, not a lot, but fire enough, and something's going to break, so we can come round again and plaster it properly."

And I am afraid that any high ranking RAF officer who told the Prime Minster that stopping enemy tanks on English beaches/shores "was not the RAF's job" would find himself commanding an army support squadron on the Northwest Frontier (Afghanistan) in short order.

Can I, as gently as possible, point out that RAF officers were in the job because they wanted to defend their country and (even more so)the people in it; it's why we had scores of volunteers arriving here, from all over the world, with the sole aim of stopping the Nazis in their tracks. If it involved flying a Lysander-come-cannon lash-up, there would have been aircrew queueing up for the task; civilians volunteered to disappear into bunkers, so that they could emerge after the first invaders had passed, to carry out acts of sabotage. They all knew that their lives would be very short, but they still wanted to do it.
Churchill's War Cabinet, as well as civilian M.P.s, had regular meetings with senior officers of all the fighting Services, in which they (allegedly) worked out ways to cooperate with each other; though we didn't have a Goering in the RAF, Leigh-Mallory was, apparently, a nasty piece of work (as could be Sholto-Douglas, at times,) but shirking his responsibilities was not one of his traits.

It might not be the job the RAF wanted or the job they pinned their hopes of an independent air service, equal in stature and prestige to the Army and Navy, on but it certainly was one of their jobs or else a tremendous amount of money had gone down the crapper in terms of army co-operation aircraft and specifications/trials for tactical bombers like the Hawker Henley

What the RAF wanted, first and foremost, was the defeat of the enemy, because the alternative was slavery and death for their friends and family. The RAF was also equipped with aircraft ordered by the Air Ministry, in direct contact with a government Minister, so they basically had to do as they were told, and with what they were given; incidentally, the concept of the Hawker Henley as light day (not tactical, and definitely not a dive) bomber was dropped in December 1936, with the order reduced to 200, and all airframes to be converted to target-towing. The RAF/Air Ministry's requirements changed, and the RAF lower order had to change with it.

 

[Shortround6]

I would like to point out that times and weapons had changed a bit from 1940 to the 1970s. With rocket pods and especially guided missiles a stationary tank is in great danger from a "second" attack from specialized anti-tank aircraft (or other AT weapons). If the 1940/41 aircraft had only 20mm cannon it's ability to cause fatal damage is no greater on the second pass than the first. It was not uncommon for crews in immobilized tanks to continue to fight their tanks. It rather depended on the threats. Wacking big AT gun getting ready for a second shot? crew bails out as fast as they can. Bunch of angry infantry with small arms? Stay in the tank and shoot back rather than bail out and hide behind tank clutching a few pistols and a submachinegun.

Can I also, as gently as possible, point out that I wrote "high ranking RAF officer" which rather excludes the bulk of the squadron pilots and squadron commanders and even a number of group/wing commanders. At least that was my intention when I wrote. The vast majority of of the RAF pilots did an amazing job and often gave their lives in gallant attacks that sometimes failed to achieve the desired results due to poor aircraft, poor training, and poor doctrine. The vast majority would have flown those Lysanders with lashed on 20mm guns and done so knowing what their chances were.
May I also point out that the rest of sentence is saying that any high ranked officer who complained or balked at co-operating with army should have demoted and sent to the most unpleasant RAF outpost in the empire, at the least. Which, in my opinion, is hardly casting a slur on the pilots who did fly and fight with such sacrifice during the war.

As for the Hawker Henley, perhaps the book I was reading was wrong.'The British Bomber since 1914" by Francis Mason. In the entry on the Henley ( starting page 306) he refers to it several times as a dive bomber, even saying ""A production order under specification 42/36 for 350 dive-bombers had been places with Gloster, and preparations had....." Yes, by some point in 1938 they had given up on the dive bombing idea but he puts forth the theory that it was as much due to equipment problems as a real change in what they really desired. Dive bombers needing constant speed propellers to keep from over-speeding the the engine in the dive (although some managed with two pitch props) and since England was short of constant speed props (and would be even into 1940).
BTW there was a plan in 1940 to use the Henleys as a 'last ditch' bomber and airframe L3276 was trialed at Boscombe Down with two 112lb and eight 20lb bombs under the wings. Up to 150 aircraft were to be pulled from the training units and converted by No 5 Maintenance unit.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

The Henley used the same (fabric-covered) wing as the Hurricane, which, with them, was restricted to a maximum diving speed of 380; this increased to 450 with metal wings. Risking the Henley losing its wing covering was not an option, and the metal wings were late, for the (more important) Hurricane, so the Henley had no chance.
All of the carefully-laid plans, for the RAF, were torn up and thrown away, with the (never allowed-for) defeat of France, hence the desperate ideas that were promulgated at the time.

 

[stona]

Close Air Support was simply not seen by the RAF as a role it should play.

It was developed after a fashion in North Africa under men like Coningham and Montgomery. The latter not often seen as a forward thinking officer, yet it was he who ensured that the Army Headquarters and that of the RAF Desert Air Force were located together and insisted that senior air staff officers shared his mess.

The situation was rather different in Europe and when Montgomery returned in early 1944 he was alarmed by it. He wrote in May that a 'definite gulf' existed between the armies and their supporting Air Forces and that success depended on each Army and its accompanying Air Force being welded into a single entity.
His words fell on deaf ears. Both Coningham who would command the 2nd TAF and Tedder, serving as Eisenhower's deputy were by now disillusioned with Montgomery. The various headquarters were far apart. 21st Army Group at Portsmouth, the Air C-in-C at Stanmore and Coningham at Uxbridge. At exactly this time Montgomery embarked upon a morale raising tour leaving his Chief of Staff (De Guignand) to deal with the senior airmen which also caused much resentment. Don't underestimate the egos of some of these men.

Even in late 1944 the Army was still complaining that cooperation didn't exist and that the RAF seemed to disapprove of any attempt by the Army to become familiar with the problems of air support. The prevailing attitude of the RAF was that the Army should state the problem and that the RAF should decide on the solution.

The RAF was hardly prepared for carrying out close air support on the eve of the invasion in 1944. It did have the benefit of aircraft more suited to the job, though NONE were designed with that job as a primary function, and it did have the benefit of a system of control developed in North Africa. The latter would require rapid development in the coming months.
It had neither in 1940 when some (who didn't have the benefit of our hindsight) genuinely believed that a cross Channel amphibious operation mounted by the Germans was a real possibility. As Edgar has intimated above, this was a possibility that had not been considered before the war. The Fall of France was an unforeseen catastrophe of epic proportions and led to all sorts of desperate schemes, none of which, thankfully, were ever tested for real.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

The Henley used the same (fabric-covered) wing as the Hurricane, which, with them, was restricted to a maximum diving speed of 380; this increased to 450 with metal wings. Risking the Henley losing its wing covering was not an option, and the metal wings were late, for the (more important) Hurricane, so the Henley had no chance.
All of the carefully-laid plans, for the RAF, were torn up and thrown away, with the (never allowed-for) defeat of France, hence the desperate ideas that were promulgated at the time.

The Henley may have had no chance as a dive bomber 'as equipped' but it was ordered as one and at the time it was ordered this would have figured into the planning/procurement of other weapons.
What the actual planned use of the Henley was is certainly subject to question, no dive brakes ( a more important factor than fabric covered wings) but then the Vought Vindicator didn't have dive brakes either (planned to use reversible propeller and was forced to dive at shallower angles. British didn't have a dive bombing sight, one in the works or??? The Henley (and even the Battle) were stressed for 70 degree dives and pull-outs. Of course with 3 to 4 years between issue of requirement/s and first service squadron getting aircraft what was planned vs what actually happened took more than few turns.
You can have more than one change in doctrine or perceived mission in 3-4 years.

 

[parsifal]

Attacking the armoured elements of a tank formation is hard, and not very effective with either guns, bombs or even rockets, in the context of the 1930-50 techs. For guns, perhaps 5% of total losses of tanks were due to shell hits. It didnt matter the calibre of the guns, they were all hopelessly inaccurate. During Kursk, for example, there are accounts of Soviets losing 90 tanks to Stuka attacks out of a force structure of about 200 tanks. Soviet records show they had 7 tanks temporarily immobilised in that battle. During Korea, Sea Furies on the HMAS Sydney carried out repeated airstrike over a 3 month period, using 20mm cannons mostly, and claimed to have knocked out 60 T-34s in that period. Post battle ground confirmation show that 7 tanks were knocked out, and these were just as likely the result of rocket and bomb carrying Fireflies.

So, attacks against tanks themselves is a waste of time really, and making dedicated anti tank killing aircraft an even bigger waste of resources. Doesnt mean that attacking armoured formations is a waste of time. quite the contrary. Attacking the formation is very productive. Those Sea Fury attacks were very effective at pinning the advancing Chinese, destroyed nearly 2000 soft skinned vehicles and tore up up and destroyed the Chinese logistic systems very effectively. those stuka attacks at Kursk, didnt kill many Soviet tanks, but they slowed them down, and gave the Germans time to prepare and defeat them on the ground. this is what the RAF shiuld have been preparing for in the 1930s, biplane army co-operation or not. Fighter defences in those kinds of battles are fairly inneffective, except if you have air superiority to air supremacy air state. Anything less and your 100 knot biplanes can operate. They will suffer heavier losses than desirable to flak, but acceptable in my opinion, and no worse than modern equipment like a Battle. If you can achieve air parity, and have 500 biplanes instead of 100 more modern monoplanes, the 500 plane biplane option is the better option, against soft skinned targets which should be the focus of your interdiction efforts

 

[gjs238]

View attachment 276089

 

[parsifal]

now that was not a waste of resources.....

 

[stona]

Getting rid of it soon. Apparently cutting the 300 A-10s (and all their support/training infrastructure) will save just 1% of the USAAF's annual budget of around 110-140 billion dollars (depending how you calculate it and who you believe).

In more good news for the US tax payer, the A-10 only costs $18K an hour to operate which is a lot less than say and F-16 (around $40k) or the F-35 (put in a figure with a lot of zeros after it) which is supposed to eventually take on its role.

Cheers

Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

F-35 (put in a figure with a lot of zeros after it) which is supposed to eventually take on its role.

Cheers

Steve

Yes the F35 (particulary the STOVL version) too expensive to risk below 1,000 feet anywhere near a guy with an AK47 plus if it has a full warload it will have enough fuel for one pass and then dash for for the tanker with an eye on the fuel guage. I bet the grunts cant wait for that to come along and protect them.

 

[tomo pauk]

A-10, now that's a flying infantryman....err, a flying tank

 

[gjs238]

Getting rid of it soon. Apparently cutting the 300 A-10s (and all their support/training infrastructure) will save just 1% of the USAAF's annual budget of around 110-140 billion dollars (depending how you calculate it and who you believe).

In more good news for the US tax payer, the A-10 only costs $18K an hour to operate which is a lot less than say and F-16 (around $40k) or the F-35 (put in a figure with a lot of zeros after it) which is supposed to eventually take on its role.

Cheers

Steve

RE: A-10 retirement: It seems the issue is not the budget, it's the A-10 maintainers.

To hit [F-35] IOC in August 2016, the Air Force has a number of requirements. One of those is to have 1,100 trained maintainers available across the US. Of that 1,100, the Air Force planned to draw 800 maintainers from the pool of A-10 crews out there.

Read the whole article:
The F-35A Might Be Late. And It's Because of the A-10. | Intercepts | Defense News

 

[merlin]

Re: the Henley - according to Goulding Moyes - "Originally designed and built with fabric-covered wings, as on early production Hurricanes, K5115 was given all-metal stressed-skin wings in August, and made its first flight in this form on the 20th ('37)." With its deep fuselage it was able the carry 2 x 250lb bomb-load internally, though according to Peter Smith, it hard wing hard-points to carry four 250lb bombs! Moreover, Thetford wrote: "There will always be speculation as to why the high performance Henley (of which the RAF had 122 in Service in September 1939) was never issued to first-line light bomber squadrons as it could carry 750lb of bombs and was much superior to the Fairey Battle.
(I have done a Thread about the Henley before).

I agree with others, that the RAF for some bizarre reason that to co-operate with the Army would somehow compromise the 'Independence' - and that was the most important consideration!! Also, the RAF didn't like specialised aircraft - dive-bombers could only dive-bomb, whereas Fighters, could (and did) become fighter-bombers!

If some of the Henleys were used in France '40, and achieve better than the Battles, then past the BoB improved versions could have gone on to be a success - the Lw would have found Hurricanes escorting Henleys a very confusing sight!!

 

[stona]

I agree with others, that the RAF for some bizarre reason that to co-operate with the Army would somehow compromise the 'Independence' - and that was the most important consideration!!

It's been described as 'Junior Service Syndrome'.

The newly formed RAF never felt itself completely safe from re-absorption into the Army or at least falling under control of the Army and fought tooth and nail to avoid any such possibility. This varied from building up the bomber force as the ultimate deterrent (that didn't work) to offering itself as a cheap solution to rather petty little potential wars in the far flung outposts of Empire (which definitely did work).

Working in close cooperation with the Army on or over the battlefield was simply not regarded as a suitable role for the RAF (by the RAF) and many senior RAF officers believed it could potentially compromise the Service's independence.

Contrary to the post invasion myth, I like to call it 'the myth of the cab rank', this was an on going problem right until the end of the war, though things definitely got much better later. There was genuine and close cooperation between more junior officers from both services, but they didn't have a dog in the fight, they wanted to finish the war and go home.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Glider]

I admit that I don't see the co operation between the Army and the RAF as being less than very close for the last 24 months of the war. Lessons were learnt in the Middle East, tested in the UK before the invasion and constantly modified and improved until the wars end.

A good example being the integration of RAF control units with Army units often in the front line.

Can anyone give me some examples of the lack of co operation between the forces

 

[stona]

Can anyone give me some examples of the lack of co operation between the forces

Look back in this thread to see what the Army was saying in 1944. This is from an official, on the record, report.

"In matters of high policy affecting the two Services the Army has deferred to the Air Force in almost every instance..... Whether a policy of appeasement was ever profitable is a matter of opinion. In any case it is difficult to believe in it under the present circumstances where, superficial affability and goodwill on the one hand, and behind the scenes criticisms and back biting on the other, constitute a poor substitute for genuine cooperation."

There was cooperation at a more junior level in Europe from 1943 onwards, but it was always an uphill battle. The senior officers of neither service generally backed it.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Glider]

I have looked and there is precious little to support your view. The fact that the RAF had a 2nd Tactical Airforce gives some idea re the effort to support the Army. The size of the 2 TAF, the planning that went into its development and the testing of the ideas before it went into battle are also practical examples of the commitment involved.

The paper you quote from could be talking about the commitment the RAF gave to Bomber Command and its demands on the nations resources for limited benefit, in which case I would agree with you but not that the RAF gave a low priority to supporting the Army from mid 1943 onwards