The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread.

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

LW against 632 fighters .... downed three P-47 while losing three

Germans were ounumbered 20:1*.... killed eleven aircraft and lost six

LW against 606 fighters .... in ferocious combat downed three fighters. lost 3 Bf109's

LW against 835 fighters ... downed two heavies and lost five of their own. at 12:45pm. 10 heavies downed, no loss of their own.

these numbers dont make any sense at all. out numbered 20:1 and you and you win the engagement by almost 2:1???!!! 11 vs 6??!! yeah, ok. "ferocious" combat against 606 allied fighters and you only lose 3??? mid air collisons would have killed more than that. against 835 fighters and you lose 5 vs 2 and then win 10 vs 0?? end of day total 5 loses to 12 victories??!! seems the more outnumbered they were the better they fought and less they lost. i need to know again how being "outnumbered" was a detriment to the LW with this data? there may have been fighters in the air but they were not in the area of engagement or there was some horrible shooting going on!

thought he was banned yesterday?? seems he can still post like he did today.
 
Last edited:
February 10th, 1944:

169 heavies screened by 466 fighters. II./JG 11 took off from airfield at Wunsdorf.
downed two B-17. losing seven of their own. later III.JG 11 intercepted same formation.
killed eleven aircraft and lost six. estimates were that the Germans were ounumbered
20:1*.

To bad P40K was banned, I was waiting to hear why the vaunted Luftwaffe would attempt to intercept 635 aircraft with only 32 fighters. Seems like a good way to lose the war.
 
Hello Pinsog
look my message #438 to see the real numbers, My source is Prien's and Stemmer's history of II./JG 3.

Juha
 
these numbers dont make any sense at all. out numbered 20:1 and you and you win the engagement by almost 2:1???!!! 11 vs 6??!! yeah, ok. "ferocious" combat against 606 allied fighters and you only lose 3??? mid air collisons would have killed more than that. against 835 fighters and you lose 5 vs 2 and then win 10 vs 0?? end of day total 5 loses to 12 victories??!! seems the more outnumbered they were the better they fought and less they lost. i need to know again how being "outnumbered" was a detriment to the LW with this data? there may have been fighters in the air but they were not in the area of engagement or there was some horrible shooting going on!

To be fair, there's alot of variability involved so making conclusions off a few given data examples can be a dangerous thing. If this thread....which has morphed mysteriously ;) from 109 landing gear issues into who had the better airforce, has proven one thing, its that data can be used to support just about any argument.

There have been alot of incidents where a small outnumbered force of fighters has come away with a positive kill ratio, the Germans made an artform of it over North Africa using 2 plane Rottes. At the same time however, bringing more planes to a tactical battle can and sometimes does have an impact, if other variables play out right and the pilots can maximize their assets and get shots in and overwhelm the oppositiion.

As for small casualties.....small losses are the norm. Excessive casualties are exceptions. The major factor i singled out that increased the average kill rate per skirmish was not numbers but the firepower of the planes. This is especially evident in my opinion from reading the day to day accounts from Shores 2nd TAF book. The cannon armed and .50cal armed fighters doubled the average kill rate from 1-2 planes to 3-5 in many cases. That seems like not alot but over time, it adds up...esp if one factors in wounded and killed pilots. Therein lay the demise of both the Japanese and German airforces.
 
The point P40K (and Jim and Tante Ju) repeatedly ignored or did not understand)
1. A large bomber force takes off at 30+ different locations, assemble over the individual Wing splashers, assemble the wings in order behind the leading wing of a Task Force. Ditto for Second and Third (and maybe Fourth and Fifth depending on how many target clusters the 8th is going after that day.
2. The entire huge string (if everbody on schedule, no snafus, no local bad weather) then moves from a rotating, climbing stream into a long trail of combat boxes and proceeds over the Channel
3. Approximately 4 to 5 Thunderbolt groups take off at different times depending on where their Penetration escort position is. The lead escort group will catch up and form up around the lead box of say the First Task Force, and another one will catch up to trailing box of First Task Force, and so one for the remaining three FG's. By the time they cross into France or Holland these four to five Groups are escorting 400-600 bombers (Feb 1944). The two Mustang groups and two Lightning groups are just now warming up and ready to take off.
4. The 4 long range escort groups cross the channel and at high cruise head for their assigned positions with the 1st and 2nd TF, leaving the 3rd uncovered, or assign two groups to cover the 1st and one each for 2nd and 3rd TF.
5. The long range target escorts may catch up and R/V with the 5 P-47 groups where the 47s have to turn back. Now we have a situation where only four escort groups are covering 70 miles of bomber stream, and split up as the individual Task forces head fro a different target.
6. The Withdrawal Support of say 4 remaining P-47 groups of the 8th take off and head for a Withdrawal R/V point near Munster.
7. The long range escorts break escort, most times before R/V with the Withdrawal support P-47s in place due to low fuel. If they had a fight near the target the escort from target to R/V may have few to zero P-51/P-38 escort remaining.

This is what it means. 13 Fighter Groups (12 8th 10 P-47 plus two P-38, 1 9th AF (354th FG) P-51 Mustangs) were sent, but no more than 48x5 (Penetration Support) took off and escorted the bombers for any one leg. Attrition rate 20-30% leaving 48x5x.8=~ 192 fighters (effectives) from England to Munster, 48x4x.7 = 135 (effectives)from Munster to Schweinfurt/Regensburg/Augsburg, and back toward withdrawal R/V, where they Might make rendezvous with the 4 Withdrawal Support P-47 Groups (48x5x.8=~ 153 effectives).

Headline says "600 8th AF bombers, escorted by 624 (13x48 with no discussion of the early return of 164Fighters) attack Regensburg, Schweinfurt and Augsburg".

JG 11 attacks How Many fighters? Pick any spot along a 70 mile volume of airspace and JG 11 will find a Maximim of one fighter Group(reduced in size due to early returns)

That is what the 8th AF day to day operations looked like, while shifting P-47 Group strength down as Mustang strength grew.

Near the end of the war Mustang strength grew to permit one half (7 groups) to escort the 3 Task forces from the Channel to the Targets, and one half (7 Mustang and one P-47) from the taget back to the Channel.

Still an average of TWO fighter Groups per 25-30 mile long string of bombers at any one time.

Do the math about the probability of directing a large force of German fighters to a space not well defended numerically.
 
Excellent description of what a deep penetration raid looks like

I mean, seriously, if there were just 32 fighters to intercept a raid like that, wouldn't you just put 466 fighters and 169 bombers onto the single airfield holding the entire Luftwaffe and wipe out the entire German airforce in a single raid?

Anyway, could we please bring P40K back and let him reply to these questions? I'd like to read his reply out of shear morbid curiosity.
 
Parsifal, you are right. Funny thing was, he was very intelligent on some things, but totally irrational on others.
 
February 10th, 1944:

169 heavies screened by 466 fighters. II./JG 11 took off from airfield at Wunsdorf.
downed two B-17. losing seven of their own. later III.JG 11 intercepted same formation.
killed eleven aircraft and lost six. estimates were that the Germans were ounumbered
20:1*.
I think this may be the "empty sky" phenomenon. A squadron attacking a formation cannot see others who have just broken off, not yet arrived or are attacking another part of the formation. During the BoB the RAF pilots always thought they were massively outnumbered while the LW pilots and crew frequently experienced being attacked from the time they crossed the Kent coast to when they left it.
 
This site seemed to evolve into bomber/fighter discussions. Was there any kind consciences, general or otherwise, on the Bf-109 landing gear configuration, or is it just one of those things that will be argued about ad infinitum?
 
There has been some interesting discussion here and I'd hate to break it off but at the same time let's not forget the original topic of this thread. I am "requesting" that some of these topics be moved to new threads and you guys can hammer away, but at the same time I do not want to interfere with the flow of information seen here.

Now with that said, a question for the masses and getting this thread somewhat back on topic - with all this talk about the -109s landing gear and difficulty in take offs/ landing, has there been any comparison to the I-16? Any numbers about takeoff and landing accidents from the VVS? (I know this info probably doesn't exist). From pilot reports "then and now" that aircraft was supposed to be a bear to handle and I have heard on many occasions that if can fly an I-16 you can fly anything.
 
The thread sort of spun off onto a tangent or tangents. For what its worth, before we got sidetracked, we could not find any conclusive evidence that made the Bf 109 especially prone to accidents, much less that the cause of that accident rate was due to the undercart. We did find some evidence of the LW generally suffering a higher attrition rate due to noncombat issues, but as to the cause of that higher accident rate (or indeed, even if it exists) there was a lot of heated discussion.

Clearly, an aircraft with a narrower track landing gear is goinfg to have a less stable CG than a wide tracked aircraft. Then again having widely spaced gear is going to place stresses from the weight of the aircraft at a distance from one of its weak points....the point where the wings attach to fuselage. I would have thought also that wide tracked aircraft are a little less manouverable whilst on the ground. So its hard to knoiw whether a narrow tracked aircraft is a nett liability on the ground, or a nett benefit
 
There has been some interesting discussion here and I'd hate to break it off but at the same time let's not forget the original topic of this thread. I am "requesting" that some of these topics be moved to new threads and you guys can hammer away, but at the same time I do not want to interfere with the flow of information seen here.

Now with that said, a question for the masses and getting this thread somewhat back on topic - with all this talk about the -109s landing gear and difficulty in take offs/ landing, has there been any comparison to the I-16? Any numbers about takeoff and landing accidents from the VVS? (I know this info probably doesn't exist). From pilot reports "then and now" that aircraft was supposed to be a bear to handle and I have heard on many occasions that if can fly an I-16 you can fly anything.

How about the FM2/F4 seriese, they had a quite narrow gear and were carrier borne to boot, we all know about the Seafires issues so how did the Grumman cope?
 
This site seemed to evolve into bomber/fighter discussions. Was there any kind consciences, general or otherwise, on the Bf-109 landing gear configuration, or is it just one of those things that will be argued about ad infinitum?

Probably just keep arguing, while one or more sources may have pointed a finger at one basic cause the more likely truth is that the 109 did suffer a large number of landing and take off accidents. With out good numbers for other fighters it is a little hard to tell if it's accident rate was barely higher than some of it's contemporaries or vastly higher. And if it is significantly higher how much is attributable to the the toe in, how much to narrow track, how much to the landing speed, how much to the CG and ground looping, how much to the fact you can't open the canopy in flight to improve the view in poor weather (how good the the little clear view panel was might be subject to question). Other aircraft didn't have the best ground handling going either, apparently Wildcats were tippy enough to dig in wing tips while taxing under certain conditions.
I would guess that 109s were harder to land than many other fighters with some variation between models. Locking tail wheels helped. Increased weight didn't, and so on. Not all 109s landed the same, just as not all Spitfires or other planes that under went extensive changes landed the same. Throw in lower standards of training as the war went on the accident totals could get rather shocking.
 
How about the FM2/F4 seriese, they had a quite narrow gear and were carrier borne to boot, we all know about the Seafires issues so how did the Grumman cope?

It had problems, soft struts could allow a lot of lean which combined with engine torque, cross winds and other problems could allow wing tips to dig in while taxiing. Arresting hooks pretty much stop ground looping in carrier landings though :)
 
Probably just keep arguing, while one or more sources may have pointed a finger at one basic cause the more likely truth is that the 109 did suffer a large number of landing and take off accidents. With out good numbers for other fighters it is a little hard to tell if it's accident rate was barely higher than some of it's contemporaries or vastly higher. And if it is significantly higher how much is attributable to the the toe in, how much to narrow track, how much to the landing speed, how much to the CG and ground looping, how much to the fact you can't open the canopy in flight to improve the view in poor weather (how good the the little clear view panel was might be subject to question). Other aircraft didn't have the best ground handling going either, apparently Wildcats were tippy enough to dig in wing tips while taxing under certain conditions.
I would guess that 109s were harder to land than many other fighters with some variation between models. Locking tail wheels helped. Increased weight didn't, and so on. Not all 109s landed the same, just as not all Spitfires or other planes that under went extensive changes landed the same. Throw in lower standards of training as the war went on the accident totals could get rather shocking.


On the money there Shortround. Planes don't crash themselves.Pilot training and the quality of 109's getting poorer as WW2 progressed must have played a part.
Cheers
John
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back