What if the Luftwaffe technological gambles worked out?

[wiking85]

Until mid 1941 all armaments contracts were annual contracts on a 'cost plus financing' basis. It means that the company is immune from losses if for example a weapon takes extra time to develop and get into production. There is also no incentive to produce more, faster or more efficiently. This is just one example of the malaise that lay at the heart of the Nazi government's cosy relationship with industry in general.

It has been estimated that the German motor industry was still operating at less than 50% capacity for military vehicles in 1942. The huge Steyr Werkes in Austria was still unoccupied in 1943!

Hoarding of raw materials was an endemic problem within industry and the aircraft industry was one of the worse offenders. This was partly due to the quota system exercised by the RLM. Companies consistently over estimated their needs assuming they would get less than whatever they asked for and then stockpiled any excess against future shortage.
There is some evidence that raw materials intended for the armament and related industries were diverted into consumer goods production. In 1942 the production of consumer goods in Germany was running at a rate only 3% lower than before the war. Corruption was rife in the Nazi system.

There was also considerable wastage due to inefficient techniques (one report estimates that a staggering 700Kg of aluminium was 'wasted' in the production of one aero engine) and inappropriate uses. Messerschmitt was still using aluminium to manufacture pre-fabricated barracks for the Navy and ladders for vineyards in 1943.

Other 'technological gambles', even those which did enjoy some success were fraught with problems. In November 1943 2,000 partially completed V-1s were scrapped due to 'structural weaknesses'.

Cheers

Steve

Steyr was producing things for the war effort during WW2:
Steyr-Daimler-Puch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Steyr Daimler Puch â€" Wikipedia

 

[stona]

Steyr was producing things for the war effort during WW2:

I'll be more specific. The new built factory at Graz was still unoccupied in 1943 (Vajda and Dancey).

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

I'll be more specific. The new built factory at Graz was still unoccupied in 1943 (Vajda and Dancey).

Cheers

Steve

My understanding was that that factory wasn't completed until 1943.

 

[stona]

My understanding was that that factory wasn't completed until 1943.

It was started in 1941 and still not operational in 1943. Whether it was complete or not after those two years I don't know, but it wasn't in use.

This was a minor inefficiency in the German aviation and manufacturing industry, cited merely as an example.

The result of the poor planning and inefficient practices was the damning figures for aircraft available to the Luftwaffe. In September 1939 the Luftwaffe started the war with 1,125 S/E fighters (870 serviceable). April 1945 it finished the war with 1,637 S/E fighters (serviceable number unknown). In the meantime they lost somewhere in the region of 42,000 of this type. For the entire war production barely kept pace with losses. The figures for other types are proportionally even worse. Put those numbers against the Western Allies or the Soviet Union and it is not difficult to divine why the Luftwaffe lost the air war. No technological gamble, however successful, was going to change this.

As I said above...resources, resources, resources.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

It was started in 1941 and still not operational in 1943. Whether it was complete or not after those two years I don't know, but it wasn't in use.

This was a minor inefficiency in the German aviation and manufacturing industry, cited merely as an example.

The result of the poor planning and inefficient practices was the damning figures for aircraft available to the Luftwaffe. In September 1939 the Luftwaffe started the war with 1,125 S/E fighters (870 serviceable). April 1945 it finished the war with 1,637 S/E fighters (serviceable number unknown). In the meantime they lost somewhere in the region of 42,000 of this type. For the entire war production barely kept pace with losses. The figures for other types are proportionally even worse. Put those numbers against the Western Allies or the Soviet Union and it is not difficult to divine why the Luftwaffe lost the air war. No technological gamble, however successful, was going to change this.

As I said above...resources, resources, resources.

Cheers

Steve

Sure, a serious issue with the German war economy was overbuilding factories and ending up running only single or double shifts due to lack of labor, in the process overburdening the machine tool industry among others and sucking up labor building all the facilities that were never used. Ostmark is a prime example of a good idea that was just not feasible given the situation as it developed after it was ordered. Simply put it was planning that was never able to come to fruition due to unforeseen war circumstances later on. Obviously part of that was silly notions like Russia being defeated in 1941, which if it had happened would have made the production planning of 1940-41 in terms of factories make a lot more sense, but were totally out of step with reality in 1943.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Me 309 had full span leading edge slats, those on the 109(like many aircraft) covered only the aileron area. That in itself would increase CLmax by 40% such that the 77% wing area compared to the P-51 becomes 108% lift loading. Although slats increase CLmax considerably they do so by allowing far higher angles of attack before airflow becomes detached. Although these higher permisable angles of attack provide the desired extra lift they do so at a lower Lift to Drag ratio. These is more drag. Hence power to weight ratio is important in such aircraft: they are efficient at level flight but under conditions of high load will have more drag.

Any drawing available on the net shows 1/2 span slats, not full span slats. I'd appreciate a superior information that would confirm the size of slats.
With that said, the slats do anything on low AoA (here) and on high speed. Expecting from the heavy Me 309 to compete in maneuverability with Bf 109 or Spitfire is an unrealistic proposal.

... A key problems will be the engines: either DB603 or Jumo 213. Neither seems to have exceeded 1750hp in production form until well into the second half of 1944. The Fw 190D9 itself had lacklustre performance until the increased boost modification increased power from 1750 to 1900hp in October and the MW50 addition to 2100 around November.

The Jumo 213A with increased low- and mi-alt power (due to MW 50 or similar additions) will still mean that high-alt performance is as it was before. However - main problem the Fw-190D-9 had was timing, not extra 10 mph of performance. Both DB 603A and Jumo 213A have had plenty of power at all altitudes, while not being too draggy or heavy,. It was RLM/LW's own goal not to have Fw-190 powered by those engines already in winter of 1943/44.

The Me 309 certainly seems to have had good performance on the 1750hp engine. It reputedly did 452 mph on 1725hp and supposedly around 462 on 1900. Moreover it had many features of what the Luftwaffe needed, a bubble canopy with spectacularly good rear vision, enormous fire power, improved range.

The speed figures should be good - plenty of power on a small and probably well streamlined aircraft. Do we know whether the prototypes were armed when speed runs were made?

It seems more likely it was the victim of circumstance and timing. A completely new aircraft entering mass production in 1944 would have been a challenge for any nation.
It seems more likely that it was abandoned due to the circumstances around it.

Germany, and some other nations, succeeded in introducing new aircraft (not just fighters) in 1944. The Me 309 was a victim of it's own design bureau, rather than other circumstances.

 

[stona]

In February 1940 Goering perfectly expressed the ineptitude of Nazi planning when he said, "the only projects considered as vital are those that will be completed in 1940 to 1941, at the latest..." His decision was an economic one, not a technical one. It was once again a short term plan to marshal resources.
Cheers
Steve

 

[wiking85]

In February 1940 Goering perfectly expressed the ineptitude of Nazi planning when he said, "the only projects considered as vital are those that will be completed in 1940 to 1941, at the latest..." His decision was an economic one, not a technical one. It was once again a short term plan to marshal resources.
Cheers
Steve

Yet they were working on multiple facilities that weren't completed until 1943 like the tank plant expansions, Niebelungenwerke, Ostmark, and several others. Goering was not known for being good at managing the economy and that is why Speer took over in 1942.

 

[tomo pauk]

Re. engine production. Granted, UK and Soviet air forces were in combat before USAF/USN, but here is about the US vs. German 'major' engines:
Allison produced 62000+ V-1710 engines prior 1945 (1940-44). Production peaked to +2000 pcs per month in early 1944, dwindling down to ~1000 per month in Nov 1944, due to cancelling out P-40 and P-39 (P-63 was never a priority). Packard built ~27000 single stage V-1650s and ~18500 2-stagers. That is two sources, granted big factory complexes. Makes a total of 107500 V-12 engines produced prior 1945.
Germany produced ~75000 of DB V-12s prior 1945 (1936-44), that includes ~4200 of 'double engines' (DB 606, 610). 68000+ Jumo 211 engines was produced, and 9000 Jumo 213s (a part of what was made in 1945). Makes 152000+ 'major' V-12 engines.

BMW 801 was produced in ~30000 copies, 1945 included. Almost 70000 R-2600s was produced, and 82000+ R-2800s; combined 152000, both designs for prior-1945 time span.

We can add ~30000 turbo set ups just for P-38 and P-47, for a good measure. Addition of turbos, along with suitable improvements, made the R-1820 and 1830 still viable engines in late war; 155000 of R-1830s and 80000 of R-1820s was produced prior 1945. 21000+ of BMW 132 engines was produced, and 5500 pcs of Bramo 323.

These numbers when combined with UK and Soviet production tend to show what Germany was against in ww2 from 1941 on. Italian and Japanese production notwithstanding.

edited: not 18800 BMW 801s, but ~30000 was produced

 

[stona]

There were over 75,000 Jumo V12s built too. 68,200 211s.

Edit: I agree with your point, it's just that there tends to be a concentration on Daimler Benz engines and large production of the Jumo 211 gets overlooked

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

I've added 4200 of W-24 DB engines to the German total of V-12s, sorry. Without those, it is about 147800 of major V-12 engines produced.

For the Soviet production, the 'TsAGI book'* states 'more than 33000' of Shvetsov's radial engines ( 9-cylinder M-62IR, 14-cylinder M-82 family) were produced during ww2; granted, Wikipedia lists 70000 of M-82 family engines
Aircraft powered by Mikulin V-12 engines were produced in 'more than 41000 examples' for ww2 and post war, along with 8000 pcs for pre-war, so total number of engines should be a bit over 50000? Wikipedia lists 36000+ of AM-38/38F produced, the AM-35/35A is probably at ~4000 pcs. Wikipedia lists 10500+ of AM-34 engines produced.
As for Klimov's V-12s, the M-105 was produced in 'more than 48000 pcs', the VK-105PF and PF2 and VK-107 were produced in 'more than 28000 pcs'. Pre-war production of M-100 and M-103 engines amounted to 13000 pcs.
Tumansky's M-88 was produced in 'more than 12000 pcs' during the war, pre-war production of M-85 to M-88 line was 4000 pcs.
AM-34xy, AM-35A, AM-38/38F and Klimov's engines total production for 1940-45 is probably at 125-130 thousand? AM-42 replaced the AM-38F at production lines in early 1945.

Hopefully someone will post credible numbers for UK production


*Same source lists 'more than 70000' of Svetsov's radial engines for pre-war, ww2 and post war production.

 

[stona]

I believe about 170,000 Merlins (including Packard production) alone were built. When you consider the extensive use of radial engines, particularly by the USAAF and even more so its bombers, it puts things into perspective.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

A major blow to the BMW 801 production happened in March 1944, when Munich production lines were hit by Allied bombers. They just reached 1000 produced engines in February there. Production dropped to ~650 engines in April, looks like another bomb raid (raids?) in June 1944 cut monthly production to under 500 pcs. Subsequent successful raids were in October, production dropped down to 300+ pcs in Oct and November. All these bombings cost Germany perhaps more than 5000 of BMW 801 engines in 1944 alone.
Production in Berlin area was low, maximum of 300 engines per month was achieved during 7-8 months in 1944.
The earlier blow to the BMW production was in March 1943, bomber hits at Milbertshofen (Munich area; undertaken by RAF BC? - help) cut the production from 400 pcs in Feb down to 100 engines produced in April 1943. Between Aug 1942 and March 1943 only 2484 BMW 801s were produced. 100 engines per month were managed for the 1st time in March 1942.

In 1942, USA produced almost 30000 of R-2600 and R-2800 combined, and in 1944 there was 45259 of R-2800 only produced. Between June 1944 and March 1945, there was only 4655 BMW 801s produced in Munchen area, and under 2000 in Berlin area.

 

[Juha]

Hello Tomo
9/10 March 43 264 British bombers attacked München/Munich, B.M.W. aero-engine assembly shop was put out of action for 6 weeks.

Source: The Bomber Command War Diaries by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt

 

[wiking85]

A major blow to the BMW 801 production happened in March 1944, when Munich production lines were hit by Allied bombers. They just reached 1000 produced engines in February there. Production dropped to ~650 engines in April, looks like another bomb raid (raids?) in June 1944 cut monthly production to under 500 pcs.

You sure about that time frame?

 

[stona]

bomb raid (raids?) in June 1944 cut monthly production to under 500 pcs. Subsequent successful raids were in October, production dropped down to 300+ pcs in Oct and November.

In 1942, USA produced almost 30000 of R-2600 and R-2800 combined, and in 1944 there was 45259 of R-2800 only produced. Between June 1944 and March 1945, there was only 4655 BMW 801s produced in Munchen area, and under 2000 in Berlin area.

Between June 1944 and March 1945 only 4,655 BMW 801s were built in the Munich plants.

Albert Speer to the USSBS:

"We were surprised for a long time that you attacked airframe production and not the motor production. we were always worried that you would attack the Bayerische Motorenwerke and others. There were only a few big factories...if you had attacked the motor factories at first and not the airframes we would have been finished."

The Munich area facilities of BMW were not attacked by the US 8th AF until July 1944 when a concerted effort was made. Munchen-Albach was hit on the 11th, 13th, 21st and 31st of July 1944. Munchen-Oberwisenwald was hit on 31st July 1944.
I guess that other raids may have been by the RAF, but I'm not about to go through the Bomber Command War Diaries page by page to find out I'm unconvinced that bombing of the Munich BMW plants was the direct cause of earlier falls in production. Of course bombing elsewhere may have caused problems.

Berlin-Basdorf was hit on 21st June 1944 and Berlin-Spandau on 28th March and 6th October 1944. Other plants were intermittently hit from June 1944 onwards, mainly in September 1944, with the exception of an early, 9th February 1944, raid on the Eisenbach facility.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Between June 1944 and March 1945 only 4,655 BMW 801s were built in the Munich plants.

Albert Speer to the USSBS:

"We were surprised for a long time that you attacked airframe production and not the motor production. we were always worried that you would attack the Bayerische Motorenwerke and others. There were only a few big factories...if you had attacked the motor factories at first and not the airframes we would have been finished."

The Munich area facilities of BMW were not attacked by the US 8th AF until July 1944 when a concerted effort was made. Munchen-Albach was hit on the 11th, 13th, 21st and 31st of July 1944. Munchen-Oberwisenwald was hit on 31st July 1944.
I guess that other raids may have been by the RAF, but I'm not about to go through the Bomber Command War Diaries page by page to find out I'm unconvinced that bombing of the Munich BMW plants was the direct cause of earlier falls in production. Of course bombing elsewhere may have caused problems.

Berlin-Basdorf was hit on 21st June 1944 and Berlin-Spandau on 28th March and 6th October 1944. Other plants were intermittently hit from June 1944 onwards, mainly in September 1944, with the exception of an early, 9th February 1944, raid on the Eisenbach facility.

Cheers

Steve

Bombing of Germany during World War II - Metapedia
Its not complete, but its a start

 

[tomo pauk]

You sure about that time frame?

I've used this graph, from von Ghersdorff et al:

Full line is the documented production in Munchen area, dashed is assumed/calculated production in Munchen area, dotted is assumed/calculated production in Berlin area. If I'm reading the caption right, it says that 350 engines made by Argus in 1942 need to be added, along with production by Kloeckner in Hamburg and Bruenn/Brno. 30000 pcs of BMW 801 is supposed to have been produced, so my math of 18800 is way off the mark Will edit previous post.
Same source says that production in Munich area (Allach, Milbertshofen) was 14605, and in Berlin/Spandau 4213 engines produced by war's end.
Richard Faltermair in 'Flugzeug Classic' 10/2003 stated production from 1940-1944:
-233
-1708
-5225
-8658
-12222

January 1945 brought another 631 engine, Allach factories produced 310 engines in Feb 1945, 375 in March '45.

Von Ghersdorff et al note the highest month output of 1450 engines in May 1944, however that number is in collision with their own graph, yet in accordance with USBSS graph.

BTW, metapedia seem to be holocaust revision/denial site. FWIW.

 

[wiking85]

BTW, metapedia seem to be holocaust revision/denial site. FWIW.

Good to know, didn't check it out beyond the bombing info.

 

[parsifal]

Yet they were working on multiple facilities that weren't completed until 1943 like the tank plant expansions, Niebelungenwerke, Ostmark, and several others. Goering was not known for being good at managing the economy and that is why Speer took over in 1942.

Ah, no. Speer took over from Fritz Todt, who was killed in an airplane accident in February 1942. Goring undeniably was not a good detail manager, which was what was exactly required for economic and military planning issues. However, he was just typical of the whole Nazi approach to governance issues. Rotten to the core, more about building personal fiefdoms and power bases. Goring was just flamboyant and one of the worst, thats all. The problems for the LW were not just restricted to one man, they were systemic and affected virtually the whole orgabisation. There were a few that were the exceptions. men like Speer and Todt, and Milch who really knew what needed to be done. Its just the machinery of the Nazi system that stifled them, not just one man. Goring was pretty much out of the picture by 1941, the Germans still couldnt make a fair go of it.


"couldnt run a chook raffle at a Bingo night" is about how I would describe LW planning and strategic management for the most part.