WW2 Aviation Mythbusters
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FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
P-40s and P-36s both participated in intercepting th attacking Japanese. P-36s shot down 2 Zeros for the loss on one and P-40s shot down several zeros, google George Welch
I think you have an agenda not an opionion.
Myth 1: Allied aircraft busted large numbers German tanks. This is indeed very much a myth, rockets were to inaccurate, tanks survived nearby bombs.
Myth 2: Most German tanks were abandoned due to fuel starvation. This myth is indeed more or less true. Approximatly half (I call half between 45% to 55%) tanks simply ran out of fuel, amunition etc and were abandoned. Its highly likely given the sever logistcs problems around Normandy.
Both are backed by citations and facts.
You want to make an irrelevant argument that Peipers tanks were "destroyed" by allied action because the supply route was cuttoff. In this instance that 'may' be true but in general the Germans faced logistical issue worsened by allied air power. And no, Peipers tanks were not destroyed in battle so both my above arguments are still correct even in the Peiper case.
You mockingly note that 1.5 tons of Parachute container fuel was inadveratantly dropped on Stoumont in a resupply effort, this is perhaps 3 parachutes from 1 or 2 Ju 52 at most. Do you find the fact that On February 22, 1944, Nijmegen was heavily bombed by American planes, causing great damage to the city centre. The American pilots thought they were bombing the German city of Kleve, they however killed hundreds of Dutch. March 3, 1945. Over 500 inhabitants of the suburb of Bezuidenhout, a suburb of The Hague, Holland, were killed when Allied bombers missed their intended target, the V-2 launching sites in the Hague Forest and dropped their bombs on Bezuidenhout.
The German transport pilots at least have an excuse given the total allied air dominace.
Gixxerman
Senior Airman
I don't know if this one has been mentioned before but after the war the US Historical Research Division made a very detailed report on the experience of German arms after the war, their big interest being (for obvious reasons) the experience of the German forces against the Russians.
As far as air to ground combat goes they specifically mention the 'Falaise Gap' and 'The Bulge' and confirm in the introduction that there was a very high degree of over-claiming by allied aircrew for knocking German tanks out by rocket bombs (and speculate, because they worked in a vacuum and could not verify the situation in the east, that there is every reason to expect that something similar undoubtedly went on on the German side too).
The report is distilled down into the book 'Spearhead For Blitzkrieg: Luftwaffe Operations In Support Of The Army, 1939 - 1945' it's well worth a read if you haven't already seen it.
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parsifal
Colonel
Per my post #372, I count approximately 25 Tigers out of roughly 160 total losses attributed to air strikes. Thats about 15% of total Tiger losses. these figures come from the websites i posted, which appear to be well researched and corroborated
According to the sources I posted, less than half were destroyed by crew, and reasons for emolition are generally not given anyway. the majority of tiger losses appear to be from enemy action.
Okay, so what are they?
pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
The number of axis tanks destroyed by airpower was in the singles digits percentage wise if my memory and recent documentary are accurate .
parsifal
Colonel
perhaps overall, but the sample I have (which is four independant Tiger Battalions) the figures for tanks lost pushes the percentage through the 10% barrier.
To be fair I think the numbers lost to airpower for this sample are skewed by losses sustained in one particular event. I think it was 13 July, one of the battalions was detrainng near Paris, was hit by either a medium or Heavy bomber strike. I dont have the details, but more than 10 tanks were destroyed in that single attack. it appears that many tanks were incinerated by an intense fire that engulfed the train as it unloaded.
If that rather freakish event is not considered, the loss rate to airpower for the tigers falls to below 10%.
To be fair I think the numbers lost to airpower for this sample are skewed by losses sustained in one particular event. I think it was 13 July, one of the battalions was detrainng near Paris, was hit by either a medium or Heavy bomber strike. I dont have the details, but more than 10 tanks were destroyed in that single attack. it appears that many tanks were incinerated by an intense fire that engulfed the train as it unloaded.
If that rather freakish event is not considered, the loss rate to airpower for the tigers falls to below 10%.
I don't have an agenda, but you seem to have.
On your myth 1, I haven't see a message on this thread which had claimed that the myth is true. so we all to seem accept that it is more or less myth, but IMHO there is more thruth in that myth than you seem to believe, see Parsifal's post #372, also read for ex Jentz' Panzer Truppen Vol 2 and look for ex p. 197, there is Oberst Schanze's report, which shows that Jabos hit Panthers, in fact numerous Panthers of PzBrig 112 12-13 Sept 44, that was during the battle at Dompaire and all participants, the French, the Germans and of course the P-47 pilots agreed that fighter bomber strikes against the Panthers of 112. PzBr were very effective. So there are exceptions to the rule that the effects of Allied air attacks on panzers were always heavily exaggerated.
On the Myth 2, I beg to disagree, many of the panzers and StuGs lost in Falaize pocket were abandoned because the Polish Armoured Division was sitting on their retreat route and after desperately trying to get through while bludgeoned by Allied air attacks and artillery and compressed to smaller and smaller area by other Allied ground troops, the Germans eventually gave up abandoned their vehicles and tried to get out on foot. Succeeding to put one's own troop to tactically decisive points on the ground and so to force the enemy to attack them along predictive routes is called tactical/operational skill. Most of the AFVs that were not caught in Falaise pocket had to be left on the left bank of Seine, because of Allied AFs had destroyed all the bridges and Allied ground forces had arrived to Seine on both sides of the Germans. Also a classical example of use of superior manoeuvrability to force enemy to unattainable position It is better to use one ability to manoeuvre to force the enemy to abandon its equipment than try an head on attack and take also own losses while destroying enemy, all sides knew that and that was one of the key points of also German military thinking, and for ex Blitzkrieg tactics.
That only proofs that you have an agenda I just stated a fact directly related to the discussion, namely The KG Peiper, and clearly a new fact to you. Nothing mocking in that, that you took it as so, only tells on your attitude. And that was all the Germans dropped. Your examples had nothing to do with the topic, any more than the fact that LW bombed Frieburg, a German town, in early 1940 in error.
Juha
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Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Lets stop the sarcasm.
"To Win the Winter Sky" is a day-by-day account of the Bulge through to Jan/Feb and gives numerous instances of 2 Tac AF hitting German armour. A good read.
"To Win the Winter Sky" is a day-by-day account of the Bulge through to Jan/Feb and gives numerous instances of 2 Tac AF hitting German armour. A good read.
pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
I erred and was thinking only of Typhoons and such neglecting heavy bombers
Thousands of heavy bombers dropped several thousand tons of bombs on Panzrs in the Normandy area. Most of the tanks were simply dug out and continued on. At most they were delayed by a day.
Myth of Combat Aircraft destroying tanks
Modern literature on WWII is replete with accounts of devastating air strikes on tank units. There are many stories about dozens or even hundreds of enemy tanks being destroyed in a single day, thereby destroying or blunting an enemy armoured offensive. These accounts are particularly common in literature relating to later war ground attack aircraft, most commonly the Soviet Ilyushin II, the British Hawker Typhoon, the American Republic P-47, and the German Henschel Hs 129. All these aircraft have the distinction of being called 'tank-busters' and all have the reputation for being able to easily destroy any type of tank in WWII.
Now what's the truth?
Case 1 - Normandy
During Operation Goodwood (18th to 21st July) the 2nd Tactical Air Force and 9th USAAF claimed 257 and 134 tanks, respectively, as destroyed. Of these, 222 were claimed by Typhoon pilots using RPs (Rocket Projectiles).
During the German counterattack at Mortain (7th to 10th August) the 2nd Tactical Air Force and 9th USAAF claimed to have destroyed 140 and 112 tanks, respectively.
Unfortunately for air force pilots, there is a small unit usually entitled Research and Analysis which enters a combat area once it is secured. This is and was common in most armies, and the British Army was no different. The job of The Office of Research and Analysis was to look at the results of the tactics and weapons employed during the battle in order to determine their effectiveness (with the objective of improving future tactics and weapons).
They found that the air force's claims did not match the reality at all. In the Goodwood area a total of 456 German heavily armoured vehicles were counted, and 301 were examined in detail. They found only 10 could be attributed to Typhoons using RPs (less than 3% of those claimed). Even worse, only 3 out of 87 APC examined could be attributed to air lunched RPs. The story at Mortain was even worse. It turns out that only 177 German tanks and assault guns participated in the attack, which is 75 less tanks than claimed as destroyed! Of these 177 tanks, 46 were lost and only 9 were lost to aircraft attack. This is again around 4% of those claimed. When the results of the various Normandy operations are compiled, it turns out that no more than 100 German tanks were lost in the entire campaign from hits by aircraft launched ordnance.
Considering the Germans lost around 1 500 tanks, tank destroyers and assault guns in the Normandy campaign, less than 7% were lost directly to air attack.(8) The greatest contributor to the great myth regarding the ability of WWII aircraft to kill tanks was, and still is, directly the result of the pilot's massively exaggerated kill claims. The Hawker Typhoon with its cannon and up to eight rockets was (and still is in much literature) hailed as the best weapon to stop the German Tiger I tank, and has been credited with destroying dozens of these tanks in the Normandy campaign. According to the most current definitive work only 13 Tiger tanks were destroyed by direct air attack in the entire campaign.(9) Of these, seven Tigers were lost on 18th July 1944 to massive carpet bombing by high altitude heavy bombers, preceding Operation Goodwood. Thus at most only six Tigers were actually destroyed by fighter bombers in the entire campaign. It turns out the best Tiger stopper was easily the British Army's 17pdr AT gun, with the Typhoon well down on the list.
Indeed it appears that air attacks on tank formations protected by Flak were more dangerous for the aircraft than the tanks. The 2nd Tactical Air Force lost 829 aircraft in Normandy while the 9th USAAF lost 897.(10) These losses, which ironically exceed total German tank losses in the Normandy campaign, would be almost all fighter-bombers. Altogether 4 101 Allied aircraft and 16 714 aircrew were lost over the battlefield or in support of the Normandy campaign.(11)
P. Moore, Operation Goodwood, July 1944; A Corridor of Death, Helion Company Ltd, Solihull, UK, 2007,
N. Zetterling, Normandy 1944, J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc, Winnipeg, Canada, 2000,
F. Crosby, The Complete Guide to Fighters and Bombers of WWII, Anness Publishing Ltd: Hermes House, London, 2006, p. 365. Also M. Healy, Kursk 1943, Osprey Military, London, 1993, p. 56.
D. M. Glantz, J.M. House, The Battle of Kursk, Ian Allan Publishing Ltd, Surrey, UK, 1999, p. 349.
T. L. Jentz, Panzer Truppen, The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Deployment of Germany's Tank Force: 1943-1945,
M. Healy, Kursk 1943, Osprey Military, London, 1993, p. 66.
D. M. Glantz, J.M. House, The Battle of Kursk, Ian Allan Publishing Ltd, Surrey, UK, 1999, p. 276. According to Glantz and House, these are admitted Soviet tanks totally destroyed but the number is probably higher. In addition a similar number were probably recovered as repairable.
Tank Forces in Defense of the Kursk Bridgehead, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Volume 7, No 1, March 1994,
parsifal
Colonel
I dont think I would disagree that aircraft as a means of killing tanks directly is overrated, however, there are still a number of issues that make the effort well worth the while.
Firstly, for some units at least, German tank losses from the point of manufacture to frontline did exceed 10%, in fact was closer to 15%. Dont know if that was a statistic that applies across the board, but it did apply to certain key heavy tank formations that deployed to western Europe in 1944. These arent claimed losses, incidentally, they are admitted losses by the Germans.
Secondly, according to Jarymowycz (great book incidentally) a significant reason for many losses for German tanks were mechanical failures At least a portion of these breakdowns are going to be the result of near misses by air strikes. If a tank breaks down, because it has suffered a mechanical failure due to a near miss, that is still a loss to airpower in my book.
Thirdly, many of the losses due to abandonment, if not due to mechanical failure, are lost due to supply shortages. German armies in the Normandy campaign were starved of resources mostly through the efforts of the allied air forces. And most of that effort was due to the impact on the European rail network. Though an indirect effort some of those tanks listed as lost to abandonment were lost to air power, because they could not get the supplies they needed to keep moving and fighting.
Fourthly, according to german accounts, airpower made movement to and around trhe battlefield extremely difficult. This meant that tanks could often not manouvre properly in the face of a developing threat on the ground. Unable to move, they succumbed to ground fire of various kinds. Airpower in this situation was assisting the ground combat by denying the germans one of their primary means of defence....their ability to move and react.
Fifthly, many German tanks were lost because their routes for retreat were cut off. For example, many bridges across the Seine were blown, leaving no escape. Some attempts were made to ferry tanks across the river....most were lost to air attacks.
Lastly, many tanks that might otherwise have been produced were lost due to the efforts in the strategic bombing campaign. Resources were forced to be diverted to air defence, civil defence, and outright damage and disruption to the overall industrial complex. USSBS esimates over 40% of potential production was lost due to strategic bombing in 1944 alone.
The indirect impacts of airpower were considerable. Almost impossible to quantify as a percentage, but airpower played a key role in delivering victory to the allies in the west at tolerable cost. Airpower, more than a means of direct attrition on German tanks, was a force multiplier for the allies. My opinion is that it probably increased the effectiveness of allied armies by 25-50% overall.
Firstly, for some units at least, German tank losses from the point of manufacture to frontline did exceed 10%, in fact was closer to 15%. Dont know if that was a statistic that applies across the board, but it did apply to certain key heavy tank formations that deployed to western Europe in 1944. These arent claimed losses, incidentally, they are admitted losses by the Germans.
Secondly, according to Jarymowycz (great book incidentally) a significant reason for many losses for German tanks were mechanical failures At least a portion of these breakdowns are going to be the result of near misses by air strikes. If a tank breaks down, because it has suffered a mechanical failure due to a near miss, that is still a loss to airpower in my book.
Thirdly, many of the losses due to abandonment, if not due to mechanical failure, are lost due to supply shortages. German armies in the Normandy campaign were starved of resources mostly through the efforts of the allied air forces. And most of that effort was due to the impact on the European rail network. Though an indirect effort some of those tanks listed as lost to abandonment were lost to air power, because they could not get the supplies they needed to keep moving and fighting.
Fourthly, according to german accounts, airpower made movement to and around trhe battlefield extremely difficult. This meant that tanks could often not manouvre properly in the face of a developing threat on the ground. Unable to move, they succumbed to ground fire of various kinds. Airpower in this situation was assisting the ground combat by denying the germans one of their primary means of defence....their ability to move and react.
Fifthly, many German tanks were lost because their routes for retreat were cut off. For example, many bridges across the Seine were blown, leaving no escape. Some attempts were made to ferry tanks across the river....most were lost to air attacks.
Lastly, many tanks that might otherwise have been produced were lost due to the efforts in the strategic bombing campaign. Resources were forced to be diverted to air defence, civil defence, and outright damage and disruption to the overall industrial complex. USSBS esimates over 40% of potential production was lost due to strategic bombing in 1944 alone.
The indirect impacts of airpower were considerable. Almost impossible to quantify as a percentage, but airpower played a key role in delivering victory to the allies in the west at tolerable cost. Airpower, more than a means of direct attrition on German tanks, was a force multiplier for the allies. My opinion is that it probably increased the effectiveness of allied armies by 25-50% overall.
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parsifal
Colonel
Accounts by the german commanders themselves are worth noting
Bayerlein: left a remarkable account of the effects of the COBRA bombing and ground assault on his command. In response to postwar interrogation he wrote:
We had the main losses by pattern bombing, less by artillery, still less by tanks and smaller arms.
The actual losses of dead and wounded were approximately: Air 50%, Artillery 30%, other 20%
According to Jarymowycz, other German commanders interviewed postwar, attributed their armour losses as follows
Guderian: (eastern front) 60-70% Mechanical failure, 15% AT fire, 5% artillery, 5% mines, 5% other, Total 90-100%
Dietrich: (West Front) Mechanical 30%, Air 10%, AT 15%, Tanks &TD 45%, Artillery negligible. Most feared Tanks and TDs
Hausser: During Movements to the zone of combat 30% of tanks are lost to mechanical failure, Considering the remainder as 100%, losses were as follows: 15% Mechanical breakdown, 20% Air Attack, AT (and tanks) 50%, 15% by artillery. Hausser agreed with Dietrich, most feare Allied weapons were their tanks and TDs.
Adjusting Hausser to a single percentage, the following figures are deduced
Mechanical breakdown 35%, Air Attack 15%, Tanks TD AT 38%, Artillery 12%
Jarymowycz then tabulates his findings in his table 13-3, which has previously beeen posted, and which is challenged by quite a few other people. If we make our own analysis of the German commanders opinions, we arrive at the following loss by cause proportions (averaging):
Mechanical: 35
Air: 21
Tanks/TD/AT: 31
Artillery: 12
Other: 1
TOTAL: 100%
Bayerlein: left a remarkable account of the effects of the COBRA bombing and ground assault on his command. In response to postwar interrogation he wrote:
We had the main losses by pattern bombing, less by artillery, still less by tanks and smaller arms.
The actual losses of dead and wounded were approximately: Air 50%, Artillery 30%, other 20%
According to Jarymowycz, other German commanders interviewed postwar, attributed their armour losses as follows
Guderian: (eastern front) 60-70% Mechanical failure, 15% AT fire, 5% artillery, 5% mines, 5% other, Total 90-100%
Dietrich: (West Front) Mechanical 30%, Air 10%, AT 15%, Tanks &TD 45%, Artillery negligible. Most feared Tanks and TDs
Hausser: During Movements to the zone of combat 30% of tanks are lost to mechanical failure, Considering the remainder as 100%, losses were as follows: 15% Mechanical breakdown, 20% Air Attack, AT (and tanks) 50%, 15% by artillery. Hausser agreed with Dietrich, most feare Allied weapons were their tanks and TDs.
Adjusting Hausser to a single percentage, the following figures are deduced
Mechanical breakdown 35%, Air Attack 15%, Tanks TD AT 38%, Artillery 12%
Jarymowycz then tabulates his findings in his table 13-3, which has previously beeen posted, and which is challenged by quite a few other people. If we make our own analysis of the German commanders opinions, we arrive at the following loss by cause proportions (averaging):
Mechanical: 35
Air: 21
Tanks/TD/AT: 31
Artillery: 12
Other: 1
TOTAL: 100%
Hello Siegfried
I can agree with almost all you wrote in your message #392
Two minor notes of tone,
1)in fact 13 Tigers means better than average % of losses caused by a/c on AFV, because there were only 3 Tigers battalions participating Normandy Campaign and sSSPzAbt 101 was a bit understregth at the beginnig, 102 arrived in July as did sPzAbt 503. Without digging out my best Tiger source (Tigers in Combat I II) I'd say some 120-130 Tigers participated.
2) AFVs were only one of the targets to FBs, much effort was used against transports and bridges, not to say against other front line targets.
But otherwise I more or less agreed. I usually get little agry when I see an article on Mortain counter-attack in Aeroplane. They usually tended to forget that there was US 30th Div with 2 TD battalions, one of which was more or less overrun, which fought hard to hinder German attack, it really wasn't purely AF show.
Juha
I can agree with almost all you wrote in your message #392
Two minor notes of tone,
1)in fact 13 Tigers means better than average % of losses caused by a/c on AFV, because there were only 3 Tigers battalions participating Normandy Campaign and sSSPzAbt 101 was a bit understregth at the beginnig, 102 arrived in July as did sPzAbt 503. Without digging out my best Tiger source (Tigers in Combat I II) I'd say some 120-130 Tigers participated.
2) AFVs were only one of the targets to FBs, much effort was used against transports and bridges, not to say against other front line targets.
But otherwise I more or less agreed. I usually get little agry when I see an article on Mortain counter-attack in Aeroplane. They usually tended to forget that there was US 30th Div with 2 TD battalions, one of which was more or less overrun, which fought hard to hinder German attack, it really wasn't purely AF show.
Juha
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Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Well, we can give you that..... if you are only counting losses by RPs.
" The 378th Squadron dropped napalm and bombs on Bourcy itself which was discovered to harbour 15 trucks and five tanks. In all the Group claimed 84 motor vehicles and 12 tanks....Thunderbolts of the 354th FG ranged far enough west to send tanks of the Panzer Lehr Division scurrying for cover.....Tanks and trucks were hit with napalm and fragmentation bombs near Forrierres; the 356th bombed and strafed another group of ten tanks and twenty trucks near Nassonge....."
December 23, 1944 from "To Win the Winter Sky" by Danny S. Parker, pg 231-232
It wasn't only RPs.
There was also this comment from the same book....
"It was not unusual for a report of enemy armour from an outpost to be followed within minutes by a covey of P-47s to hit the German tanks."
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Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
Gallands supposed preferrence for spitfires seem to stem from qoting out of context from this meeting, often supporting the quoters opinion that the spitfire was THE best fighter in 1940.
I only recently found it with context in James Hollands The Battle for Britain which, some shortcomings apart, do a great job for contextualising that conflict on many levels (I've found only a few outright factual errors over nearly 800 pages, though I might disagree somewhat on the strategic outlook). Then there is of course his claim that Bf 109 E was the best fighter during that conflict (and that is of course a reason for supplying the wider context). It's good features was good climb, accelleration and (instant) dive and its armament. (Please be aware that I am not intending to start over again the whole cannon-mashinegun argument here, I'm only condensing his argument).
Apparantly the meeting took place on 6th of september (the cronology can be a little messy oftentimes) but the rendering differs somewhat from what Galland is quoted for. Of course there are inherent possibilities of misrepresenting when accounts are translated from german to english to (in this case) norwegian, but others than Galland might have referred from the meeting, and details often differs when memory serves).
The order goes:
Göring berates the fighter pilots for not protecting the bombers adequately.
He asks for the needs of the luftwaffe, and Galland wish for his sqadron to be equipped with spitfires (note that the translation might give rise to the squdron-squadronS disagreement which have surfased in this thread).
After that Galland explains that the spitfires' greater manouverability at slower speeds makes it a better (I assume close-) excort fighter.
Having no answer to that, Göring growls and leave.
Only difference to the qute seem to be that here Gallands rationalisation comes last, but I'm glad for both renderings as they supply the context thereby puncturing a myth.
Another interesting aspect is that Luftwaffe was grappling with some of the same problems as the 8th airforce in 44 as to how best protect bombers/ attain air superiotrity, close escort or frie jagd.
Just a nomenclature tidbit: German word 'Geschwader' can be found many times as an equivalent of English 'Squadron'. But the 'Staffel' is 'Squadron'; Geschwader is operational equivalent of 'Group' in RAF, or 'Wing' for USAAF.
So if/when Galland asks that his Geschwader is to be outfitted with Spitfires, he speaks about ~100 (as Readie quoted in his post) planes, not just 12 or 16.
In naval forces, Geschwader is indeed an operational equivalent of Squadron.
Wing for RAF USN is equivalent of Group in USAAC USMC.
So if/when Galland asks that his Geschwader is to be outfitted with Spitfires, he speaks about ~100 (as Readie quoted in his post) planes, not just 12 or 16.
In naval forces, Geschwader is indeed an operational equivalent of Squadron.
Wing for RAF USN is equivalent of Group in USAAC USMC.
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Good post, JS
Yes, there seems to be misunderstandings on what Galland meant with his request. Have seen the Galland's explanation before but it's good that Holland retell it in his book. Have not seen the book, but what I have seen in his blogs he seems to have limited technical understanding, which can be seen for ex in his armament arguments.
Juha
Yes, there seems to be misunderstandings on what Galland meant with his request. Have seen the Galland's explanation before but it's good that Holland retell it in his book. Have not seen the book, but what I have seen in his blogs he seems to have limited technical understanding, which can be seen for ex in his armament arguments.
Juha
