I just quoted Basil Dickens who said there were no reliable figures. You're not paying attention!
You mention all the books you have. Start Looking at the primary sources. I provided a link to Basil Dickens paper. Read it.
What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?
- Thread starter Donald Johnson
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
- Status
You mention all the books you have. Start Looking at the primary sources. I provided a link to Basil Dickens paper. Read it.
I never said it was obvious at the time. But we do know about such things as the 'Bomber Mafia' in the US, and I have read enough about Harris (including his own book) to know that not all of his strategic decisions were wise, and in fact there were times when he didn't even follow orders. Curtiss LeMay is another one who I don't think was always thinking strait and I have no qualms pointing that out.
I believe IF it's true that the Mosquito could do the job, (and I think it may have been, though I don't pretend to be certain of that) it would have taken some extraordinary decision making to pull it off.
That said, we did have some extraordinary decision making involved in the very creation of the Mosquito itself, and in the decision to put the Merlin engine in the Mustang and bet heavily on production of that aircraft. Kind of similar for the Hellcat too I'd say.
But we know it wasn't done, I'm more interested in if it could have worked, than how you would talk guys like LeMay into it. I'm not sure that would have been possible.
There have been 1103 posts in this thread to date, counting this one, a large percentage aimed at contradicting something I posted. It may be possible I didn't read every link on every single post.
Why don't you summarize the actual data as distinct from the opinions? I already knew they didn't decide to use Mosquitos as Strategic bombers before this thread was ever even dreamed up. I knew that 40 years ago. Provide some data to improve the signal to noise ratio of the conversation.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
They were there at the time, they were going on what they knew.
The Axis needed to be put down hard and fast.
This meant crushing the enemy by any means possible to remove their ability and desire to make war.
Little surgical precision strikes were not going to accomplish this.
Total war is ugly. It is costly and it requires overwhelming the enemy until you prevail.
Scipio didn't ask anyone their opinion on how to sack Carthage without hurting any of the civilians, he said kill anything that walks or crawls and tear the city down and toss it into the sea so that nothing remains.
My Patience is wearing thin! From Basil Dickens Head ORS Quoted post 857:
"It was bombs on the target per casualty that really mattered, and
there is little evidence of the bombing accuracy of the Mosquitoes."
Why? Because the Light Night Striking Force was only a few aircraft.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Luckily we aren't ruled by Caesar, which I think is part of what the war was fought over, and I'm personally glad George Marshall had the bright idea to do basically the opposite of what Scipio Africanus did. That is why we can still go to Germany and Italy and Japan today and can also count on them as allies against other more dangerous states. YMMV.
But the civilian casualties are a distraction in this discussion, as I've pointed out out over and over but apparently that part of my posts is unreadable, it's not the main point.
The point of using more a fast, pinpoint strike aircraft instead of a slow bomber stream is precisely to put down the Axis "fast and hard". It's because destroying actual industrial targets, like the oil infrastructure, was an order of magnitude more effective at ending the war than 'De-Housing'. It's because Mosquitos had a far lower loss rate per sortie than Lancasters or Halifaxes or B-17s.
That, and the quoted text, are generalizations. Wartime generalization, granted, but it's still just one mans opinion. And we already know they didn't decide to replace the heavy bombers with Mosquitos. We already know what decisions they made and didn't make.
I'd really like to look at specific details and statistics of actual strikes. From the passage I read it sounds like he is referring to night-time level bombing strikes. Is his analysis based on low altitude strikes? Dive bombing? Day time or just night?
If it turns out Mosquito strike accuracy and mission survival rate is just a myth, or some kind of mixup between all the many types of missions they flew, by all means lets get to the bottom of that and figure it out. I'm not wedded to the wartime reputation of the crate. If that is the case it would be great to know.
If it's more or less "as advertised" what I see is this-
Faster strike aircraft, across many Theaters, did seem to do better (i.e. have fewer losses) against AAA.
For a while, Mosquitos are fast enough to evade German fighters. I don't know precisely when the DB 605 powered 109s with methanol water injection started showing up in the field in numbers, but I know those were fast enough to catch a Mosquito. I also don't know when Mosquito's started taking more losses, but I wouldn't be surprised if those developments were related. A Mosquito flying in at say, 370 mph at high altitude still isn't necessarily very easy to catch, and a 109 can't necessarily do a very long chase at high speed, it's also possible to fly in high and bomb low) but it's certainly going to make life more perilous for Mossie pilots.
So there is a gap between for a while in 1943 when the faster 109s and maybe 190s show up and when enough escort fighters were available, when the Mosquito would be more vulnerable.
That might have meant a temporary shift to more twilight or night bombing, or to striking targets closer to the range of the existing (P-47 etc.) escorts. To me the ability of a Mosquito to fly in at dusk, hit a target, and fly out (at low or very high altitude) under cover of darkness is part of the versatility that makes it so advantageous over other types.
But it seems to me like a P-51 in particular, thanks to a similarly high cruise speed and range, would have made an excellent escort for a Mosquito strike. Here is where you get the knock on effect of taking on the Luftwaffe.
So from late 1943 to 1945, I see Mosquitos escorted by P-51s (and maybe P-47s, P-38s, and eventually for shorter range strikes, Spitfires and Tempests) as being a viable approach for using Mosquitos against Strategic targets. The only thing I can see derailing that is if AAA becomes so formidable that they can't do it without prohibitive losses. But it seems like the greater variability of targets, and far greater unpredictability of a lot of Mosquito strikes on a given day, would make concentrating such defenses more challenging.
If it's more or less "as advertised" what I see is this-
Faster strike aircraft, across many Theaters, did seem to do better (i.e. have fewer losses) against AAA.
For a while, Mosquitos are fast enough to evade German fighters. I don't know precisely when the DB 605 powered 109s with methanol water injection started showing up in the field in numbers, but I know those were fast enough to catch a Mosquito. I also don't know when Mosquito's started taking more losses, but I wouldn't be surprised if those developments were related. A Mosquito flying in at say, 370 mph at high altitude still isn't necessarily very easy to catch, and a 109 can't necessarily do a very long chase at high speed, it's also possible to fly in high and bomb low) but it's certainly going to make life more perilous for Mossie pilots.
So there is a gap between for a while in 1943 when the faster 109s and maybe 190s show up and when enough escort fighters were available, when the Mosquito would be more vulnerable.
That might have meant a temporary shift to more twilight or night bombing, or to striking targets closer to the range of the existing (P-47 etc.) escorts. To me the ability of a Mosquito to fly in at dusk, hit a target, and fly out (at low or very high altitude) under cover of darkness is part of the versatility that makes it so advantageous over other types.
But it seems to me like a P-51 in particular, thanks to a similarly high cruise speed and range, would have made an excellent escort for a Mosquito strike. Here is where you get the knock on effect of taking on the Luftwaffe.
So from late 1943 to 1945, I see Mosquitos escorted by P-51s (and maybe P-47s, P-38s, and eventually for shorter range strikes, Spitfires and Tempests) as being a viable approach for using Mosquitos against Strategic targets. The only thing I can see derailing that is if AAA becomes so formidable that they can't do it without prohibitive losses. But it seems like the greater variability of targets, and far greater unpredictability of a lot of Mosquito strikes on a given day, would make concentrating such defenses more challenging.
Look at the actual losses on the famous Mosquito raids like Amiens and other Gestapo buildings and telecom HQ.
I have, although I think those are somewhat outliers, and those range from fairly high to quite low. They seemed to routinely lose one or two planes, so if they sent in four and lost 1 (as at Oslo), it's a huge loss rate. If they send in 24 and lose 1 (as at Aarhus), it's not so heavy.
Operation Carthage was a bit of a disaster (losing 4 out of 20 Mosquitos and 2 out of 30 P-51s) but partly (I think) due to the second wave of bombers having a lot of problems. It is noteworthy though that it was a Mosquito raid escorted by Mustangs. It's also a reminder that escort fighters can help against AAA by strafing them.
Also noteworthy, all of those raids seem to have resulted in destroyed targets. So they didn't have to go back over and over.
To know the real definitive answer in terms of efficiency we would need to look at a larger number of raids at a variety of different types of targets.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Bottom line it can't, it's that simple. The leaders of the day saw fit not to use it as a high altitude strategic bomber, that simple
No one ever said that - you were the one trying to show that using the Mosquito was going to limit civilian causalities, an opinion on your part.
Again you're opinion but it was clearly shown why the leaders of the day did use it as a Strategic bomber
That's 100% BS - what was shown was there was no interest to build COMBAT wooden aircraft by manufacturers or the War Dept.
If you followed the HISTORICAL time line this is 100% true. You keep trying to revise history based on your own opinions!
And that's exactly what you're doing, even when shown why some of your comments are out in left field
Then tap out now because there were many on here who provided ample evidence why the OP's question wouldn't be possible given the historical timeline and (drumroll) THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE DAY!
The reason I think those are (a bit) outliers is that Gestapo hq etc. are often in city centers, and because those raids were in part propaganda raids, they were trying extra hard to avoid civilian casualties (which didn't work that well)
But factories and oil refineries are often located in the suburbs, in big industrial areas, and that means less flying in over built up areas.
But factories and oil refineries are often located in the suburbs, in big industrial areas, and that means less flying in over built up areas.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
And I suggest you research who Basil Dickens was...
But let's not forget, WW2 lasted a while, and technological advancement was rapid. "The technology of the day" ranged from biplanes to jets. Bombers available in 1940 were not the same as what was available in 1943 or 1944.
In terms of performance, a Mosquito is a little closer to an Ar 234 than it is to a Whitley or a Botha. In fact the Mosquito had much better range, better climb and a higher ceiling, and carried a bigger payload than the Ar 234.
In some cases, improved technology led to significant changes in policy. What would have happened with the US Strategic bombing offensive if they hadn't rapidly developed the P-51? Serious question.
Luckily they made a pretty sharp turn there right in the middle of the war.
Luckily for the 8th AF aircrews they didn't just shrug their shoulders and stick with what they were already doing.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
OK - now you're rambling. In addition to Basil Dickens I also suggest you look up our own Dana Bell who is a valued member here and provides this forum with a wealth of valuable historical information, not opinions or guesses.
They were also not recognised targets so had no AA defences. Even so losses were suffered. Attacking something like a refinery, steelworks or marshalling yard at low level was close to suicidal, even at high level formations avoided such areas.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Per the input and recommendation of several members, this thread is now CLOSED!
- Status
