Luftwaffe after BoB: strategy, tactics, tecnology?

[stona]

As an aside what could the LW have built if using our hindsight they don't produce the Me210 until its fixed, same with the He177, and the Ju288 is cancelled when the Jumo 222 runs into its 1940 problems? How about the effect of building the Ostmark engine facility around the Jumo 213, which would get the full support of the RLM once the Jumo 222 is dropped and probably be available a year or so earlier as a result? Or not gearing up for the Ta-154? https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wulf_Ta_154#Produktion
Perhaps more Ju88Gs with earlier Jumo 213s? Or would we see more He-219s with Jumo 213s? Perhaps an earlier Ar234P for night fighting, or an earlier Me262B?

It wasn't like the Luftwaffe wasn't the Nazi's favourite child. Following Goering's announcement in October 1938 of the Reich's new re-armament plan the RLM submitted it's first draft for its expansion on 26th October.
It was to build 45,700 aircraft by Ist April 1942 at a cost of 60 billion RM. That's equivalent to the entire defence budget from 1933-1939. In early 1942 the Luftwaffe was to have 10,300 operational aircraft with 8,200 in reserve.
People wonder why the poor old Kriegmarine's 'Plan Z' was postponed until 1948!

On 15th November 1938 the RLM announced details of the aircraft to be built:

7,327 Ju 88
702 He 177
2,000 He 111
900 Do 17
2,002 Ju 87
4,331 Bf 109
3,320 Bf 110/ Me 210, proportion not yet fixed, dependent on Me 210 development.

This would require 230,000 MORE workers and expansion of the RLM at a cost of 2.2 billion RM. New machine tools would cost another 327 million RM and the cost of equipment needed from abroad would be another 125 million RM.
In ADDITION another airframe plant of 20,000 employees would be required.

This all went into 'Production Plan No.9' which was unattainable before it even started. The impact of aircraft like the He 177 and Me 210 was minimal at this time, though allowances were made in the next plan (No.10) of December 1938. Delays with the He 177 and Ju 88 were noticed and production of the Do17 and He 111 extended to cover this.

It's not like the Luftwaffe didn't have the opportunity in the immediate pre-war period. The planning was unrealistic and typical of the Nazi state. Simply writing a plan doesn't make it happen, even with 60 billion RM to back it. The issues with the He 177 and Ju 88 were indicative of things to come. 'Production Plan No.10' which covered the period from 1st January 1939 through 30th June 1941 (30 months) included 43 different types and sub types made at plants all over the Reich. The Bf 109 alone was being manufactured at five different locations.

What was urgently needed was some kind of rationalisation of the various programmes but this never happened. In fact it got even more complicated and expensive.

All this led directly to the Luftwaffe's first 'defeat'. Between July and December 1940, the period including the Battle of Britain the Germans produced 1219 fighter aircraft (Bf 109), the British 3,225 (Spitfire, Hurricane). In 1940 the RLM built on average 139 S/E fighters per month. In July 1940 alone the British built 490.
Between January and April 1941 the figures are 5,216 for the British and 2,510 for the Germans. This is before American production becomes a major contributing factor.

It wasn't a lack of planning that was the problem but an inability to properly organise the aero industry as a whole in a way which could make the plans realisable. Political interference didn't help. The Germans seem to have been incapable of making a plan and then sticking to it.In June 1940, just when the Germans should have been going all out to increase production it was decreased and aircraft exports were restarted! Plans were made to stop production of many types by late 1941! This in direct contradiction to the immediate pre-war production plans.

Between May 1933 and March 1945 more than 100 General Staff requirements were given to the RLM. In response the Technical Office produced 42 Beschaffungsprogrammen (procurement programmes). Some had one or two variations. Of these programmes 36 were issued to the aviation industry as Lieferplanen (production plans). Production Plans included legal contracts and were supposed to allow the various firms of the aviation industry to plan facilities, procure man power and raw materials and, if they wanted to, sub- contract for parts. The problem was that there were many plans creating a set of ever moving goal posts at which the various individual companies were supposed to aim.
In August 1941 there were still more than 40 types in production, Messerschmitt alone had 11, Heinkel 10.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Stona that's all great info, but the problem is it doesn't address my point; part of the reason historically the LW had issues with production was by wasting a lot on projects that didn't pan out even after they were shown to be duds and needed modifications to be worthwhile or were complete wastes of time; the Me210 fiasco cost about 2000 aircraft due to wasted time, effort, and materials, while the He177 program turned out nearly 1200 useless bombers. Beyond that the tooling costs for the Ta-154 cost an unknown number of aircraft, same with the major investments in the Ju288, which was one of the most expensive projects in LW history, with great numbers of highly specialized large machine tools being scrapped in the process.
So whatever the unrealistic pre-war plans were and the issues with early war production, partly the problem of Udet's and Goering's awful production planning, not helped by Goering poaching the LW's production planner for the 4 Year Program (Fritz Loeb) in late 1936, the issues with wasted effort on massive scale, plus the proliferation of research projects, especially in the engine department, cost the LW major amounts of aircraft during the war. I'm just trying to figure out how to quantify the Me210, He177, Ju288, and Ta-154 losses.

 

[stona]

I'm just trying to figure out how to quantify the Me210, He177, Ju288, and Ta-154 losses.

I don't think that there is any easy way of doing that.

Take the Ta 154. It was one of three designs developed by Tank in September 1942. Contracts to build 13 prototypes of what the RLM now designated the Ta 154 were issued in November 1942. So far things have moved quickly. The Ta 154 V1 flies on 1st July 1943, so far so good. Even before this, on 18th June, the RLM has ordered a first batch of 250 Ta 154 night fighters and started to organise mass production at Breslau, Erfurt and Posen (built with the help of 2,000 Jewish 'workers' who were then promptly sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau).

Deliveries were to start in January 1944 and by November there was to be a combined monthly output of 250 aircraft rising to 500 by the summer of 1945. This posed some problems but late in 1943 the production centres were increased to aid the mass production. The Focke-Wulf Cottbus plant was added to the programme to make cockpits and fuselages. Famo opened a new facility at Bunzlau where 1,500 inmates from the Gross-Posen concentration camp worked to build components for the Ta 154. The Erfurt plant was expanded by acquisition of the Holzflugzeugbau Gotha plant a mere 24 Kms from Erfurt.
In March 1944 the following short term delivery schedule was implemented for the Ta 154. By May Posen-Kreising would deliver 37, Erfurt 21 and Breslau 5.

What went wrong?

I've read a lot about glues and other technical problems, but this is what happened.

First the destruction of the Goldmann firm at Wuppertal on the night of 20/21 May 1944, ironically by RAF Mosquitoes, completely stopped the production of the Tego-Film adhesive vital to Ta 154 production. The failings of the alternative from Dynamit AG at Leverkusen-Schlebusch are well documented. Credit is rarely given to acts of sabotage committed by some of the 245 French and Belgian prisoners/workers at this plant. They risked their lives to do this just as surely as the allied airmen bombing the other facilities.

On 9th April and 29th May Posen was bombed by the USAAF. The first Posen built aircraft didn't fly until 30th June 1944. By August Posen and Cottbus had built only 57 aircraft. On 11th April Cottbus was bombed.

Erfurt also struggled. Along with the Gotha works it assembled just 64 aircraft, most were never flown. Erfurt was bombed on 20th July 1944.

Famo didn't complete an aircraft until May 1944.

Because of the priority of the Ta 154 programme further facilities were utilised at the underground Focke-Wulf plant at Salzbergwerk-Bremen and the Flugzeugwerk-Mielec in Poland. The latter was staffed by about 5,000 workers, including 2,000 Jewish prisoners for whom a camp was specially built. The facility soon developed a reputation for sabotage. Despite the relatively large workforce the plant built just 14 fuselages before evacuation in August 1944 the face of Soviet advances.

The Ta 154 programme was cancelled in August 1944.

The Luftwaffe received just 8 production night fighters, 4 in June and 4 in July of 1944. The allies did not find a single intact Ta 154 at the end of the war.

Most of the problems of producing the Ta 154 are simply those of attempting to build anything when you are losing a war, being bombed into next week and using labour which is at best uncooperative and at worst actively sabotaging your efforts.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

A bit on the drop tank installation for the Bf-109, per Prien Rodeike: the fuel was forced, by the compressed air, to flow from the drop tank into the fuselage tank. The limiter prevented overfilling of the fus. tank. So our Bf-109 can enter the combat on full internal fuel, since any fuel used up for warm up, take off and initial climb will be topped up by the fuel from the drop tank.

The Bf-109F modified for longer range work would still need to carry more fuel, be it with extra fuselage tank (in lieu of where the GM-1 tank was on some 109F-4s), or a longer fuselage/main tank - those modifications should mean maybe 500 (roughly 130 US gals) instead of 400 liters aboard. The wing tanks should add maybe another 150 liters (roughly 40 US gals). Or, in imp gals, total of some 140 gals.The larger drop tank would be also useful, at least 400 liters there.
That should be the principal variant for use in SU and MTO.

For the ETO - armament upgrade. Eg. go with installation of the MG 131 as much as supply allows. Another option is the pair of the MG FFM in the wings. Not as drastic as the Galland's machine, that had both (more about it: link), but certainly with a great punch. The MG 131 installation in the Galland's 109F was, outwardly, a much less bulky thing than at the later Gustavs.
Get the cranking on MG 131 production (would be needed for the LG 109s, too), as well as on the earlier introduction of the 90-rd drum for the MG FFM, it is almost of same size as the 60-rd one.

 

[tomo pauk]

The question of next-gen bombers.
The He-177 is in works, the 1st prototype flew a year ago from our starting point here. My suggestion is to redesign the wing ASAP to take 4 individual engines (the DB does only the 601 and 603, not the 606/610 and 604, even while the 606 is the derivative of the 601E), rather than 2 coupled ones. Should make 'German Lancaster+', rather than 'German Manchester+'. We give up some speed, but earn a lot in decreased engine problems, along with the ability to use any of the the 1300-1700 HP engines Germany had in volume production. One lucky hit will not 'delete' half of available power either. The use of smaller prop would enable a shorter stronger landing gear, so less accidents in landings than historically.

The twin engine bomber category is to be filled with two reasonably new bombers, the Ju-88 (already in service) and Do-217 (to enter service). Both have shortcomings - Ju-88 has a too restrictive bomb bay, forcing the bombs bigger than 50 kg to be carried outboard, that cut both in the speed and range. Maybe the bomb bay could be redesigned to carry bombs vertically, like it was the case for the He-111 - eight 250 kg bombs it carried internally? Not sure it could dive bomb with bombs carried like that, though.
Another option is the earlier introduction of the wooden bomb panier, cut some drag with big bombs carried under fuselage. The redesigned fuselage section where the wing was attached, so the wing is relocated in the 'shoulder' position, might also allow for a less restricted bomb bay.
The Do-217 needs ASAP better engines than the BMW 801A/L, so it might be an early recipient of the DB-603 engines, along with BMW 801D/MG. The 603 should benefited from the cancellation of the a number of DB engine projects in Autumn of 1940, so more resources can be spent on the 603. For the BMW 801D, I've suggested keeping the compression ration on the ballpark with the 801C, so there is hopefully less problems when introduced (the cost is a bit of altitude power), and the over-boosting will be tested introduced earlier, with major benefits for bombers fighter-bombers.
After those, the Ju-288. The Jumo 222 gets cancelled, the Ju-288 remains with small wing and gets tested with BMW and DB-603. Against the Ju-88, it offers far better bomb bay and fuel tanks layout, better defensive armament, so it will progresively replace the Ju-88 as a bomber.

A non-conservative design, if I may - a 3-engine bomber, with two engines on the wings and 3rd engine in fuselage, as a pusher. Rear-facing MGs installed at the rear end of the nacelles, like at Fw-191.

 

[stona]

Heinkel, Oranienburg was a plant with one of the largest number of 'workers' used from concentration camps (5,939 are listed from a projected total of 6,500 from the Sachsenhausen camp). They were all involved in He 177 production and that can cause problems. See above.
Lets not lose sight of who and why we were fighting.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

The use of slave labor to in aircraft industry is a self-inflicted wound, apart from what that did to the slave workers themselves.
BTW, the He-177 was also produced by Arado and Heinkel-Sud (Wienna).

 

[stona]

Not just slave labour, imported labour and more pertinently unskilled labour.
In January 1933, before the expansion started the German airframe and aero-engine industries employed 2,813 and 1,175 workers respectively
In July 1944 these figures were 342,601 and 202,999 respectively.
It was an impossible situation for the Germans. At the Messerschmitt plant at Kematen the percentage of skilled labour had dropped to 23% by early 1943. Across the Henschel organisation it fell to only 11% by as early as 1942.
Is it any wonder the quality of production suffered? The more complicated the aeroplane, and the He 177 was a very complicated machine, the worse the problem. By 1942/3 the aircraft industry would really struggle to develop these types, as is demonstrated by the historical figures.
Quantity was less of a problem. In 1944 2.33 million workers produced 40,593 aircraft, four times the number produced by 1.2 million workers in 1940. The fallacy of the "production miracle" is that the vast majority of the late war production was of single engine types, much smaller and easier to produce than larger aircraft.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

The He 177 with individual engines would be a less complicate plane. There is no much sense to build the He 111s from late 1942 on, they would be easily killed by Hurricanes Is or Yak-1s, let lone by the contemporary Allied fighters. The force of the He 177s that would use, say 1000 Jumo 211 engines would carry more ordnance further away than the force of He 111 that use same 1000 of Jumo 211s. It would do that on higher cruising speed (especially if the bigger bombs need to be carried), and while carrying greater defensive armament. The targets the He 111 can tackle, the He-177 also can, while vice-versa does not apply. The engine-out situation does not mean an immediate return to base. The crew needed would be also smaller, 250x6 vs. 500x5 men - 1500 vs. 2500.
Of course, the escort fighter would be needed either way, the higher cruising speed of the He-177 vs. He 111 makes the job for the escorts easier.

 

[stona]

Well there were plenty of Jumo 211 engines around. Over 68,000 were built and they were attaching engines from the reserve stock to Ju 88 Gs as late as March 1945.

You seem to be suggesting that the He 177 should have been built to the original proposal in which the Jumo 211 was one of six engines suggested. The problem is that the aircraft that would have resulted could only carry 2,000Kg of bombs.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Quantity was less of a problem. In 1944 2.33 million workers produced 40,593 aircraft, four times the number produced by 1.2 million workers in 1940. The fallacy of the "production miracle" is that the vast majority of the late war production was of single engine types, much smaller and easier to produce than larger aircraft.
Cheers
Steve

Yes, but in the face of a massive bombing campaign that made any production very difficult. It was a miracle anything got built. It would have been much higher without strategic bombing and only rose to those numbers because they were smaller, easier to make aircraft, rather than 1942 build priorities.

 

[wiking85]

Quantity was less of a problem. In 1944 2.33 million workers produced 40,593 aircraft, four times the number produced by 1.2 million workers in 1940. The fallacy of the "production miracle" is that the vast majority of the late war production was of single engine types, much smaller and easier to produce than larger aircraft.
Cheers
Steve

Yes, but in the face of a massive bombing campaign that made any production very difficult. It was a miracle anything got built. It would have been much higher without strategic bombing and only rose to those numbers because they were smaller, easier to make aircraft, rather than 1942 build priorities.

 

[tomo pauk]

Well there were plenty of Jumo 211 engines around. Over 68,000 were built and they were attaching engines from the reserve stock to Ju 88 Gs as late as March 1945.

You seem to be suggesting that the He 177 should have been built to the original proposal in which the Jumo 211 was one of six engines suggested. The problem is that the aircraft that would have resulted could only carry 2,000Kg of bombs.

Cheers

Steve

Why would the 4-engined bomber with 4 Jumo 211s carry less bombs than the one with 2 same engines? What version of the Jumo 211 is in the question there, ie. what power is available?

 

[wiking85]

You seem to be suggesting that the He 177 should have been built to the original proposal in which the Jumo 211 was one of six engines suggested. The problem is that the aircraft that would have resulted could only carry 2,000Kg of bombs.

Cheers

Steve

Based on what? The coupled engine and twin props only saved 3-4% in drag, which while significant isn't anywhere near reducing it from 6 to 2 tons of bombs. The Lancaster used 1200hp engines (same as Jumo 211B) and had a much heavier payload a longer ranges while being the same weight as the He177A. In fact the He177B would have been lighter over all if it had not have the upweighting due to the dive bombing requirement. So with the same weight or less and same engine power and roughly similar dimensions there is no way the He177B would be restricted to 2 tons of bombs.

 

[stona]

It was due to the narrow fuselage of the original proposal. It was smaller than what became the He 177, a four or five man crew, but I don't have the details to hand. It would have been the A series engine at the time.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks.
The Jumo 211A was with 1000 PS for take off. By Autumn of 1940, the 1200 HP Jumo 211B is long available, the 1340 PS 211F is in the pipeline, the fuselage can remain as historically it was on the He 177.
By late 1941, the intercooled 211J is there, 1420 PS for take off.

 

[Shortround6]

The He 177 with individual engines would be a less complicate plane.

A bit less complicated than the real He 177 in some ways, a bit more complicated in others. And a 37,000lb airplane is always going to be much more complicated than a 19,000lb airplane to build. More than a simple comparison of weights.

There is no much sense to build the He 111s from late 1942 on, they would be easily killed by Hurricanes Is or Yak-1s, let lone by the contemporary Allied fighters.

A few problems here,
1. the He 111 always seemed to be on the short of the stick when it came to getting engine upgrades.
2. the He 111 always seemed to be on the short of the stick when it came to getting defensive weapon upgrades.
3. The He 177 wasn't going to survive in daylight against those fighters either. Both bombers would have had to operate by night in order to keep losses to an acceptable level.

The force of the He 177s that would use, say 1000 Jumo 211 engines would carry more ordnance further away than the force of He 111 that use same 1000 of Jumo 211s. It would do that on higher cruising speed (especially if the bigger bombs need to be carried), and while carrying greater defensive armament.

Everybody always wants to introduce a new airplane/tank/ship with the armament it carried after several years of service. The armament carried by the He 177A-1s was not very good, and like a number of German bombers, had one crew man responsible for guns pointed in different directions so actual firepower was less than the list of weapons carried.

According to Green (corrections welcome) the standard weapons fit for an He 177 A-1 was a single MG 81 out the nose [one man], a 20mm MG FF out the front of the gondola (how effective this was for air defense I don't know)[2nd man], a remote control barbette with a single 13mm MG 131 on top controlled by gunner from behind the pilot [3rd gunner], single 13mm MG 131 out the tail with the 4th gunner. Pilot makes 5 man crew.
A variety of extra weapon sets were available. A pair of MG 81s in the rear of the gondola to protect the belly (maned by who? the 20mm gunner? the gunner for the remote control barbette?), This position could also be used as a sighting station for a ventral barbette for a single 13mm gun. A manned dorsal turret (behind the bomb bay)with a single 13mm MG 131 was also available (manned by extra gunner? or tail gunner runs back and forth?). This is hardly great defensive armament in 1942.

The engine-out situation does not mean an immediate return to base.

Actually it does, sort of. The plane with engine out will NOT be able to keep up with the formation unless it does something like drop it's bomb load, even then??? depends on speed altitude of the formation?? And if operating single or in a bomber stream flying further into enemy territory with one engine already out means if a 2nd one quits the plane is pretty much lost (yes, US and British bombers sometimes made it back on two engines but it was by no means a guaranteed thing).

Stick better engines in the He 111, stick 13mm Mg 131s or twin MG 81s in some of it's gun positions. It won't be better than a He 177 but the difference will be closer.

edit: An early He 177 is going to be stuck with the same MG 15s as the He 111, Do 17 and Ju 88s used.

 

[stona]

The He 177 was doomed from the start and not just because of the infamous dive bombing requirement. Many other early design features simply over stretched the ability of the engineers to make them work. Now I'm not saying having to abandon an evaporative cooling system would necessarily be a disaster (think Spitfire) but it is illustrative of the sort of poor decisions taken at the outset of the design process. Heinkel had already had equivocal results with such systems on much smaller aircraft like the He 100 and He 119. The increased drag of radiators was one of the contributing factors that led to the two engine design winning out.

It's amazing to think that on 22nd June 1937 Heinkel promised to deliver the first pre-production aircraft to the RLM on 1st October 1939, almost in time for the start of WW2.

A four engine version was actually proposed again in mid 1939, but Udet cancelled it in September 1939, 11 days after the invasion of Poland. There's no way it would have been ready for operational service in 1940 even had the process gone ahead.

Everything that followed regarding actual production targets for the He 177, starting with Udet's initial order for 120 aircraft a month from June 1940, is pure fantasy.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

...
A few problems here,
1. the He 111 always seemed to be on the short of the stick when it came to getting engine upgrades.
2. the He 111 always seemed to be on the short of the stick when it came to getting defensive weapon upgrades.
[moved up]Stick better engines in the He 111, stick 13mm Mg 131s or twin MG 81s in some of it's gun positions. It won't be better than a He 177 but the difference will be closer.

Installation of better engines does not solve the problem the He-111 had - the external carriage of bigger bombs (above 500 kg). The He-111 with, say, BMW 801s aboard will have to cut the range and/or bombs tonnage carried - the Do-217 can do anything similar already, and it can carry big bombs internally. Neither of those has the capability to have a bigger firepower than He 177 was capable to carry in it's tail.

3. The He 177 wasn't going to survive in daylight against those fighters either. Both bombers would have had to operate by night in order to keep losses to an acceptable level.

Hmm - I've suggested the escort fighters. The He 177 cruised as fast as the He 111 was doing flat out, without bombs and 1/2 fuel.

Everybody always wants to introduce a new airplane/tank/ship with the armament it carried after several years of service. The armament carried by the He 177A-1s was not very good, and like a number of German bombers, had one crew man responsible for guns pointed in different directions so actual firepower was less than the list of weapons carried.
...

The bomber with 4 engines can more easily 'swallow' the addition of defensive armament. You are right re. He-177A-1 guns, the A-3 introduced heavier guns, and more powerful engines.

edit: An early He 177 is going to be stuck with the same MG 15s as the He 111, Do 17 and Ju 88s used.

En early He-117B (= 4 engines) will not be available in force before early 1942, since the redesign of the wings will start in Autumn of 1940, per this thread original premise. By then it can have better stuff than the MG 15s.

 

[stona]

The wing was redesigned time and time again. It was first redesigned to accommodate extra fuel tanks after the evaporative cooling system was abandoned in order to compensate for the loss of range that would have been incurred due to the drag of the radiators. Then it was redesigned because of the infamous dive bombing requirement. That in turn led to a complete redesign of the undercarriage to accommodate the extra weight....and so it went on until virtually the end of the war.
It was a lame duck and the RLM should have abandoned it (and any number of other projects) to concentrate on projects that might actually work and be useful.
Cheers
Steve