The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread.
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bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
all planes had some sort of nasty habit....i think if you blew the landing in a p51..thus having to go around... if you hit full throttle without trimming you could get into trouble. Drgondog may be able confirm or dispel. it may have been a p40 quirk...
the thing about landing a 109 that gets me and i didnt think of it until flyboy j ran through the traffic pattern set up....usually like he said you are dropping so many degrees of flaps per leg and have your glide plane/ rate of decent set up all nice and cozy. but the 109 had the automatic slats...and as i understand they deployed pretty quickly. depending on where you were in the pattern when they deployed it could get exciting. i am wondering if 109s were brought in hot... at a higher speed so the slats wouldnt deploy? and that too could add to complicate landing.
the thing about landing a 109 that gets me and i didnt think of it until flyboy j ran through the traffic pattern set up....usually like he said you are dropping so many degrees of flaps per leg and have your glide plane/ rate of decent set up all nice and cozy. but the 109 had the automatic slats...and as i understand they deployed pretty quickly. depending on where you were in the pattern when they deployed it could get exciting. i am wondering if 109s were brought in hot... at a higher speed so the slats wouldnt deploy? and that too could add to complicate landing.
parsifal
Colonel
Great Information. This was before the commencement of the big daylight bomber offensive. and yet even then 845 out of about 1200 fighters (SE and TE) were attached to the reich defences. According to Murray Reich defences had increased to over 1600 fighters by January 1944. As I said, one of the great myths of the war was that the Luftwaffe was outnumbered by Allied fighters over Germany in 1944
parsifal
Colonel
According to you guys the LW had the same serviceability rates as the Allies.....but now all of a sudden its an additional factor affectibg the number of German fighters that can be put into the air. You cant have it both ways. If the LW enjoyed the same rates of serviceability as the allies, then the two factors cancel each other out. If they didnt....well, then what have you and the other germanophiles been feeding us all this time.
The truth is that over germany itself, serviceability rates were comparable. I will do the math tonite, but it will be quite satisfactory for the LW for those units in Germany. As to Pilots, there were sufficient pilots to render 4900 of its airc strength "serviceable. Serviceablke means "ready for operations, and that means you have a pilot to fly it. Or are you attempting to argue that they could not fly all 4900 at the same time.
What was rupturing in the LW were pilot standards. They were losing experienced aircrew hand over fist throughout 1941-3. The replacements in 1941-2 were adequate, no better, but those from 1943 onwards showed a distinct lack of skill due to very limited training times. this was reflected in the massacres of 1944. Exchange rates of 4, 5 or 6:1 were not uncommon
drgondog
Major
Yes they have - but what you miss in your scholarship is what the force balance over GERMANY was, in January 1944 through July, in fighter versus fighter numbers. The oft repeated "there I was minding my own business attacking B-17s and B-24s when a HORDE (pick a ratio 5:1, 10:1) of Mustangs attacked us."
Well 10:1 (a true Horde) over Berlin, for a force of say 125 fighters German fighters defending - implies 1250 US fighters in that 10 cubic mile airspace - when only 30-50 were within 20 miles. You decide on the exagerations but defend your views with facts.
They are well documented and easy to discern simply by range capabilities of the P-47 and Spit in the first half of 1944.
Simply, the GAF could neither defeat or seriously bloody the noses of the USAAF 8th FC over Germany - you decide what the reasons were -but it wasn't "more escort fighters than the attacking GAF force".
I don't think that is correct. The number of serviceable a/c is the number of a/c capable of operations whether there was pilots or not to fly them.
parsifal
Colonel
Then would they not place the numbers in the reserves list if there are insufficient crews to man the aircraft. In fact, I am certain that the LW had a small reserve of aircraft, and a larger reserve of pilots in 1943. Thy were churning out more than a 1000 pilots per month in 1944. but losing more than that number from about April 1944 onward. Its true that from late in 1944 onward, the training and replacement system completely broke down, and the LW was forced to send pilots with virtually no training. But remember the time period we are talking about...March 1943, what major cataclysm had befallen the LW at that stage. There was a constant and serious drain on their elite pilots and expereineced aircrews, but no great rupturing of their training system. They had been forced to curtail training times and flight hours for crews because of
1) a shortage of training aircraft,
2) a shortage of instructors, particulalry for the bomber crews after Stalingrad
3) a shortage of fuel, particularly in 1942
This caused a crisis in training standards, but not yet availablity. That happned from the end of 1943, when the 8th AF tore into the rookie LW fighter pilots with a vengeance. By that stage, USAAC replacements were receiving an average of 400 hours of training before committment, compared to about 150 hours for the average LW jock. And, for whatever reason (I suspect from overcommittment), the LW was suffering a much higher percentage of atrition than the USAAC. This had to be having an effect on retention rates of exerienced aircrw as well.
1) a shortage of training aircraft,
2) a shortage of instructors, particulalry for the bomber crews after Stalingrad
3) a shortage of fuel, particularly in 1942
This caused a crisis in training standards, but not yet availablity. That happned from the end of 1943, when the 8th AF tore into the rookie LW fighter pilots with a vengeance. By that stage, USAAC replacements were receiving an average of 400 hours of training before committment, compared to about 150 hours for the average LW jock. And, for whatever reason (I suspect from overcommittment), the LW was suffering a much higher percentage of atrition than the USAAC. This had to be having an effect on retention rates of exerienced aircrw as well.
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parsifal
Colonel
Some easily digested basic material on German pilot training in WWII
Pilot Training of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) in WW2.
The Germans were not short of pilots in 1943, but they were running short of good pilots. Outside the ever shrinking elite, the majority of the LW pilots were just chaff for the machine
This site is useful as well, and it is worth noting the average numbers of fighter pilots in Jamuary-May 1944 for the Germans was 2262 at any given time. It would have been higher in March 1943
The November 1944 battles between the Luftwaffe and the US Air Force
Pilot Training of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) in WW2.
The Germans were not short of pilots in 1943, but they were running short of good pilots. Outside the ever shrinking elite, the majority of the LW pilots were just chaff for the machine
This site is useful as well, and it is worth noting the average numbers of fighter pilots in Jamuary-May 1944 for the Germans was 2262 at any given time. It would have been higher in March 1943
The November 1944 battles between the Luftwaffe and the US Air Force
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General Gunther Rall said:
' In my experience, the Royal Air Force pilot was the most aggressive and capable fighter pilot during the Second World War. This is nothing against the Americans, because they came in late and in such large numbers that we don't have an accurate comparison. We were totally outnumbered when the Americans engaged, whereas at the time of the Battle of Britain the fight was more even and you could compare. The British were extremely good. '
I'm sorry, but I'll believe a highly respected person like General Rall. When he says the Luftwaffe was outnumbered, you can take that as the truth. Especially from those who were there.
' In my experience, the Royal Air Force pilot was the most aggressive and capable fighter pilot during the Second World War. This is nothing against the Americans, because they came in late and in such large numbers that we don't have an accurate comparison. We were totally outnumbered when the Americans engaged, whereas at the time of the Battle of Britain the fight was more even and you could compare. The British were extremely good. '
I'm sorry, but I'll believe a highly respected person like General Rall. When he says the Luftwaffe was outnumbered, you can take that as the truth. Especially from those who were there.
parsifal
Colonel
General Rall does deserve respect, and overall, the USAAC did outnumber the LW by a significant amount. But in the crucial area of fighters over germany, the esteemed General is not correct.... for that critical period March 1943 to May 1944, it was most definately the other way around. What perhaps does need to be conceded are the limits of the german equipment. though they clearly had superior numbers over germany, the limited endurance of their machines meant they had difficulty in concentrating their forces for a decisive blow. Of course, even this is an over simplification. There were other factors at work other than range of the LW interceptors.....issues like radar jamming, communications, spoofing to name just a couple.
I do not mean any disrrespect to Rall, but he does have a reason to say what he says. By saying they were outnumbered, it is a convenient raison detre to explain why they were defeated. If he had to get into the failures of the LW to adequately prepare for the final showdown....inadequate training, inadequate arrangements for fuel reserves, inadequate endurance in the design, inadequate command and control, overextension of the LW, profligate wastage in the lead up to 1944, he would have had to accept a degree of culpability for the LWs defeat. By putting it all down to the numbers, he has a ready made and convenient scapegoat that leaves him, and indeed the LW blameless for its defeat.
In a way, and in the finish, Rall is correct. The LW was in part beaten by numbers. But this was no accident, and more than a little it was the fault of the LW itself that it found itself so outnumbered at the end of the war....
Its also a little humourous for Rall to claim that in the BoB, the LW was only on par in terms of numbers, whereas in 1943-4 the LW was outnumbered. In the BoB there were 3000 a/c engaging at the beginning 300 British fighters, which later increased to about 500. Over Schweifurt, i think there were 250 German interceptors engaging about 300 bombers. So Rall thinks 10:1 in favour of the LW is an even match, whilst 1;1, the LW is heavily outnumbered.......hmmmm
I do not mean any disrrespect to Rall, but he does have a reason to say what he says. By saying they were outnumbered, it is a convenient raison detre to explain why they were defeated. If he had to get into the failures of the LW to adequately prepare for the final showdown....inadequate training, inadequate arrangements for fuel reserves, inadequate endurance in the design, inadequate command and control, overextension of the LW, profligate wastage in the lead up to 1944, he would have had to accept a degree of culpability for the LWs defeat. By putting it all down to the numbers, he has a ready made and convenient scapegoat that leaves him, and indeed the LW blameless for its defeat.
In a way, and in the finish, Rall is correct. The LW was in part beaten by numbers. But this was no accident, and more than a little it was the fault of the LW itself that it found itself so outnumbered at the end of the war....
Its also a little humourous for Rall to claim that in the BoB, the LW was only on par in terms of numbers, whereas in 1943-4 the LW was outnumbered. In the BoB there were 3000 a/c engaging at the beginning 300 British fighters, which later increased to about 500. Over Schweifurt, i think there were 250 German interceptors engaging about 300 bombers. So Rall thinks 10:1 in favour of the LW is an even match, whilst 1;1, the LW is heavily outnumbered.......hmmmm
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Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
Rall transferred to the West in late April 1944, just when 8th AF fighter strength was in the ascendancy and the situation in the West had dramatically deteriorated for the Luftwaffe.
If he'd transferred over in April 1943, when the 8th AF flew just 510 sorties over the month and a grand total of eight - yes 8 - bomber escort sorties, isn't it possible his opinion might be a little different?
Monthly effective fighter sorties by 8th AF fighters
1943
Jan 422
Feb 435
Mar 584
Apr 510
May 2109
Jun 1879
Jul 2133
Aug 2017
Sep 2987
Oct 2888
Nov 3436
Dec 5101
1944
Jan 6464
Feb 9703
Mar 14613
Apr 19216
May 32860
Jun 50748
Jul 39923
Aug 42409
Sep 30397
Oct 27132
Nov 27871
Dec 33242
In May 1943, 8th AF fighters flew more combat sorties in 20 days than they had in the whole of 1943. It was not until November 1943 that 8th AF fighters claimed more than 100 aircraft in a month.
This is complete false what you say.. Rall is right. British German strenght in BoB - equal. The myth of the RAF outnumbered - false. Very stubborn myth of course.
Also like USAAF in 1944, LW did not sent all its aircraft to France to fly against Britain; part was sent. Which fly from France, did not all fly against Britain on day. Most rest. Numbers clear.
Study example 15 September 1940. In both case or raid, few of German bomber escort by more - 2-3x - fighters, but engaged far more British fighters in each occasion. Battle of Britain Day - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Also you are wrong about the Luftwaffe outnumbering the USAAF over Germany. This is false. If you want to prove, show numbers. Not tactical - local superiority is possible from time. Operation numbers on level..Even late 1944, sometimes bomber were caught un-escorted. Results as expect..This was rarer.
Sorry, you are wrong again. It was shown and calculated with shortrund that 109 and 190 had enough range. This is fact, shown, proven. So why you keep argue and just you say again opposite means nothing without proof? ou have false claim, simple case of this, sorry, I do not mean to offend you, but has to say.
IF there was trouble of concentration - no proof again, and funny, dragondog says they had concentration all the time - that is how they outnumber USAAF as I understand him, hope right, if not sorry! - it was not due to range. Also, 100% concentration is difficult to achieve - time and space factors, consideration of tactical thinking, like spoof raids, delay in report and order etc.
Funny side, problem always searched on German side.. some people are bit signs of desperating try to so show I say. But thing were much more simple, in 1943 USAAF had few planes, so German had success, but in 1944 US number built up so rapid, despite strong losses in early 1944, that German simply could not keep equal, no matter what they try. USAAF ocean simply washed German fighter away.. this is truth.
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Mustang nut
Banned
- 200
- Jun 14, 2011
"Battle of Britain day" was the day that it became obvious Germany was losing The conflict took place from the fall of France the ratio of fighters changed from overwhelming German superiority at the start to almost parity in the end. The figures and ratios vary by what is termed a fighter and what is termed available the British had gladiators defiants and blenheims but they could hardly be called fighters.
The Luftwaffe needs more planes to defend than the USAAF needs to attack, a
bf 109 cannot defend Belin Hannover Dortmund and Munich at the same time.
Glider
Captain
Servicable RAF fighters in Fighter Command 15th September 9.00 hours
192 Spitfires
389 Hurricanes
47 Blenheim
24 Defient
8 Gladiators
581 front line fighters in ALL of Fighter Command including 13 group against how many German aircraft?.
The fact that the RAF made better use of their resources doesn't alter that fact that the German forces had the numbers
192 Spitfires
389 Hurricanes
47 Blenheim
24 Defient
8 Gladiators
581 front line fighters in ALL of Fighter Command including 13 group against how many German aircraft?.
The fact that the RAF made better use of their resources doesn't alter that fact that the German forces had the numbers
parsifal
Colonel
Mustang Nut you answered the issues about the BoB pretty well spot on, even if we want to compare fighters to fighters, a more realistic comparison, the numbers of fighters possessed by the Luftwaffe outnumbered those available to the RAF considerably. Especially as at 15 June when Fighter Command was down to 300 machines, spread allover the UK. The Germans had the advantage of being able to concetrate, but failed to exploit that advantage.
Funny how these guys will say anything, without the slightest shred of supporting evidence, in any way they like, but squeal "show me the proof" or "you cant talk to me like that" at the smallest opportunity....Im always amazed by that.
Funny how these guys will say anything, without the slightest shred of supporting evidence, in any way they like, but squeal "show me the proof" or "you cant talk to me like that" at the smallest opportunity....Im always amazed by that.
But there was simply no overwhelming German superiority at the start. Just study numbers..
Also, if you look at 15 September, you can see on that day, biggest considered for BoB, certain more famous, how few Luftwaffe planes were in air at time - say midday attack, 112 bombers only attacked with ~300 fighters escort, about 1/3 in close contact, British had 275 fighters in air.
But in morning raid situation was opposite: around 120 Bf 109s and 25 Do 17s were facing 245 Spitfires and Hurricanes in air.
Also very evident neither side sent up just all in the air.
Also, if you look at 15 September, you can see on that day, biggest considered for BoB, certain more famous, how few Luftwaffe planes were in air at time - say midday attack, 112 bombers only attacked with ~300 fighters escort, about 1/3 in close contact, British had 275 fighters in air.
But in morning raid situation was opposite: around 120 Bf 109s and 25 Do 17s were facing 245 Spitfires and Hurricanes in air.
Also very evident neither side sent up just all in the air.
No, this is false. Shown already.
Ever hear of Battle of France..? It was going on still in June. Are you say German should have just left France, only real enemy, before defeating it complete, and start of other Battle - with enemy (England) already defeated (Dunkerque)...? And just ignore that German air units were also tired, needed repairs, replacements, just like British? Sorry, you make no sense to me.. you sound like armchair historian who always know better than the professional soldiers of time.. like many historians, see June 1940 as some kind of irrational time "given" by German to RAF as "gift", complete blind and ignore French were still fighting.. and still did not sign rest of arms.
Actual: self description.. sorry. For example you argue 109 had not enough range - just week ago shown to you not true, with lot of time spent and research.. you ignore. You claim LW had outnumber USAAF over Reich, poster Milosh shows you number of LF Reich numbers in May 1944, shows ca. 300 singe engine fighter, plus about 100 day-night s-e fighter capable of operations.. total about 400.. in best case. And you say this outnumbered USAAF force which flew ca 20 000 fighter sortie a month.. that is, avarage 6-700 fighter sortie a day. And you ignore and accuse other "squeal".
As practice, you use rude and insult when they do not agree.
parsifal
Colonel
I dont agree with your figures,and neither do any of the 6 reputable references including Gallands own account. you are using highly selective and biased techniques to try and push a point that is so hopelessly out of step with reality its laughable
Anyway, the numbers of aircraft involved in this last major daylight attack against England, after the RAF had been given more than a week to recover and had substantially reinforced its badly depleted forces saw 630 RAF defenders pitted against morethan 900 Luftwaffe attackers. And remember, this was basically after the overall battle had been decided. Prior to that the numbers were heavily in favour of the Germans, even in category to category basis
Wiki is about the standard of information needed to counter the argument being mounted here. Relevantly it says:
In the two main engagements, the fighter losses had been about equal. The big difference was the bombers losses. Fighter Command had had greater success against the afternoon attack rather than the morning assault, which it out numbered 2:1. The ratio of German fighters to bombers had been 3:1 in the morning but 5:1 in the afternoon, so there were more targets. The more bombers Kesselring sent, the more were lost.
Kesselring was back where he started. Park's handling of the actions was a masterpiece of aggressive defence, yet he was not under the same pressure as he had been in the battles during August when air battles were so confusing they were hard to control. A big set-piece offensive played into his hands.
Mustang nut
Banned
- 200
- Jun 14, 2011
Tante I am reading "The most dangerous enemy" by Steven Bungay at the moment but I am at work and the book is in the hotel. From memory at the time of the fall of France the RAF had just over 300 fighters and were hugely outnumbered mainly because so many had been lost supporting the BEF and French forces including Dunkerque. The crux of the BoB was fighter and bomber production. By and large in the key period of the battle July to Sept, Britain rarely lost more than it produced on a week by week basis and the LW rarely produced more than it lost. At the end of the Battle the RAF was substantially stronger than at the start and the LW substantially weaker. I will quote the full figures tomorrow.
