What if the Luftwaffe gained air superiority during d-day?

[Admiral Beez]

In summer 1944, the Luftwaffe had almost 5,000 serviceable/operational aircraft, this included over 1,600 fighters. Pull every Luftwaffe fighter and bomber squadron out of Russia, eastern Europe, Italy and Germany, put everything in France. If somehow the movement is not discovered, the Luftwaffe can put up a good fight for about a day. After that, it's over.

 

[Venomstick121]

1,600 fighters

does this include heavy fighters?

 

[Admiral Beez]

does this include heavy fighters?

Yes.

Luftwaffe serviceable aircraft strengths (1940–1945) - Wikipedia

By comparison, by 1944, the USAAF alone, excluding the USN and USMC had over eighty thousand aircraft. Heck, even the British Fleet Air Arm had more than 3,700 aircraft by 1945. The Luftwaffe of May 1944 was just too small to seize the initiative for even a few days. And if the Germans knew where and when the invasion was going to take place, and understand that they signals were being read, the smarter move would be to send every U-boat into the Channel to stop it. But the RN's ASW will be expecting you.

 

[Snautzer01]

I seemed to have poked the bear with this one

Neeh just good folks with a bit of knowledge having fun.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I seemed to have poked the bear with this one

Most replies to What-If scenarios default to telling us why something would not, could not or should not have been feasible.

You can try to posit more plausible What-If scenarios to encourage more open discussion, but it won't stop our kneejerk contrarians.

 

[Shortround6]

Most replies to What-If scenarios default to telling us why something would not, could not or should not have been feasible.

And if the Germans knew where and when the invasion was going to take place, and understand that they signals were being read, the smarter move would be to send every U-boat into the Channel to stop it. But the RN's ASW will be expecting you.

Well, you have somewhat provided your answer to the "would not, could not or should not have been feasible.
Now follow it to a conclusion.
U-boats in Shallow waters.
U-boats in mined waters (approaches to the landing sites/Allied supply routes)
And the RN's ASW forces as mentioned.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

In summer 1944, the Luftwaffe had almost 5,000 serviceable/operational aircraft, this included over 1,600 fighters. Pull every Luftwaffe fighter and bomber squadron out of Russia, eastern Europe, Italy and Germany, put everything in France. If somehow the movement is not discovered, the Luftwaffe can put up a good fight for about a day. After that, it's over.

Of course it'll be noticed; the Allies are doing daily recon as part of their preparation.

 

[pbehn]

In summer 1944, the Luftwaffe had almost 5,000 serviceable/operational aircraft, this included over 1,600 fighters. Pull every Luftwaffe fighter and bomber squadron out of Russia, eastern Europe, Italy and Germany, put everything in France. If somehow the movement is not discovered, the Luftwaffe can put up a good fight for about a day. After that, it's over.

Northern France Belgium and the Netherlands were the most photographed region on the planet. Almost every German asset that was there at D-Day was left to avoid making it obvious where the landing would be. If Herman did move anything in advance to prevent an invasion he would almost certainly have moved it to oppose a landing in the Pas de Calais, which leaves S/E fighters out of range of the Normandy beaches. It may have taken more than a day, but it would have had little effect on the landings and Herman would have lost all of his air force. At D-Day the beach head was 100 miles from the UK coast, any LW airfield within 100 miles of the beach head was easily within range of thousands of four engine and twin engined bombers as well as s/e fighter bombers. It would have been carnage and would probably shortened the war considerably.

 

[Howard Gibson]

How would it affect the outcome? I know there is no way to perfectly gauge the destruction.

The big question about alternate history like this is how does Germany achieve air superiority on D-Day? Air superiority does not happen on its own. Somebody somewhere made good decisions.

The Germans made bad decisions. They failed to develop two-stage superchargers early in the war, only delivering the technology in the last weeks of the war. In 1943, at the B-17 bouncing altitude of 30,000ft, the Germans were 50mph slower than the USAAF P-47 Thunderbolts, and could only equal its climb rate. They also failed to deliver the C4 fuel to all its fighter aircraft. If they make good decisions, their experienced pilots don't get killed off quite as badly, and there is a functional airforce facing D-Day. The Hs293 glider bombs could have created havoc without the bombers coming in range of allied sea-based anti-aircraft.

Invading Russia was a bad decision, but it was the whole point of the war. The real bad decision was starting the war in the first place.

In all fairness, if Germany avoids some stupid decisions, the allies should avoid some stupid decisions too. The Russian decision to supply Germany with fuel for its early war blitzkrieg was a very bad decision. How about a turbo-charged groundhog?

 

[Alan Stevens]

Most replies to What-If scenarios default to telling us why something would not, could not or should not have been feasible.

You can try to posit more plausible What-If scenarios to encourage more open discussion, but it won't stop our kneejerk contrarians.

What I call "coulda woulda shoulda territory."

Like, what if Germany had more warships than the Royal Navy at D-Day?

 

[Shortround6]

Hs293 glider bomb

From Wiki.

Operational range	at 2.2 kilometres (7,200 ft) altitude: 4 kilometres (13,000 ft) at 4 kilometres (13,000 ft) altitude: 5.5 kilometres (18,000 ft) at 5 kilometres (16,000 ft) altitude: 8.5 kilometres (28,000 ft)

Staying out of the range of the proximity fused heavy AA was going to be a problem.
Especially as the bomber had to pretty much fly over the target while guiding the missile.

They would have sunk/damaged some ships, but not a decisive number.

 

[EwenS]

By the end of 1943 the Allies had effective jammers to protect against the radio controlled Hs293 and Fritz X weapons. By D-Day many ships were fitted with them.

Kehl-Strasbourg radio control link - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[z42]

From Wiki.

Operational range	at 2.2 kilometres (7,200 ft) altitude: 4 kilometres (13,000 ft) at 4 kilometres (13,000 ft) altitude: 5.5 kilometres (18,000 ft) at 5 kilometres (16,000 ft) altitude: 8.5 kilometres (28,000 ft)

Staying out of the range of the proximity fused heavy AA was going to be a problem.
Especially as the bomber had to pretty much fly over the target while guiding the missile.

They would have sunk/damaged some ships, but not a decisive number.

Interesting to compare to current day glide bombs like the American JSOW AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon - Wikipedia

22 km range from a "low altitude" release (whatever that altitude means..), 130 km for a high altitude release.

Of course back then they didn't have the guidance technology to make use of such a long range, but still.

Also I'm sure it also helps to release it from a fast jet rather than a He 111 lumbering along.

 

[Shortround6]

Interesting to compare to current day glide bombs like the American JSOW AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon - Wikipedia

22 km range from a "low altitude" release (whatever that altitude means..), 130 km for a high altitude release.

Of course back then they didn't have the guidance technology to make use of such a long range, but still.

Also I'm sure it also helps to release it from a fast jet rather than a He 111 lumbering along.

A problem with most of the early guided weapons was that to guide them the operator (person controlling the weapon) had to have a line of sight from the platform (aircraft that dropped the weapon) to the target and the operator was guiding the weapon to fly along that line of sight. Usually with flares on the weapon so it could be seen at distance. Please note that if the drop aircraft gets out of line, Gets ahead of the weapon, gets behind or too far to the side, control is near useless. The operator does not have the needed perspective to steer the weapon on the correct path.
The Germans did a lot with privative Television (camera in nose) in testing but they never got them operational, this would have allowed the launch aircraft to turn away. Once the the camera in the weapon picked up the target there was no need for the drop aircraft to to keep the target in sight. The perspective/view has changed to the nose of the weapon, much like modern videos of guided weapons approaching their targets. Even the 1950s weapons still required the operators to steer the weapons using a joy stick, so the dropping aircraft had to use flight maneuvers that did not disturb the operator's arm/body too much. There was a way to go to get to 'fire and forget".

While the Germans were pioneers there was a long, long way to get to where they (or anybody else) needed to be.

AGM-12 Bullpup - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

1960s and the US planes still following the weapon along the flight path into the AA guns.

 

[EwenS]

Interesting to compare to current day glide bombs like the American JSOW AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon - Wikipedia

22 km range from a "low altitude" release (whatever that altitude means..), 130 km for a high altitude release.

Of course back then they didn't have the guidance technology to make use of such a long range, but still.

Also I'm sure it also helps to release it from a fast jet rather than a He 111 lumbering along.

While the He111 was used for Hs293 trials, it was the Do217, He177 & Fw200 that were the operational carriers. Mostly The first two.

 

[Shortround6]

While range may or may not be an issue over Normandy the fact that the host airplane can only control one weapon at time means a 2nd attack run for the 2nd weapon and the chances of surviving both the AA and the Fighter patrols without any surprise is going getting rather slim.
There is only one optic/control unit and only one weapon operator.

The Germans can score some kills/damages but it is going to come at a high cost. Can the Germans cause enough damage to stop/postpone the landings or just delay things for a few weeks? German industry has a harder time making up losses than the Allies do.

 

[Barrett]

Overlord would not be launched, absent Allied air superiority. And to paraphrase what others have noted, call Tom Cruise because playing catch-up in one or two days was Mission Impossible.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Overlord would not be launched, [...]

I doubt Stalin would accept that. Marshall as well might push for it too. Neither Sicily, Salerno, nor Anzio were undertaken with air superiority.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

While the Germans were pioneers there was a long, long way to get to where they (or anybody else) needed to be.

There were earlier efforts.

Bruce, J. M.: 1957, British Aeroplanes 1914 - 1918. London, UK: Putnam. Second Impression 1969, pp 459-469 mentions a 'R.F.C. Experimental Works Radio-controlled Aircraft'. This apparently started with a direction to Professor A.M. Low <Archibald Low - Wikipedia> to investigate the possibility of using a form of television to direct a radio-controlled bomb. Apparently tests were successful, but not a lot of details are available. They were not tried operationally.

On p 460 it says `It was the true ancestor of various devices which were used in the Second World War, preceding by a quarter of a century weapons which were claimed by their inventors to be the first of their type'.

The Wikipedia article says: `1917 Low and his team also invented the first electrically steered rocket (the world's first wireless, or wire-guided rocket), almost an exact counterpart of the one used by the Germans in 1942 against merchant shipping. Low's inventions during the war were to a large extent before their time and hence were under-appreciated by the Government of the day, although the Germans were well aware of how dangerous his inventions might be' and `During World War II the Germans also made good use of Low's 1918 rocket guidance system and used it as one of the foundations for their V projects'.

As people are no doubt aware of the difficulties in making such weapons work in WWII it is clear the WWI experiments needed a lot more work before anything would have become operational. Also I suspect Wiki is overstating the influence of the tests.

The British were ahead of German use of radio in WWI, in terms of fitting them to aircraft and introducing voice as well as Morse sets, so trying radio control is an obvious next step. The between the wars Queen Bee series radio control targets and ideas of using them or similar for strikes.

 

[N4521U]

Jeezus................ I never knew the Luftwaffe coulda won D-Day!
I'll have to spread the word. Weren't we lucky.