What if the Germans had radar proximity fused AA shells?

[tomo pauk]

(contrary to the claims there is no indication that the Germans were seriously preparing for war until 1938-39 when it was clear the Allies were preparing for war).

Seriously?

Also keep in mind the Germans advanced MUCH further over far worse infrastructure than the Allies did in 1944 France and had less issues with supply.

Germans advanced over the much better infrastructure in 1940, than what the Allies had to overcome in 1944. Germans also had basically no opposition in France past late May of 1940.

Much of the claims about how bad the Germans were at logistics is post-war propaganda to bolster the image of the Allies, as they really made a ton of mistakes that the generals were very interested in covering up. After all they mostly ignored the ports and then were shocked when they ran out of supplies at the German border. Like how could the vaunted Allies miss how important Antwerp was? Then even after they captured it they didn't allocate enough labor to even fully utilize it. And they ran out of infantry replacements so were using untrained clerks as meatshields by late 1944. During the Bulge the US even had to beg the Brits for 400 Sherman tanks even as thousands of Shermans were waiting in depots in the US to go to Europe.

Allied generals made a mistake.
German politicians made even more serious mistakes, only to find themselves in hot water when the whole enterprise of conquering the world bit them in the hides. Part of the mistakes was that Germany have had no logistical tail big enough to cater for grand plans tailored up.

 

[Shortround6]

Allies bit themselves in the butt with some of the bombing in France/low countries in 1944.
Yes they kept the Germans from moving supplies/reinforcements to the front. Also kept the Allies from moving supplies/reinforcements from the coast/ports inland.

About 1/3 or the locomotives and rolling stock had been sent elsewhere by the Germans from 1940 to 1944. The Air campaign reduced rail traffic by D-day 1944 to about 10% of what it have been Feb 1944. Destroyed locomotives, rolling stock, bridges, rail yards etc.
Just about everything had to go by truck and the roads were in a lot worse shape in the summer of 1944 than they had been in 1940.

The US built a few special classes of locomotives for over seas use. Around 800 2-8-0s went to England (out of over 2100 built) and 400 were "run in" by British rail roads helping make up for British losses and moving invasion supplies. Another 400 were stored for the invasion and brought across as soon as practical. Most or all of the first 400 were eventually sent to Europe.

The air campaign was more effective than they realized as it crippling Europe's transport systems. It took more effort and resources than they planned to get it working for the allies.

 

[wiking85]

Seriously?

Look at their spending on the military to GDP from 1933-37. 1938-39 yes they were preparing for war, prior they were spending less than any likely foe and just rebuilding their military.

Germans advanced over the much better infrastructure in 1940, than what the Allies had to overcome in 1944.

I was talking about Russia, but in 1940 the Germans went further faster than the Wallies in 1944 as they didn't go out of their way to wreck infrastructure for months.

Germans also had basically no opposition in France past late May of 1940.

That's just a flat out wrong. The hardest fighting and bloodiest part of the French campaign for the Germans was in June:

After Dunkirk: The French Army's Performance against 'Case Red', 25 May to 25 June 1940 on JSTOR

Martin S. Alexander, After Dunkirk: The French Army's Performance against 'Case Red', 25 May to 25 June 1940, War in History, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 219-264

www.jstor.org

Allied generals made a mistake.
German politicians made even more serious mistakes, only to find themselves in hot water when the whole enterprise of conquering the world bit them in the hides. Part of the mistakes was that Germany have had no logistical tail big enough to cater for grand plans tailored up.

First of all they weren't trying to conquer the world, that was a British fabrication:

Amazon.com

Second I don't disagree that serious mistakes were made by Germany though they lacked options to do much else given how anti-negotiation the Allies were, but the US had the war on easy mode and still managed to fuck up. In fact had Hitler not been so obsessed with Antwerp in 1944 and adopted Rundstedt's plan the 90 division gamble could have seen the US army effectively collapse in NW Europe via the Ardennes offensive. Also it wasn't logistics that stopped the Germans in 1941 or 1942, it was Hitler's poor choices to try and clear the flanks before going for Moscow and the obsession with trying to bag prisoners instead sticking to plan Blau. Otherwise the USSR was on the verge of implosion by late 1942 economically due to the loss of territory, population, farmland, resources, etc.

 

[33k in the air]

I was talking about Russia, but in 1940 the Germans went further faster than the Wallies in 1944 as they didn't go out of their way to wreck infrastructure for months.

That isn't just an apples to oranges comparison, it's apples to ostriches.

 

[SaparotRob]

Allies bit themselves in the butt with some of the bombing in France/low countries in 1944.
Yes they kept the Germans from moving supplies/reinforcements to the front. Also kept the Allies from moving supplies/reinforcements from the coast/ports inland.

About 1/3 or the locomotives and rolling stock had been sent elsewhere by the Germans from 1940 to 1944. The Air campaign reduced rail traffic by D-day 1944 to about 10% of what it have been Feb 1944. Destroyed locomotives, rolling stock, bridges, rail yards etc.
Just about everything had to go by truck and the roads were in a lot worse shape in the summer of 1944 than they had been in 1940.

The US built a few special classes of locomotives for over seas use. Around 800 2-8-0s went to England (out of over 2100 built) and 400 were "run in" by British rail roads helping make up for British losses and moving invasion supplies. Another 400 were stored for the invasion and brought across as soon as practical. Most or all of the first 400 were eventually sent to Europe.

The air campaign was more effective than they realized as it crippling Europe's transport systems. It took more effort and resources than they planned to get it working for the allies.

Were these locos "pushed over the side" at the end of hostilities or are they still around?

 

[EwenS]

The Allies didn't miss how important Antwerp was. Eisenhower made that clear in his report to the leaders at the Octagon Conference in Sept 1944, just a week or so after Antwerp was captured.

Problem was that having run across northern France and Belgium in 2-3 weeks, Allied intelligence believed that the German army was on the brink of total collapse 1918 style, and with it Hitler and Germany. One good kick at the German front door, it was believed, could see the war over by Christmas. Problem was Allied intelligence was behind the curve. German resistance had already begun to stiffen, something that wasn't realised until Market Garden. Touch of victory disease.

Eisenhower recognised the logistics risk in his report, but felt that risk worthwhile given the state of knowledge if it could end the war by Christmas. The Joint Chiefs could have overridden his decision but didn't (and the matter was raised by the British delegation). FDR & Churchill could have overridden his decision but didn't. Nothing was missed. A positive decision was made on a course of action. That time the risk didn't pay off for the Allies.

 

[wiking85]

That isn't just an apples to oranges comparison, it's apples to ostriches.

Yes because advancing over the same infrastructure in the same country 4 years apart is that wildly different. You also act like the Luftwaffe wasn't smashing up infrastructure either.

 

[wiking85]

The Allies didn't miss how important Antwerp was. Eisenhower made that clear in his report to the leaders at the Octagon Conference in Sept 1944, just a week or so after Antwerp was captured.

Problem was that having run across northern France and Belgium in 2-3 weeks, Allied intelligence believed that the German army was on the brink of total collapse 1918 style, and with it Hitler and Germany. One good kick at the German front door, it was believed, could see the war over by Christmas. Problem was Allied intelligence was behind the curve. German resistance had already begun to stiffen, something that wasn't realised until Market Garden. Touch of victory disease.

Eisenhower recognised the logistics risk in his report, but felt that risk worthwhile given the state of knowledge if it could end the war by Christmas. The Joint Chiefs could have overridden his decision but didn't (and the matter was raised by the British delegation). FDR & Churchill could have overridden his decision but didn't. Nothing was missed. A positive decision was made on a course of action. That time the risk didn't pay off for the Allies.

I don't think you understand your own comparison. In 1918 German resistance was stiffening exactly the same as in 1944 the closer they got to Germany. Eisenhower was problem to blame more than anything, as he genuinely refused to give up on the idea that the Germans were just about to collapse...all the way to the start of the Battle of the Bulge. He had a wager with Monty that it would be over by Christmas despite all the mounting logistical problems. So even with Market Garden command did not change its belief about anything and then their bloodiest battle of the war started because of their fixed thinking. The lesson of 1918 was overshadowed by the belief that revolution would break out in Germany despite the situation being totally different.

 

[MIflyer]

For more than you could ever want to read on it: Radio proximity fuzes for fin-stabilized missiles : Ellett, Alexander, 1894-1981 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

If the Germans had them .... shucks, we would have jammed the crap out of them. Alone among the combatants, we had electronics capacity out the whazoo. We ended up making most of the British designed airborne radios and radar sets. I have SCR-522 equipment with both US and Crown nameplates. We probably could have made the German proximity fused shells explode as soon as they left the barrel.

Now, as far as the infantry and and proximity fused shells bursting above the ground, that would have been harder, since the Poor Bloody Infantry did not haul around a lot of electronics. But imagine equipping airplanes with jammers that would have caused the shells to explode in mid-flight before they got to our troops. Mind you, that would be a mission somewhat fraught, since you could get hit by a shell even if the fuse did not go off if you were flying through the shell trajectories.

After all they mostly ignored the ports and then were shocked when they ran out of supplies at the German border.

The WW2 USAAF intelligence magazine admits that when Patton ground to a halt due to lack of supplies the best use of the heavy bomber force probably would have been to haul fuel, bullets and beans to our ground forces.

 

[33k in the air]

Yes because advancing over the same infrastructure in the same country 4 years apart is that wildly different. You also act like the Luftwaffe wasn't smashing up infrastructure either.

You originally said this:

Logistics was far more the reason behind decisions they made there. Also keep in mind the Germans advanced MUCH further over far worse infrastructure than the Allies did in 1944 France and had less issues with supply.

The above appears to reference the Soviet Union, something which you confirm here:

I was talking about Russia, but in 1940 the Germans went further faster than the Wallies in 1944 as they didn't go out of their way to wreck infrastructure for months.

My comment was in reference to the Eastern Front.

Comparing operations on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1941 to those in France in the summer of 1944 is a comparison verging on ludicrous. Even a comparison of operations in France in spring 1940 to those of summer 1944 is one bordering on silly given the enormous difference in political, economic, and military conditions between the two time periods.

 

[33k in the air]

The Allies didn't miss how important Antwerp was. Eisenhower made that clear in his report to the leaders at the Octagon Conference in Sept 1944, just a week or so after Antwerp was captured.

Antwerp wasn't the problem, it was clearing the approaches to it — the Scheldt — a job given mostly to the Canadians and one not begun until October.

 

[wiking85]

You originally said this:



The above appears to reference the Soviet Union, something which you confirm here:



My comment was in reference to the Eastern Front.

Ah gotcha, from context I thought you meant the France situation. Yes it is comparing apples to oranges, with the Germans being in a much worse situation overall in 1941.

Comparing operations on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1941 to those in France in the summer of 1944 is a comparison verging on ludicrous. Even a comparison of operations in France in spring 1940 to those of summer 1944 is one bordering on silly given the enormous difference in political, economic, and military conditions between the two time periods.

How so in your mind specifically? The Germans were outnumbered in 1940 and 1941 and in 1944 in all categories. Yet they continued advancing the Allies stalled.

 

[wiking85]

Antwerp wasn't the problem, it was clearing the approaches to it — the Scheldt — a job given mostly to the Canadians and one not begun until October.

Exactly. That was the great mistake.

 

[wiking85]

Interesting book on Allied logistics in WW2: #Reviewing War of Supply: World War II Allied Logistics in the Mediterranean

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

At the start of the war they were ahead in radar, but lost the lead due to the US and UK merging their programs, the Germans giving up on cavity magnetron research (which they had the lead in until 1940), and the Japanese not sharing their technology (they were at the same place with cavity magnetron research as the British in 1940 and arguably kept pace until the end of the war). They also had the best air defense system in the world until US production was able to take Britain to the next level somewhere in 1943-44.

Since the cavity magnetron has become a sort of magic device there are lots of claims about what qualified and who did it, in order USSR, Japan, Britain. The German field sets were more advanced than the British ones in 1940, but not the ones under development. The Germans then standardised in order to make the numbers required, while the allies made improvements. Given the results of 1940 air fighting, and the lack of Luftwaffe raids on Britain 1941 onwards deciding best air defence systems lacks evidence.

Cryptography saw the German achieve immense success, something the Allies covered up until the 2000s:

The Germans cracked things the allied merchant ship code and early war RN codes, for example See Hitler's Spies by David Kahn, copyright 1978. The cracking of various US codes also, like the Black code. Axis Allies also had successes but the Axis powers devoted plenty of effort to crack each other's systems. Nothing comparable to Ultra/Magic.

Much of the wartime issues was lack of resources, lack of manpower, lack of preparation for war (contrary to the claims there is no indication that the Germans were seriously preparing for war until 1938-39 when it was clear the Allies were preparing for war).

In the 1940 fiscal year Germany spent more on interest and loan repayments than the war. As of 1938 Nazi Germany was going to either explode militarily or implode financially in a few years. Do the spending figures in Germany include things like the off the books MEFO loans? Europe began preparing for war because of Nazi Germany, not the other way around.

The guaranteed local markets thanks to all that mostly military deficit spending meant there was less incentive to export and earn the foreign exchange to pay for imports. The synthetic oil program comes to mind as a war preparation along with pressuring companies to build up large stockpiles in Germany, not counted as defence spending.

Logistics was far more the reason behind decisions they made there. Also keep in mind the Germans advanced MUCH further over far worse infrastructure than the Allies did in 1944 France and had less issues with supply. Much of the claims about how bad the Germans were at logistics is post-war propaganda

Actually no, things like tank repair was in Germany but the tanks broke down in the east. The supply plan that assumed defeat of the Red Army close to the border. The Germans in the east used local food supplies, human and horse and still had supply problems. They were not too worried about civilian supplies. Same for PoW and enemy military hospitals. Soviet tactical problems kept German losses down.

On 15th August Anvil/Dragoon landings start, amongst the units landed in the first two days are 25 truck companies and 2 gasoline supply companies. The supplies include 300,000 blankets and 350,000 sets of Red Cross relief clothing for the civilian population, due to the known shortages.

In France in 1944 During September 5,000 Italians arrive from the Mediterranean to be used as part of the US logistics system. As the US starts to hire French citizens it finds "Labour was plentiful, though rendered inefficient by malnutrition."

Allied relief supplies to The European Theatre of Operations, long tons, by quarter, excluding liquid fuels,
Q2/44 727 (In other words 6 to 30 June 1944)
Q3/44 157,639
Q4/44 588,968

The Germans concentrated more on removing supplies from the civil populations.

Back in the east in 1941 in the north the European gauge rail was largely captured intact, it was the Russian gauge parts that were heavily damaged. Army Group Centre stopped at Smolensk. Meantime the German rail troops had low priorities for equipment and supplies. As most of the Baltic ports were captured intact Army Group North could use ships.

Army Group Centre stopped for supply reasons, it could free a panzer army to strike south, where the resistance had been solid, and send troops north to be supplied by Army Group North. Then came the logistically risky attack on Moscow. The Soviet recapture of the Mosbas coal fields in 1941/42 was important

After all they mostly ignored the ports and then were shocked when they ran out of supplies at the German border. Like how could the vaunted Allies miss how important Antwerp was? Then even after they captured it they didn't allocate enough labor to even fully utilize it.

At the start of the Octagon conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree with General Eisenhower's intention to continue to strike towards Germany as a higher priority than opening the ports. The CCS do note the ports will be needed before bad weather sets in. Both 1st and 3rd Armies report they have the fuel and ammunition needed to advance to the Rhine. Centuries of warfare meant plenty of European borders were good defence lines, putting a hole in the German western defences was considered worth trying for. Clearing the approaches to Antwerp first would give the other German defences time to solidify.

Neither the Germans nor the allies missed the significance of ports in France, after all the Germans kept hold of some to the end and wrecked others. The turn into Brittany instead of to Falaise during the break out and the subsequent capture of Brest was all about ports. The US Army port units were inexperienced, the ports small and/or damaged with only a few weeks to make them work if the 1944 advance was to continue. The result was even if the rail systems were working perfectly the allies were not landing enough supplies to keep advancing in September 1944 but the lack of trucks and non working rail made the port performance irrelevant. While a working French rail system in June 1944 was a direct threat to the beach head, start with German units turning up as units, not partial arrivals that became battle groups only later reassembled as the full unit.

The basic rule for the US Army was it took about 3 weeks to load then completely unload a merchant ship in a well equipped port using experienced workers. That put a major delay in supply times. Dry cargo ships to the UK were taking an average of 59.8 days for a return voyage in 1943. Army dry cargo ships were taking 76.9 days on average to complete a round trip voyage to England in the period January to June 1944, including 15.4 days in English ports and 27.4 days in US ports. War Shipping Administration figures for 1,412 ships completing round voyages to England January 1943 to March 1944 gives the average round trip time as 69.4 days including 18.4 days "in overseas area" but with 5 less days at sea and 5 less days in US ports than the army cargo ships. The explanation appears to be a combination of more ready to ship cargo in the US and lower priority unloading in England. Times would blow out in 1944. On 17th August to give an idea of the shipping situation a ship, presumably loaded with medical supplies arrives in Europe on this day, it finally begins unloading on 10th December.

Supply depot in Germany to rail head was days, assuming the rail lines were open. US was rail to port depot, load ship, ship across ocean, unload ship to port depot, rail to supply depot and unloaded.

When it comes to the ports the allies tried various options, so on 2nd October Le Havre opens as a US port, in the first 3 months of 1945 35.2% of cargo handled will be unloaded via DUKWs. On 15th October the very small port of St Brieue is closed, it was opened on 16th September, unloading 9,521 tons at an average of 317 tons/day.

Antwerp was under continual V-1 and V-2 attack, so not all of its 242 berths were put back into action while the decision was taken to only unload ammunition there for the AA guns defending it, other ports handle the army ammunition, except for special cases. To help clear the cargo the Albert canal is to be brought into operation, hopefully by mid December. Antwerp actually makes the rail congestion problem worse since it shortens travel time, leaving the depots that much less time to unload trains. Personnel are landed at Le Havre or southern France.

In January 1945 the workers at Antwerp will go on strike due to a lack of food, clothing and coal, where possible the allies were using civil workers in the ports and rail systems. However for example as of 24th November 1944 to run the US part of Le Havre the US Army is using 8,919 men.

Providing spare parts for the port cranes etc. was a problem.

And they ran out of infantry replacements so were using untrained clerks as meatshields by late 1944. During the Bulge the US even had to beg the Brits for 400 Sherman tanks even as thousands of Shermans were waiting in depots in the US to go to Europe.

US army supply and loss rates were set based on North African experience, in particular the large amount of ammunition sent but not used, it took a long time to ship it back out. Changing the rates required evidence, June/July 1944, transmission of that to Washington followed by action in the US, followed by shipment and unloading. The failure to open enough ports early resulted in units being sent to the south of France and to Britain. There had been little maintenance done to French roads in 4 years.

The US Army had hit its manpower ceiling in 1944, the first warnings of what this would mean had been in September 1943. In April 1944 a meeting Washington with the European and Mediterranean Theatre of Operations representatives was told that from now on only replacements for existing units would be forthcoming, requests for additional men would have to be found by using existing resources more efficiently or reallocation of existing manpower. The days of expansion were over. The European Theatre of Operations command noted the report but did not make any changes.

On 1st September there were 42,000 infantry replacements versus requirement of 55,000 only 15,000 of these had the MOS 745 classification, a rifleman. The theatre will retrain 14,400 men as riflemen in September and October. Mainly from replacements originally meant for other ground service arms. A retraining system was set up for the rest of the war. The 400 Sherman transfer was the direct result of the assumed low casualty rates.

I was talking about Russia, but in 1940 the Germans went further faster than the Wallies in 1944 as they didn't go out of their way to wreck infrastructure for months.

They did wreck things it was going to be or was in enemy hands, by the way the Red Army recovered Soviet territory in 1943/44 at about the same rate the Germans took it in 1941/42

First of all they weren't trying to conquer the world, that was a British fabrication: Second I don't disagree that serious mistakes were made by Germany though they lacked options to do much else given how anti-negotiation the Allies were,

Hitler's war aims were somewhat opportunistic and shifting , in the 1930's he wanted revenge on France and conquering the east. Ruling the world was held off while ruling Europe was achieved. How about outlining the terms the Germans were prepared to offer the allies? Or the ones they would accept instead of allies would not negotiate. And what happens when the extermination system is discovered.

but the US had the war on easy mode and still managed to fuck up.

The Germans were really good even superior but the US had it easy?

In fact had Hitler not been so obsessed with Antwerp in 1944 and adopted Rundstedt's plan the 90 division gamble could have seen the US army effectively collapse in NW Europe via the Ardennes offensive.

Except the majority of US forces were south, it was the Commonwealth forces that stood to be pocketed, also as the Ardennes showed, the entire attack had to be in close to unflyable weather.

Also it wasn't logistics that stopped the Germans in 1941 or 1942, it was Hitler's poor choices to try and clear the flanks before going for Moscow and the obsession with trying to bag prisoners instead sticking to plan Blau.

No, Army Group Centre was staying where it was until the rail head was brought forward, the lack of winter clothing shows even months later how bad the supply situation was. In 1942 it became supplies and lack of troops, 60 mile wide divisional fronts for example. The Luftwaffe largely becoming battlefield support to compensate.

Otherwise the USSR was on the verge of implosion by late 1942 economically due to the loss of territory, population, farmland, resources, etc.

As of around May 1942 the Germans needed to keep about half the front quiet and used multiple axis allied armies elsewhere to be able to attack, mostly taking open terrain, meantime the USSR was down to around 2/3 its pre war population. The death toll in Leningrad gives an indication of how tough it was to crack the Soviet system.

The Mediterranean supply book: the MTO had been in combat since November 1942 and only some select combat units and personnel were sent to Britain for Normandy. So the ETO supply system was green. The French forces coming from the MTO had few support units and concentrated on creating more combat units. As for the selective unloading,

On 6th June landings begin, by the end of the day 19 US wounded have made it back to England, Portland Harbour.

On 7th June at 18:00 hours shellfire forces the ships offshore from Omaha beach to withdraw. Even without this interference the build up of ships waiting to unload is growing beyond what was planned.

On 8 June the first LSTs were dried out as the supply organisation tried to be selective in unloading ships, but the attempts were heavily compromised by a lack of manifests and even ship names. The same sort of problems as the trans Atlantic shipping had in 1942. Hence the tours of the anchorage in a landing craft and using loud hailers to discover what was out there.

On 10th June LCTs and LSTs began to be unloaded in arrival order, on 11th June this was extended to all ships. On 12th June blackout restrictions were eased and by 15th June the shipping backlog had been cleared.

On 12th June the confusion on the English side of the channel, caused by the slow return of ships reached its height. The situation is not helped by units failing to strip out items to be sent as cargo, instead taking all the equipment into the marshalling areas. Units are shipped in whatever shipping is available and not in the planned order.

15 September 1944 SHAEF gains control of 6th Army Group, on 20 November COMZ the US ETO supply system gains control of SOLOC the supply system for 6h AG.

Mid September the rail lines from the Mediterranean coast are to Bourg, 220 miles inland, 1,500 tons/day since the locomotives could not cross some of the repaired bridges. To handle the supplies the army opens up the never used WWI US Army depot at Mirimas, 20 miles from Marseilles.

On 25th September rail from the South has reached Lyon, offering 3,000 tons/day. In late September 12th Army Group calculated its 22 divisions plus air force plus local supply units needed around 19,000 tons per day to resume the offensive.

On 4th October the southern rail capacity is nearing 8,350 tons/day enabling trucks to go back to short haul services, as a result the "Flaming Bomb Express" truck service is terminated 4 days later

By mid October rail capacity from the Mediterranean ports is at 12,000 tons/day

At the end of October the plans for mid November have 21st Army Group with 18 1/3 divisions, 12th Army Group with 30 divisions and 6th Army Group with 16 divisions. Despite the supply problems the armies have adapted, reducing their consumption, 12th Army group now has 155,000 tons of reserve supplies, 1st army has 7 days of fuel, 3rd less than 2 days. In Marseilles there has been congestion caused by a backlog in clearing cargo from the port area even though the railway running north can now handle 12,000 tons/day it will remain the supply bottleneck in the south for the remainder of the war, it does not have the capacity to clear the cargo from a fully working Marseilles, so once Antwerp opens ships will be unloaded in the north where possible.

US Army Cargo landed 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 excluding bulk POL and vehicles in Long Tons / personnel landed
South France 4,123,794 / 905,512
Cherbourg 2,697,341 / 95,923 (67,022 personnel in September 1944)
Antwerp 2,658,000 / 333 ("little momentum" before mid December 1944)
Omaha 1,264,990 / 801,000
Le Havre 1,168,171 / 1,014,036
Rouen 1,164,511 / 82,199 (Mainly a POL port)
Utah 726,014 / 801,005
Ghent 614,861 / 6
Minor Ports in Normandy 600,884 / 788
Brittany Ports 253,837 / 1378
Total 15,272,412 long tons, 3,702,180 personnel. Utah and Omaha also handled 287,500 vehicles.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Also keep in mind the Germans advanced MUCH further over far worse infrastructure than the Allies did in 1944 France and had less issues with supply.

I was talking about Russia, but in 1940 the Germans went further faster than the Wallies in 1944 as they didn't go out of their way to wreck infrastructure for months.

Yes because advancing over the same infrastructure in the same country 4 years apart is that wildly different. You also act like the Luftwaffe wasn't smashing up infrastructure either.

[All emphases added -- Thump]

Would you please make up your mind?

 

[SaparotRob]

[All emphases added -- Thump]

Would you please make up your mind?

Sorry. I couldn't help myself.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Sorry. I couldn't help myself.

 

[wiking85]

[All emphases added -- Thump]

Would you please make up your mind?

The first quote was about Russia, the second was about how the Germans didn't conduct a Transportation Plan level wrecking of infrastructure for months ahead of the ground campaign, and final one was that they did attack infrastructure during the operation, just not to the level that the Allies did in 1944 in the run up to the invasion so were able to cope with the issues their bombing caused because it wasn't as extensive. Part of logistical planning is to also avoid wrecking that which you will need to advance and containing attacks to that which is necessary to conduct operations. Also to avoid overextending yourselves logistically, especially when you could also simply seize at low cost a major port and the waterway that services it, in pursuit of a logistically unsustainable military operation, which is what the Allies did in NWE in 1944 and suffered the consequences as a result. That said the Germans also did the same things in November-December 1941 and suffered the consequences as a result. They too made serious mistakes, it's just that they had less room for error than the Allies did. My entire point though hinges on the narrative that the Allies were fantastic at logistics and the Germans sucked, which the historical record doesn't support, especially with the NWE campaign of 1944. Barbarossa wasn't the logistical disaster that it is often portrayed as, though it did cause considerable issues, which compounded with Hitler's serious operational/strategic mistakes.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The first quote was about Russia, the second was about how the Germans didn't conduct a Transportation Plan level wrecking of infrastructure for months ahead of the ground campaign, and final one was that they did attack infrastructure during the operation, just not to the level that the Allies did in 1944 in the run up to the invasion so were able to cope with the issues their bombing caused because it wasn't as extensive. Part of logistical planning is to also avoid wrecking that which you will need to advance and containing attacks to that which is necessary to conduct operations.

It's all quite well to write that from the comfort of a computer desk, but the only thing harder than an amphibious landing is an amphibious retreat. The Allies figured that in order to slow the flow of reinforcements and supplies the Transportation Plan had to be undertaken. The alternative, allowing Panzer divisions to attack the beachhead intact and in formation, was deemed to risk more than saving the road and rail net for an advance that might be snuffed out before it started.

Also to avoid overextending yourselves logistically, especially when you could also simply seize at low cost a major port and the waterway that services it, in pursuit of a logistically unsustainable military operation, which is what the Allies did in NWE in 1944 and suffered the consequences as a result. That said the Germans also did the same things in November-December 1941 and suffered the consequences as a result. They too made serious mistakes, it's just that they had less room for error than the Allies did.

Not seizing a port was certainly a major problem, but to be fair, after the seizure of Cherbourg, the Germans made it clear that any port seized was going to be out of service for a while.

The Allies got lucky grabbing Antwerp on the fly. I think their biggest blunder was not immediately clearing the Scheldt as a priority even over M-G.

My entire point though hinges on the narrative that the Allies were fantastic at logistics and the Germans sucked, which the historical record doesn't support, especially with the NWE campaign of 1944. Barbarossa wasn't the logistical disaster that it is often portrayed as, though it did cause considerable issues, which compounded with Hitler's serious operational/strategic mistakes.

I don't think either side were geniuses, but I think it's obvious the Allies were superior at the practice. Their supply lines, after all, went all the way back to Ohio and Michigan and Dallas. And that's not even counting what the Americans did in the Pacific.