The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread.

[Tante Ju]

I wonder if the escort ever received radar assistance from Britain? Were they forewarned of enemy interceptions imminent, or were they on their own???

I think unlikely. Radar in Britain did not have range.. I think about listening to German radio traffic, but then - radio sets in US fighters probably did not have range either.. it was typical range of less 100 km in fighter sets..

To what extent did radar, and ECM affect the performance of both sides in the battle????

German were in use of radar, like RAF in 1940. One development I know of was Y guide use. This was very useful for navigation and control - all fighter plane had Y device for 1944, one in group turn it on, and it guided to exact point fighters like X anbd Y device in 1940 bombers.. may seem small but naviation is not so easy in fighter.

I wonder - did US use Window? But here concern - Germans had worked counter measures by 1944, multi change of Hz rating of radar and other. Also as I think of it - maybe window not very use at all. Window does not make plane invisible to radar, it just gives many false signals.. and since plane drop window, you just head for false signal path, like blood dog to blood.. of course it makes estimate of strenght, altitude very hard still.

 

[parsifal]

I believe the first AEW aircraft were converted Wellingtons which began operations with 100 Group either late'44 or early '45.

Extensive use of spoofing and ECM was adopted by the RAF in the Night Operations,But I am unaware of any equivalent assets in the USAAC. Perhaps they had them, perhaps not. I also know that Window was effective at times, but less so at other, exactly as you say. RAF used it a lot, and when it worked it reduced losses greatly. Flak was also affected by all this stuff as well

Centimetric ground based radars in Britain had effective ranges that could reach to the German western borders whilst the AI MkIX had a detection range out to 100km with a degree of error of no more than +/- 10 yds. More important than that was the search arc width. The radar assisted "field of vision" was wide which was of great help in tactical situations. The combination of effective airborne detection and Airborner Early Warning capability in theory at least would have removed or lessened the need for GCI in England for the RAF, but I do not know the actual extent this was integrated during the war. But all of the ingredients of a modern airborne control system were there.

The RAF used OBOE I in 1943 as a more advanced and developed version of the German XGerat system. This allowed radar assisted blind bombing with great accuracy out to the 250 mile mark, which was gradually increased as the war progressed. Because of its narrower bandwidths it was more accurate than XGerat, and the gradually increasing range of the system increased its capability markedly. Harris's decision to jump ahead of his technology, and advance to Berlin was one of the biggest blunders of the war in my opinion...he should have waited....he would have halved BC losses, done about 80% more damage per ton dropped over an admittedly more restricted area, but he couldnt resist the magnet of Berlin, like a light for a Butterfly....

I mention all of this merely to point out that the allies had at their disposal considerable blind bombing, blind navigation and radar assisted and airborne controlled fighters for the night offensive that by wars end could reach deep inside of germany. I dont know (but I doubt it) whether the Americans ever adapted their Day bomber forces, and the fighters that went with them, to include this sort of technology.

 

[Hop]

I wonder if the escort ever received radar assistance from Britain? Were they forewarned of enemy interceptions imminent, or were they on their own???

To what extent did radar, and ECM affect the performance of both sides in the battle????

Not so much radar, but the RAF "Y" intelligence, based at Kingsdown, listened in to German radio traffic to, and between, fighters. From Signals Intelligence Support to the Cockpit
Captain Gilles Van Nederveen (Van Nederveen is the Associate Editor of the Aerospace Power Journal at Maxwell AFB)

The Eighth Air Force also exploited Y intelligence near real time during bombing
missions over Western Europe. Activated in 1943 the RAF Kingsdown Hook-up produced and
disseminated near-real-time intelligence from voice intercepts to the pilots of Eighth Fighter
Command as they flew escort missions and fighter sweeps in Northwest Europe. RAF
Kingsdown gathered the data, evaluated it, and passed it directly into the fighter control room at
AJAX, headquarters of the VIII Fighter Command. They in turn passed it to the fighter control
centers (FCC) of three subordinated wings: the 65th, 66th, and 67th Fighter wings.

Specially trained intelligence and operations officers held conference calls and moved aircraft according to
intercepted data engaging Luftwaffe fighters and protecting bomber formations.

Since Eighth Air Force bombers flew outside the range of UK based tracking radars, Y
intelligence also informed US fighter controllers where the bombers were located based on
intercepted Luftwaffe communications. As longer ranged fighter escorts entered the USAAF
inventory, the RAF Kingsdown Hook-up increased in value as wing controllers operating
exclusively on Y-intelligence vectored P-51 and P-38 to Luftwaffe fighter assembly areas to
engage them far from the bombers and to disrupt the enemy's plan and sequence of attack.

http://www.dodccrp.org/events/6th_ICCRTS/Tracks/Papers/Track7/012_tr7.pdf

 

[drgondog]

Hop is correct.

8th AF FC exploited both "Y Intelligence" and migrated to flying Radio Relay missions over the channel to relay to and from BC flying deep in Germany.

As to tactical communications the 'C" channel in the Mustang radio, set specifically for each mission to reduce jamming from German sources, was designed for Bomber to Fighter communications. It was set specifically for a block of bombers and the assigned fighter groups to provide updates relative to waypoints and times to let the fighter commander know whether his assigned block of bombers were on time for the R/V or more importantly if they needed help - as the fighters assigned might be covering a space of say 20 miles and could not always see a German attack.

From about May, 1944 Beachy Head and Type 16 Controls were able to use radar located near East Anglia coast to detect formations and direct specific fighter groups to investigate - sometimes allied and sometimes German formations... the range grew as the war progressed to western Germany.

 

[drgondog]

One thing to consider is that the American fighters may have had to engage several German fighter groups. Dragondog certainly knows better than I and several other members of this forum have detailed accounts of the some of the German units. but did some of those American fighters have to engage one group of German fighters and then another 20 minutes later and perhaps a 3rd group even later? All after dropping tanks at the first combat and not being able to re-arm guns?

Shortround - the point is dead on. Over time Erich and I have disseminated one of many such examples for the November 26 Battle over Misburg in which ~ 42 Mustangs of the 355FG/2SF dribbled off sections at a time trying to cover 90 B-24s against three separate waves of between 75 and 125 German fighters from all of JG301, JG1 and squadrons of high cover 109s from JG4

It was a battle which lasted from first contact ~ 1210 all the way through 1245 from Celle to Misburg to south of Hannover to sw Hannover and the last German waves managed to break through and take out 20 B-24s from two bomb groups before the last Mustang force of 7 (2SF) broke up the last attack. The 355th were credited with 20 fw 190s, 5 109s

Afterwards, the 339th FG entered the fray and continued the engagement with JG301 from west Hannover to Dummer Lake.

The two Groups destroyed 44 Fw 190s and 8 Me 109s. the 355th had no losses and I think the 339th lost two.

From a an historical note the author of Sernade to a Big Bird, Bert Stiles - former B-17 pilot(and narrated by quotes in WWII in HD?) was one of the 339th KIA chasing a 190 into the ground. He had voulnteered for fighters after his tour in B-17s.

 

[parsifal]

So DG, perhaps it is more correct to describe localised superiorities of numbers as the actual function of the battle. What I am trying to say by that is that there were tactical advantages at work....communication, radar, tactics, that might give the Americans an advantage in numbers at a particular point, but overall the Germans enjoying a numerical superiority over those escorts. If so, thats just a product of the development of the battle......just another area where the germans were being overtaken

 

[drgondog]

How where the US escort squadrons controlled was there a senior officer in a bomber or a fighter who called in the escorts or was it just down to any pilot to shout for assistance.

Each of the BS commanders within a specific 'box' (maybe more than one bomb group within a box) had the "C" Channel crystal installed in their radios - tuned to the escort squadron/Group leaders assigned to cover the one or more bombers.

So the radio transmissions to/from the bombers and fighters were limited to a few sets and the radio C channel frequencies were different from one Task Force of many bombers to another Task Force so as not to cause confusion.

The problem to be solved is that you didn't want a general call for 'help' to come from an unkown distance and direction with subsequent confusion on the part of a fighter commander.

 

[drgondog]

So DG, perhaps it is more correct to describe localised superiorities of numbers as the actual function of the battle. What I am trying to say by that is that there were tactical advantages at work....communication, radar, tactics, that might give the Americans an advantage in numbers at a particular point, but overall the Germans enjoying a numerical superiority over those escorts. If so, thats just a product of the development of the battle......just another area where the germans were being overtaken

Absolutely - and the tactics evolved over time to improve efficiency, reduce confusion, etc. One valid complaint on the part of German fighter pilots was a fight evolving from one in which their fighters had caught an undefended box of bombers, were in the middle of a fight when the escorts poured in.

Having said that, it was rare when one Fighter Group (US) responded to a call for help en masse. I have seen many examples when one commander would see a big fight miles in the distance, see the assigned escorts of a bomber box 10 miles out in front engage, and issue orders for say one squadron of his own group to move forward and fill the vacuum.

I am not saying that US escorts never had numerical or tactical advantage. A Sweeping Group of Mustangs might catch a Gruppe forming up 50 miles out in front and catch them by surprise - and have a field day because of altitude and speed advantage even if the numbers were balanced.

But the tactics solidified to enable fighter commanders the discretion to direct flights or sections into a gaggle of German fighters while retaining escort cohesion with the balance of his Group. He might direct a flight to bounce a couple of German fighters, he might lead an entire squadron into a large force of German fighters. He might get bounced and call for help from other elements of his force.

Remember a Fighter Group in escort might have one squadron (broken into two sections and weaving) 5,000 feet above and in front of the leading bombers of his box, one squadron in same mode of sections and essing off 5 miles to one side and 2,000 feet above the bombers while the third might be in trail sweeping from front to back.

At any one volume of space of 5x5x1 cubic miles there might be just one squadron in position to meet any attack... or none.

 

[Milosh]

What I find interesting is that many of those that claim the LW was outnumbered in the battles over Germany in 1944, claim during the BoB that the RAF was not outnumbered.

1944: LW fighters vs USAAF fighters and bombers
1940: LW fighters vs RAF fighters, excluding the LW bombers

 

[drgondog]

It doesnt surprise me that the LW had difficulties in concentrating, or that in detail the USAAC was able at times to achieve superior concentration of force. LW had a number of issues to contend with....its radar detection systems were being downgraded by window, and other measures, it had a wide arc of territory to defend, by the latter part of Jan-May it was running out of pilots and fuel, and spares, and a whole range of other difficulties. We could draw some similarities (and differences) to the british situation in 1940 I might add.

The German controllers were well informed from radio chatter leaking during bomber assy, to radar and spotters picking up bomber direction and altitude, to repeated entry points on the continent suggesting to the controllers where the highest probability target(s) could be, placing units on alert, moving units from say Augsburg to stage at Huldesheim if the Controller thinks Berlin. Big cat and mouse game.

But these issues are part of the battle, i would submit. They are the manouverings that makes comparisons of raw numbers somewhat arbitrary. Ther will be occasions when the germans achieve superiority of numbers, others when they wont. But they certainly wont if they dont have the numbers in the first place. And here lies the question that we have to turn our minds to....in terms of raw numbers available, did the defending fighters have more available than the USAAC could put fighters over the target? from there ther are numerous supplementary questions like, were there other factors that conspired to reduce that raw total for the germans and make it hard for them to achieve the necessary concentrations?

Unequivocally yes to Germans having many more fighters available en masse within LFReich, than long range escort fighters available for deep penetrations for the specific period November 1943 through July 1944. Then the question to be answered was where to concentrate them, or where to piecemeal smaller but significant blocks of multiple Gruppe's.

When a battle was engaged the unit cohesion on both sides was seriously disrupted and in many cases its 6:12 or 4:2 or 4:6 in individual fights as the German fighters scattered, etc

My opinion is that the Germans did outnumber the US 8FC in terms of available numbers, but by various tactical advantages the Americans were able to achieve better concentrations most of the time at the critical points of contact. So perhaps there are elements of truth in both arguments......something none of us had considered perhaps.....

There was zero possibility of two US fighter groups collaborating except by sheer accident like the April 24 battle I described above, until late in 1944 when all but the 56th and 78th FG had converted to P-51s. By that time the 8th could provide 3-4 P-51 Groups of 40-48 effectives on any one 30 mile section of bombers.

November 1944 is a classic example when the Germans could easily place 250+ fighters into a volume of airspace like Misburg to Celle against a tactically vulnerable US force.

Another example is the September 27 massacre when the 448th BG wandered off course on an attack on Kassel, alone, and was hit by a huge force of Sturms near Eschwege and lost 27+ B-24s in the span of minutes - and it took escort fighters at least 5-10 minutes to respond to cries for help.

 

[parsifal]

Thanks for that, and you kinda answered my next line of questioning....what advantages the germans could rely on to achieve local superiority.

Its not an easy situation to understand

 

[TheMustangRider]

I wonder - did US use Window? But here concern - Germans had worked counter measures by 1944, multi change of Hz rating of radar and other. Also as I think of it - maybe window not very use at all. Window does not make plane invisible to radar, it just gives many false signals.. and since plane drop window, you just head for false signal path, like blood dog to blood.. of course it makes estimate of strenght, altitude very hard still.

Relying on my memory, first-hand accounts of bomber crew members describe the use of metalized paper strips used in a attempt to throw off radar guided flak guns and sometimes it worked, saving the life of many bomber crews.
Don't remember such measure being called Window though.

 

[TheMustangRider]

From a an historical note the author of Sernade to a Big Bird, Bert Stiles - former B-17 pilot(and narrated by quotes in WWII in HD?) was one of the 339th KIA chasing a 190 into the ground. He had voulnteered for fighters after his tour in B-17s.

In case you are not completely sure Drgondog, I can confirm that the story of Bert Stiles was featured in WWII in HD.
From my personal point of view his story is very sad, having gone through so much as a bomber co-pilot, eager to become a fighter pilot and then tragically lost in his first contact with the enemy seconds after achieving his first kill.
I'm looking forward to get a copy of his book.

 

[TheMustangRider]

Double post.

 

[davparlr]

for aircraft carrier use, along with an arrester hook. the 109 was as pure of a fighter as one can get.

This has already been disproven, right? According to DerAdler, the Naval version was the Bf-109T, which used the conventional Bf-109 gear, which was strengthened, not the revised swing shown on the V-31.

That is the Bf 109V-31 (at least off the top of my head I believe that is the V-31) which was a prototype with wide landing gear. The carrier version was the Bf 109T and all it was a Bf 109E with longer wingspan and arrester gear

Which brings me back to my original question, if there was no problem, why did the Germans expend time and money looking at a more conventional gear?

 

[drgondog]

I wonder - did US use Window? But here concern - Germans had worked counter measures by 1944, multi change of Hz rating of radar and other. Also as I think of it - maybe window not very use at all. Window does not make plane invisible to radar, it just gives many false signals.. and since plane drop window, you just head for false signal path, like blood dog to blood.. of course it makes estimate of strenght, altitude very hard still.

Yes - the first example was the 3 day/night pounding of Hamburg in July 1943. As you note the Germans developed effective countermeasures. Also notable is that the Germans picked up the H2X frequencies and used them as target ranging for flak - which was very accurate and effective.

 

[marshall]

I can confirm that the story of Bert Stiles was featured in WWII in HD.
From my personal point of view his story is very sad, having gone through so much as a bomber co-pilot, eager to become a fighter pilot and then tragically lost in his first contact with the enemy seconds after achieving his first kill.

War is a very sad story.

 

[jim]

I understand that many of the olders members have much more years of research , Mr Drgondog for example , as they are much older than the younger members, and their opinion is more important but let us the youngers too have an opinion. We too spend A LOT of money in books- ask my angry fiance.
1)German controllers during the deep penetration missions had to deal with a lot of feints attacks , bombers courses changes , weather limitations over german airfields, diferent flight performances of various types of intercepting fighters. So never did the defending fighters attacked at once. p51 faced them in turns.
2) The MISSION PROFILE of german fighters was to engage the bombers or face execution so always P51s entered the fight with great altitude advantage. Even 8 P51s versus 30 Fw190, is not equal if p51 are 3000ft higher and the Fw 190s are concentrated to attack the bombers . And one bounce is enough to destroy the attack as every german fighter dived away.It took a lot of time to reorganize a gruppe even in the days of unescorted raids. And only massive attacks were effective.
3) German controllers were bad . Never warned german leader formation of approaching alleid fighters . No equal combat took place. Most german formations were attacked from higher altitude approachingbombers or during their attacks . in such conditions not even experience could help. Galland of II/JG26 deid that way 17/8/43 ,Egon Mayers February 44, Philip fall 43 ( excuse me, i write from memory) all the same way , attacked from above without warning during their attacks in bomber formations.
4) Some people insist not to consider the bombers part of the air superiority. Firstly bombers were credited with douzens of german fighters after each missions according to western mythology. Secondly if the bombers were not there P51s would have suffered the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941/42.
5) Escort fighters were never attacked . It was not nessecary to score kills. Just force them to jettion early the drop tanks and disrupt their randevous programme. It was proposed but was rejected.
6) Several of the mentioned units did fought in areas that could not be reached by P47s/ Spitfires but had to take off from airfields within range of medium bombers and sometimes short range fighters.
7)bmw 801 was useless at altitude (irrelevant!)
In my country there is a moto. The best way to lei is using the numbers. We all do it more or less. But to claim that LW had numerical superiority ?!?!
Just my opininon , i may be wrong.

 

[parsifal]

Hi and welcome Jim.

What was the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941-2? Much is made about the losses they sustained, and in the latter half of 1941, it really did get quite bad. However this is to overlook the conditions that they were forced to fight under.

I will acknowledge that my position is disputed, but evidence to disprove what I support is yet to be posted. In a related thread, I have posted that the LW took heavy losses up to June 1941, when its bombers were withdrawn. Thereafter the balance of losses tipped in favour of the LW, and remained in favour of the LW throughout 1942, but was less one sided. Plus these Allied losses achieved something, ultimately the LW losses only weakened their defences.

Beginning in April 1941, anbd continuing right through to the end of 1942, the RAF began a program of gaining the upper hand in Western European skies. This followed a planned deliberate and staged program. It began by denying access to the LW to British skies. This had been achieved by the beginning of June (well apart from some minor nuisance raids). It also included denying the Germans the ability to interfere with channel maritime traffic. This was achieved also by mid 1941 (again, some nuisance raids are an exception). Then it proceeded to deny the germans control of French airspace close to the channel. This was a much longer and more difficult process. Although the German bombers were quickly pulled away from the Coast, German fighters simply refused to come up unless they could attack from a position of numerical and tactical advantage. The RAF was forced to attack at known disadvantage in order to entice the LW into the fight. Results were often against the RAF as a result, but strategically this was still a victory. Gradually German losses mounted, less and less were they able to come up and defeat the British sweeps. Last big Hurrah for the LW along the channel was Dieppe, and this was not quite the one sided affair it is often made out to be.

By the time all this had ended, RAF was left in control of channel, British airspace, French coast....everything they had set out to do in other words. it was a very hard fought for set of preconditions that made cross channel invasion a possibility as early as 1942. Germans came away from this long, unsung series of clashes with a big material victory, but had lost all the key objectives that caused those clashes.

Plus, I cannot make the connection between this fight, and a possible fight between Mustangs and the LW.

 

[Nikademus]

I guess i'm missing the point of the last 10 pages or so. Seems like the 109's landing gear is no longer suspect at least.