One of the Skua's weaknesses was that it could only carry a 500lb bomb, which was inadequate against battleships, and provided less destructive power against (Japanese) carriers than the 1000lb bombs that were widely used by other dive bombers. Was the 500lb bomb the product of technical limitations, deliberate doctrinal choice for naval warfare (perhaps torpedoes are for killing ships?), the Air Ministry specification for a non-doctrinal reason, or something else?
I believe I have found the answer, somewhat in plain sight.
According to Neville Jones' The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power: A History of the British Bomber Force, 1923-1939, in July of 1932 the Chief of the Air Staff decided that no bomb larger than 500lbs would be produced. This was despite the fact that operational experience had shown the need for larger bombs, that Trenchard had stated in 1923 that 4000lb bombs would eventually be needed, and that a 1000lb bomb was in trials in 1930.
In 1935, a sub-committee of the Bombing Committee reaffirmed that no bombs over 500 lb should be produced.
Because the Skua was designed to Specification O.27/34, the 500lb limit was in effect, so there was no prospect of a larger bomb being introduced, even Blackburn had thought about going beyond the specification.
To make this even more tragic, early in 1939 the Air Staff called on Bomber Command to plan to attack enemy warships, and specifically to sink at least one German battleship. Beyond the Commander-in-Chief replying that he did not believe that his forces could hit enemy warships, the naval staff produced a paper "expressing the strongest doubts" that any kind of warship could be destroyed by the RAF's 500lb bombs. In other words, the Air Staff had simply ignored the possibility that the RAF might be called on to attack ships by bombing (presumably, they mentally assigned this role to torpedo bombers, which was not totally irrational, but would be impossible with land-based aircraft based in the UK). The contrast with the USAAC, which was obsessed with attacking battleships with high-altitude bombers, and with the IJN, is striking. This provides an example both powerful and subtle of the damage done to the Fleet Air Arm by making it part of the RAF.
tl;dr The RAF wasn't going to buy bombs bigger than 500lbs, so there was no point in designing a dive bomber to carry anything larger.
PS--The belief that more small bombs were better against industrial targets than a few large bombs also influenced the design of the Fairey Battle. Placing four 250lb bombs inside this wings as the primary armament make a thick wing necessary to accommodate them, regardless of the choice of wing profile for takeoff distance and range. The thick wing limited the maximum speed of the Battle after it had dropped its bombs. I cannot make a meaningful statement about the Battle's maximum speed and range if it had a thin wing and carried a single 1000lb (or 500lb) bomb externally.
PPS--The conversation around bombing ships was part of the "Oh, dear, the entire concept of the RAF was that our bomber forces would hit first, hit hard, and keep hitting until we win, but now we don't think that we can pull it off and we're afraid that if we do start bombing, the Luftwaffe will attack our airfields and annihilate Bomber Command, even though we don't think that there's any way that Bomber Command could attack Luftwaffe airfields with any effect, and the government is afraid that if we start bombing, the Germans will retaliate against London, and we agree that it's a risk and that the UK population might crack first and none of our thinking right now is internally consistent" period.
I believe I have found the answer, somewhat in plain sight.
According to Neville Jones' The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power: A History of the British Bomber Force, 1923-1939, in July of 1932 the Chief of the Air Staff decided that no bomb larger than 500lbs would be produced. This was despite the fact that operational experience had shown the need for larger bombs, that Trenchard had stated in 1923 that 4000lb bombs would eventually be needed, and that a 1000lb bomb was in trials in 1930.
In 1935, a sub-committee of the Bombing Committee reaffirmed that no bombs over 500 lb should be produced.
Because the Skua was designed to Specification O.27/34, the 500lb limit was in effect, so there was no prospect of a larger bomb being introduced, even Blackburn had thought about going beyond the specification.
To make this even more tragic, early in 1939 the Air Staff called on Bomber Command to plan to attack enemy warships, and specifically to sink at least one German battleship. Beyond the Commander-in-Chief replying that he did not believe that his forces could hit enemy warships, the naval staff produced a paper "expressing the strongest doubts" that any kind of warship could be destroyed by the RAF's 500lb bombs. In other words, the Air Staff had simply ignored the possibility that the RAF might be called on to attack ships by bombing (presumably, they mentally assigned this role to torpedo bombers, which was not totally irrational, but would be impossible with land-based aircraft based in the UK). The contrast with the USAAC, which was obsessed with attacking battleships with high-altitude bombers, and with the IJN, is striking. This provides an example both powerful and subtle of the damage done to the Fleet Air Arm by making it part of the RAF.
tl;dr The RAF wasn't going to buy bombs bigger than 500lbs, so there was no point in designing a dive bomber to carry anything larger.
PS--The belief that more small bombs were better against industrial targets than a few large bombs also influenced the design of the Fairey Battle. Placing four 250lb bombs inside this wings as the primary armament make a thick wing necessary to accommodate them, regardless of the choice of wing profile for takeoff distance and range. The thick wing limited the maximum speed of the Battle after it had dropped its bombs. I cannot make a meaningful statement about the Battle's maximum speed and range if it had a thin wing and carried a single 1000lb (or 500lb) bomb externally.
PPS--The conversation around bombing ships was part of the "Oh, dear, the entire concept of the RAF was that our bomber forces would hit first, hit hard, and keep hitting until we win, but now we don't think that we can pull it off and we're afraid that if we do start bombing, the Luftwaffe will attack our airfields and annihilate Bomber Command, even though we don't think that there's any way that Bomber Command could attack Luftwaffe airfields with any effect, and the government is afraid that if we start bombing, the Germans will retaliate against London, and we agree that it's a risk and that the UK population might crack first and none of our thinking right now is internally consistent" period.
